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ABSTRACT
Cultivating Intelligent Consumption: The United 
States Food Administration and Food Control During 
World War I 
James H. Smith
This dissertation examines government food control in the United States during the First 
World War. More specifically, it looks at the food conservation program, and the 
associated propaganda, formulated by the United States Food Administration (USFA). 
The USFA was a wartime government agency headed by future president Herbert 
Hoover. I argue that the philosophy guiding the Food Administration’s food control 
program was clearly influenced by a particular strain of progressivism that men like 
Hoover subscribed to. Using the input of experts in various fields such as nutrition, 
physiology, and advertising, the government was able to present a message to the 
American public that both generated an emotional response to act and educated people 
in a new, scientific approach to eating. Such an approach allowed Hoover to avoid 
imposing mandatory rationing, thus preserving the freedom from government 
intervention into the personal lives of American citizens. In addition to examining the 
various dimensions of Food Administration propaganda that attempted to stir the 
emotions and enlighten the intelligence of the people, this dissertation also examines a 
third theme that is found in the messaging. Hoover and his agency also worked to get 
Americans to think more about how their food choices might impact people and events 
overseas. Through their propaganda the Food Administration sought to get people to 
think more globally when considering the impact of their food choices. Though the Food 
Administration itself was relatively short-lived, the impact it had on the shaping of 
modern food culture was rather large. 
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Introduction:
When the United States officially joined the Great War in April of 1917, the 
government moved quickly to initiate an unprecedented (and controversial) program to 
control the American food system. Never before had the federal government requested 
this level of power to determine what and how Americans would eat. To achieve this 
goal it formed the United States Food Administration. This wartime agency was tasked 
with a number of responsibilities, including the direct control of the domestic production 
and distribution of certain foodstuffs such as wheat, the prevention of hoarding and 
profiteering at the wholesale level, as well as the coordination of Allied purchases of 
American food supplies. In addition, the Food Administration was responsible for 
developing and administering a program that would attempt to control the amount and 
types of food the American public ate. The overall objective was to create a surplus of 
foodstuffs that could then be shipped to Europe in order to feed both the soldiers and 
the citizens of the Allied nations. In order to secure this cooperation, the government 
worked to craft a message for Americans to show them that the food conservation 
program not only provided them an opportunity to express their patriotism, but it also 
gave them a chance to practice new modes of efficiency within their homes.  
Additionally, by cutting back on certain foodstuffs, Americans were led to believe that 
they were playing a crucial role in making their country an influential force among the 
world’s major powers.
While certain government regulations were placed upon food producers, 
Americans’ food consumption habits were to be altered through their voluntary 
cooperation with the United States government. This approach, as it related to individual 
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conservation, reflected both an appreciation for long-standing American political 
tradition, as well as the modern progressive outlook of those individuals who were 
tapped to lead the Food Administration. This particular agency, along with the host of 
other wartime measures initiated by the government, represented a dramatic increase in 
the power and influence of the federal government. Such steps, especially in the midst 
of a war that was not universally supported by the public, had the potential of creating 
further internal unrest. A fundamental suspicion and fear of a powerful central 
governmental authority could be traced all the way back to the nation’s origins. With the 
Food Administration in particular, the potential was there for federal power to reach all 
the way into the homes of American citizens. Herbert Hoover, the man that would come 
to lead the food control agency, appreciated such an outlook, and his particular 
approach to implementing government food control reflected a strain of progressive 
thought that envisioned a limited government role in addressing social crisis. While the 
Old World nations of Europe, the enemy Germany as well as our Allies, were forced to 
impose various degrees of rationing upon its citizens, American food conservation 
would be based on the voluntary cooperation of the people. In this scenario, the power 
of the government would be limited to providing expert guidance to educate the public 
on the reasons for and methods of food conservation. Once educated, the belief was 
that Americans would willingly comply with government conservation guidelines.  
With this particular approach, it was believed that individual liberty would be 
preserved. Thus, in addition serving the explicit goal of increasing food shipments for 
people in need overseas, the success of this particular approach to food conservation 
would also serve as proof of the superiority of the American democratic political system 
 2
over other, Old World systems. In addition, there were other, less explicit motives 
behind the particular nature of the American government’s food control program. As 
stated previously, the nation’s involvement in the First World War was not universally 
supported by the population. This reflected an overall tension that had existed in 
American society throughout the early twentieth century. It was during this period that 
the nation had experienced an enormous wave of immigration that contributed its 
overall ethnic and cultural diversity. America was increasingly transforming into a 
modern, urban country which led to a certain level of unease within mainstream 
American society. The Food Administration campaign was viewed by many as an 
opportunity to forge solidarity amongst the citizenry, not just to support the war effort, 
but to foster the creation of a more homogeneous society moving forward. In addition, 
those behind the wartime food conservation program saw it as an opportunity to 
convince the American public that the message of efficient, economical behavior could 
become a normal part of life after the conflict was over. 
Thus, as suggested above, the U.S. Food Administration was in many ways a 
progressive project. Many scholars have studied the relationship between the 
progressive movement and World War I, examining both how the war impacted the 
movement and how progressive thought influenced wartime government policy.  The 
Progressive Era was a period of American history that roughly encompassed the years 
1890 to 1920.  Largely characterized as an attempt to deal with the drastic changes 
brought about by rapid industrialization, the period is marked with a myriad of 
complexities and contradictions that have perplexed and challenged scholars to this 
day.  Was it a movement for social justice or was it an attempt at large-scale social 
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coercion and control?  Was “big business” the target of reform, or were they actually 
calling the shots?  Who exactly were the progressives?  Was there even a progressive 
movement at all?  While historians continue to struggle with such questions, there is no 
doubt that American society at the turn of the twentieth century experienced long-lasting 
changes that were largely headed by an emerging group of reformers who had a faith in 
the power of government to exert its influence on society.1
Beginning in the nineteen sixties historians such as Robert Wiebe attempted to 
reformulate Richard Hofstadter’s famous “status anxiety” interpretation.  While he 
maintained the critical eye towards progressivism that had existed in Hofstadter’s The 
Age of Reform, Wiebe disagreed with the idea that progressives were largely backward-
looking moralists driven by status anxiety.  Rather, he argues that the era was created 
by a “new middle class” of professionals and social scientists who were determined to 
turn away from the past and establish order in a rapidly modernizing society. Wiebe 
relies heavily on social theory to explain the development of progressivism.  Rapid 
industrialization at the turn of the century disrupted traditional social structures, 
threatening small, autonomous communities and resulting in social chaos, political 
corruption and economic instability.   2
 Helen Veit, “Victory Over Ourselves: American Food and Progressivism in the  Era of the Great War,” 1
PhD Dissertation, Yale University (2008), vii-xvii.
 Richard Hofstadter, Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955); One of the 2
most prominent works to present this reinterpretation of Progressivism. Hofstader challenged the 
traditional scholarship that viewed Progressives as common Americans. Rather, he argued that the 
reform movement was urban in nature and was composed primarily of members of the traditional middle 
class who by the turn of the twentieth century were experiencing status anxiety. According to Hofstadter, 
ministers, lawyers and college professors, long seen as leaders of the community, were increasingly 
being overshadowed by the likes of political bosses and their allies in the business community. From this 
perspective, Hofstadter was able to take a more critical look at the movement and point out some of the 
more negative aspects of Progressivism. He saw the Progressive as moralistic and culturally intolerant 
middle class Protestants whose reforms were more about self-help than curing society’s ills.
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A key belief that existed amongst this new, forward-looking group of reformers 
that included physicians, scientists and social workers was that government action was 
needed to impose order and stability on this increasingly urbanized society.  Wiebe 
describes the fundamental transition that the U.S. government experiences during the 
early twentieth century, marked by an increased, direct involvement in society’s 
operation and a newly powerful executive branch. He also makes key connections 
between the social thought of the new middle class and the era’s broader intellectual 
changes.  The new social reformers, with their faith in the power of government 
intervention, fit into the new intellectual trend that offered up a challenge to Social 
Darwinism.  Wiebe’s work is important in many ways, particularly because it was one of 
the first studies to fully describe the impulses that drove the new middle class to change 
society.  3
While some scholars point to the beginning of U.S. involvement in World War I as 
the end point of the Progressive Era, it is hard to deny that progressive ideals continued 
to exert their influence.   Indeed, some argue that World War I was in many ways the 
culmination of the era of reform.  They often point to developments such as the passage 
of Prohibition and women’s suffrage measures as evidence that the progressive spirit 
carried on after the U.S. joined in the fight.   Entry into the war certainly divided the 4
movement, but President Wilson was able to place U.S. involvement in progressive 
terms.  The government quickly established bodies such as the War Industries Board 
 Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Macmillan, 1967); For a more recent 3
overview of the Progressive Era, see Michael McGerr’s A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the 
Progressive Movement in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).
 McGerr, A Fierce Discontent; Ellis Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History 4
of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917-1933 (New York: Waveland Press, 1997).
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and the Committee on Public Information to control production and rally public support.  
As a result, the war effort was organized along bureaucratic lines, and appeals for 
public cooperation were done so in the language of the Progressive Era: the war was 
part of a great moral crusade to reform the world and make it “safe for democracy.”  5
More recent works have examined the relationship between the war and progressivism 
in a broader, international context.  Alan Dawley argues that, despite the diversity within 
the movement, progressives were driven by a hope that promoting their ideals at home 
would form the basis of an international campaign of social and moral reform.6
 Scholarship on the work of the United States Food Administration during World 
War I had been relatively limited. Many studies of the American home front during the 
Great War managed to give a passing mention to the government’s food control 
program, but most failed to provide an in-depth analysis of the Food Administration or 
explore its relationship with larger social, cultural and political forces. In recent years, 
however, this has begun to change. The structure of the Food Administration itself, 
where much of the agenda generated by the national offices in Washington was actually 
carried out at the state and community level, has given rise to a number of works that 
have examined the food control program in this localized context. Leslie DeBauche has 
shown that the government’s food control agency and the burgeoning film industry 
forged a strong relationship during the war, while Celia Kingsbury examined Food 
Administration propaganda to show how the government’s “campaign for scientific 
cooking” became part of a campaign linking food conservation with military victory. In 
 Ibid.5
 Alan Dawley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution (Princeton, NJ: 6
Princeton University Press, 2003).
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terms of the Food Administration’s links to progressive ideals, the recent work of 
Elizabeth Cafer Du Plessis looked at how the “search for order” provided an idealogical 
basis for mobilizing food production and led to a greater emphasis on industrial 
agricultural practices. Helen Veit argues that the government’s effort to change how 
American’s ate was a progressive project and contributed to a lasting American 
obsession with food and science.  7
By focusing in on the propaganda campaign developed and implemented by the 
U.S. Food Administration, this project will attempt to answer two major questions.  First, 
how did the United States government work to control the food behavior of its citizens 
during World War I?  Second, how did the progressive movement inform the message 
presented to the American people by the U.S. Food Administration?  Like the work of Du 
Plessis and Veit, the goal of this study is to show that in many ways the Food 
Administration represented a continuation of Progressive Era ideals, in which an active 
central government, guided by emerging middle class experts and professionals, had a 
greater role in American society. Further, this study will show how the wartime food 
control program, with its reliance on nutritional science to shape policy and use of 
modern advertising and publicity techniques to shape public attitudes played a key role 
in the development of modern food behaviors. Today, many Americans place a great 
 Celia Malone Kingsbury, For Home and Country: World War I Propaganda on the Home Front (Lincoln, 7
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010): 32; for examples of studies of the Food Administration at the 
local or state level, see Rae Katherine Eighmey’s Food Will Win the War: Minnesota Crops, Cooks, and 
Conservation During World War I, (St. Paul, MN: MHS, 2010), Angela Jill Cooley’s “Hearth, Home, and 
Hoover: The Politics of Food in Alabama, 1896-1919,” The Southern Historian, vol. 27, (2006), 38-58, 
Erika Janik, “Food Will Win the War: Food Conservation in World War I Wisconsin,” The Wisconsin 
Magazine of History, vol. 93, no. 3 (2010), 17-27, or Joseph Carruth, “World War I Propaganda and Its 
Effects in Arkansas,” The Arkansas Historical Quarterly, vol. LVI, no. 4 (2007) 385-398; Leslie M. De 
Bauche, Reel Patriotism: The Movies and World War I (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1997); Veit, “Victory Over Ourselves.”
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deal of emphasis on the nutritional composition of foods in assessing its value. This 
phenomenon, referred to as “nutritionism” by many food experts, can trace its origins 
back to the early twentieth century and in particular the work done by the U.S. Food 
Administration.
This study will attempt to distinguish itself from recent scholarship by focusing on 
government propaganda and the message it was trying to convey to the American 
public regarding the food choices it made during the war.  Whereas Du Plessis focuses 
primarily on the impact of “progressive science” and government food control on the 
agricultural industry and food production, my study will focus on the opposite end of the 
food chain: consumption.  In addition, this project is different from Helen Veit’s recent 
work in terms of how it assesses the specific importance of the U.S. Food 
Administration.  Veit’s study focuses much of her attention on the progressive influence 
on American food culture that preceded the war by many years. According to her, by the 
time the government created the Food Administration, the public welcomed the 
opportunity to participate in conservation efforts. Here, the wartime government of 
Woodrow Wilson will play a more central role, as one of the major themes I will be 
exploring is they ways in which the USFA used propaganda to address public resistance 
to this unprecedented government action. In utilizing the services of leading experts in 
emerging fields of science, nutrition, public policy and advertising, the government 
actively sought to promote a particular type of food consumption by presenting a 
carefully crafted message via a number of outlets. This work presents and examines 
three distinct themes within the government food control propaganda. First, the Food 
Administration contained messages and imagery that presented a strong emotional 
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appeal to the American public. With the purpose of arousing the “war conscious” of the 
population, much of propaganda contained militaristic and patriotic language to drive 
home the idea that each and every food choice being made at home would have an 
impact on the outcome of the war being fought overseas. The second aspect of Food 
Administration propaganda was to explain the “hows” and “whys” of food conservation 
by educating the American public in the ways of scientific eating based on the principles 
of the emerging field of nutrition. Finally, an important aspect of the government 
conservation program emphasized the global dimensions of the wartime food crisis. 
Americans were bombarded with propaganda that drove home the idea that their nation 
was part of a global community and poised to take a leadership role once the war was 
over. The goal of this project is to help provide a better understanding of the political, 
social and cultural forces that helped alter Americans’ relationship both with their 
government and their dinner plate.
The Food Administration was headed by Herbert Hoover, the engineer and future 
president who by 1917 had risen to international fame with his relief work in war-torn 
Belgium.  The agency was headquartered in Washington, D.C. and had representatives 
stationed in each of the Allied nations.  Each state also had an office, which worked 
closely with the leadership in Washington.  The officers of the agency were primarily 
volunteers, and most were recognized for their professional expertise in a particular 
field, including social scientists, nutritionists, home economists and advertising 
executives.  The operation they directed was well-organized and productive, a model of 
progressive efficiency. 
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This project analyzes the various ways in which the government, through the 
United States Food Administration, attempted to influence American food behavior 
during World War I. More specifically, it explores the propaganda produced by the U.S. 
Food Administration during the First World War. In being committed to the avoidance of 
a compulsory rationing program, the government had to convince Americans to 
voluntarily conserve food and thus had sell the public on the apparent benefits of 
following Food Administration guidelines. The government attempted to reach 
Americans through a number of different mediums. Experts in the fields of nutrition and 
various social sciences advised Americans through the printed page and the spoken 
voice. The Food Administration coordinated the publication of articles in both popular 
and professional periodicals, and sponsored various public lectures. In addition, the 
government worked closely with the film industry to convey its message on food control 
to the masses. It also attempted to educate the public through direct interaction with its 
activities at a number of state fairs and festivals. The Food Administration also worked 
to target specific groups with its propaganda.  It produced textbooks and other materials 
for college courses and created divisions within its structure to deal solely with African 
Americans and working class groups.  
  The first chapter of this work examines the events surrounding the creation of 
the U.S. Food Administration. The issue of a government-directed food control program 
was a hotly-debated topic in the spring and summer of 1917 and reflected the tensions 
surrounding both U.S. involvement in the war, as well as the growing concerns of a food 
crisis at home. This chapter examines the political debate leading up to the passage of 
the bill that created the Food Administration looks at the nature of the political resistance 
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to the Lever Food Control Bill, as well as the growing social tensions over rising food 
prices. It also examines how the Wilson administration attempted to shape the nature of 
the debate and appeal directly to the public to convince them that such legislation was 
necessary. Finally, the chapter introduces a number of the major figures within the 
agency and provides some insight into their backgrounds in an attempt to associate 
them with the progressive movement.
Chapter two begins the in-depth examination of Food Administration propaganda.  
Specifically, it looks at the aspects of the agency’s message that was aimed at eliciting 
an emotional response from its audience. It shows how the Food Administration utilized 
the expertise of the burgeoning modern advertising industry to sell the food 
conservation campaign to the American people. To accomplish this goal the government 
utilized nearly every conceivable medium, including a motion picture industry still in its 
infancy. In addition, the government produced numerous examples of printed materials, 
including posters that were put on display throughout the nation. Finally, this chapter 
examines a particularly intimate aspect of the Food Administration, the home card 
campaign which placed the government directly inside the home of Americans. 
The third chapter focuses on aspects of food conservation propaganda that 
sought to educate the American people on the specific actions that had to be taken in 
order to comply with government guidelines. Utilizing the input and guidance of various 
experts in the fields of biological and nutritional sciences, the Food Administration 
generated propaganda that aimed to shape American food behaviors that took a more 
scientific or rational approach to eating. Particular attention is given to efforts made by 
the government to reach and educate Americans attending state and county fairs, as 
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well as children attending schools at all levels. Chapter four looks at the transnational 
dimensions of Food Administration propaganda. Working closely with its counterparts in 
Britain and France, the U.S. government attempted to connect food conservation and 
substitution at home with the broader global struggle against German aggression.  Not 
only did the Food Administration work closely with Allied food controllers and media 
outlets to portray the food situation in England, France and Italy as being extremely 
perilous, it also made sure the American public knew that the fruits of their sacrifice 
were going to a worthy recipient that was conscious and appreciative of American 
efforts.  Rather than being a burden, the program created by the Food Administration 
offered the nation an opportunity display its strength and efficiency to the rest of the 
world.
The U.S. Food Administration not only succeeded in convincing the majority of 
Americans that they needed to at least consider the impact their dietary choices might 
have on the immediate outcome of the First World War, it was perhaps the first time the 
American public on such a broad and comprehensive scale was presented with a new 
way to approach the subject of food itself. In many ways, the effects on modern 
American food culture are still behind felt today.
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Chapter 1 - “Food Dictator or Food Administrator?: The Creation of Government 
Wartime Food Control” 
On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. By that time the 
Great War had been raging for nearly three years, with the Entente Powers led by 
France and Britain battling the Central Powers led by Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
From the start, both the American public and its political leadership had proclaimed a 
strong desire to remain out of the military conflict. Woodrow Wilson’s reelection 
campaign of 1916 used the slogan “He Kept Us Out of War” to win another presidential 
term. However, while the U.S. government maintained its neutrality and avoided 
sending troops into the fray, American money and supplies were increasingly being 
shipped across the Atlantic to aid the French and the British. The Germans, who had 
implemented a blockade to prevent such actions, initiated submarine warfare against 
ships coming from the United States, which resulted in a number of incidents where 
German u-boats sunk American ships, as well as the British passenger ship the 
Lusitania. Over time, as the number of attacks increased, more and more Americans, 
including the president himself, abandoned their neutral stance and began pushing for 
full-scale military involvement. In March of 1917, the U.S. intercepted the “Zimmerman 
telegram” and was quickly published in newspapers. The German note proposed to 
Mexico a joint attack against the United States. This was the final straw, and within a 
few weeks President Wilson was standing before Congress to request a declaration of 
war.1
 David Kennedy, The First World War and American Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004) 1
10-44.
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Soon after war was declared, President Wilson called upon Congress to give him 
certain powers to control the production, distribution and consumption of food in 
America. The next day, the Council of National Defense--an advisory body created by 
Wilson the previous August for the purposes of planning for the mobilization of the 
American home front in the event of war--contacted Herbert Hoover to request that he 
head up its committee on dealing with the supply of foodstuffs. Hoover, a mining 
engineer from Iowa who was living in London at the time, was already a relatively well-
known figure both at home and abroad. He had achieved international acclaim for his 
humanitarian work as head of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. His experience in 
handling the administration of food relief on such a large scale made him a natural 
choice to tackle the issue of wartime food control back in his home country.2
However, the process of constructing the institutional machinery that would allow 
the president to carry out his objectives would prove quite difficult. Much of the 
justification for implementing a food conservation program at home was based on the 
argument that America’s allies overseas were facing a food crisis. However, Americans 
themselves were facing a food crisis of their own. Rising prices and shortages had 
already led to a series of food riots in some of the nation’s largest cities. Americans 
would be hesitant to cut back when they were already struggling to fill their pantries. 
Still, the power requested by the president over the nation’s food supply was in many 
ways unprecedented. Thus, the White House also faced resistance from those who 
feared such a government agency would put too much authority in the hands of one 
 George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Master of Emergencies, 1917-1918 (New York: W.W. 2
Norton, 1996), 3-6.; David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 114-117.
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person. The result was a heated political struggle and public debate over right of the 
government to have control over the basic of human resources, food. 
This chapter examines this debate and provides insight into the arguments for 
and against legislation that authorized the government to exert control over the nation’s 
food system. It will attempt to show that, for the most part, the confrontation over 
wartime food control was part of a larger conversation about what role, if any, 
government should play in the lives of its people. While those opposed to such a 
measure viewed it as a threat to the basic freedoms of the American people, advocates 
like Herbert Hoover saw it as an opportunity to reaffirm, on a global scale, the 
superiority of American democracy. It also provided an opportunity for progressives to 
use the power of the state and the knowledge of experts to solve various social 
problems such as the one surrounding food. The outcome of this struggle showed that, 
for the most part, the American people were willing to put old fears to rest and follow the 
lead of administrative experts like Hoover in the implementation of this ambitious 
government initiative. 
Most historians of the Progressive Era have agreed that World War I had a 
dramatic impact on the reform movement. However, while some have argued that the 
war signaled the end of the era, others, like Michael McGerr have suggested that the 
war actually strengthened progressivism. In looking at the war itself, historians have 
come to a number of different conclusions as to the event’s impact on American society.  
One of the earliest and most notable works published within the past thirty years comes 
from Ellis Hawley’s The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the 
American People and Their Institutions. In this work, Hawley offers new insight into the 
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war period to show that it was a precursor of the America that would emerge in the 
years following World War II. According to him, the years from 1917 to 1933 saw a 
“quest by men deeply influenced by the organizational experience of a democracy at 
war to draw from that experience a set of liberal ordering mechanisms capable of 
coordinating an expanding organizational economy and fostering peaceful progress.”  
Not only did this experience lead to an attempt to balance laissez-faire with overbearing 
statism on the domestic side, it lead to an attempt to balance isolationism with 
internationalism in the international sphere. Not only does the story of the Food 
Administration reflect the tensions between direct state intervention and concern for a 
central government with too much power, it also expressed a the desire held by many 
progressives for the United States to become more active in global affairs both during 
and after the conflict.3
Ronald Schaffer argues that World War I caused a social and political revolution 
in America in which a wartime welfare state was created with pervasive federal 
government control. Looking at a number of different contexts, from the farm to the 
battlefield, Schaffer develops two major themes. One deals with the government’s 
management of the war, while the other deals with Americans’ use of the conflict to 
advance their own personal agendas. He looks at the work of councils of defense, 
which were created by state and local governments and used their powers to intimidate 
citizens and silence dissent. He also discusses the way in which the war produced a 
welfare state for business, in which large companies were able to obtain huge 
 see Michael McGerr’s A Fierce Discontent: The Rise and Fall of the Progressive Movement in America, 3
1870-1920, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Ellis Hawley, The Great War and the Search for a 
Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1992), 8-15. 
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government contracts while eliminating competition. In many ways, what Schaffer 
describes is a continuation of progressive desires to create a more uniform, efficient 
society. In addition to describing the war as a climax of the progressive movement, 
Schaffer finds that much of the revolutionary changes lasted well beyond the end of 
hostilities and could be seen in the policies that shaped both the New Deal and the 
society during the Second World War. Alan Dawley has also examined the war’s 
broader impact on American society. He describes a conflict caused by the 
contradictions of the liberal state and the strains of American involvement in world 
politics through the mid-1920s. Domestically, such contradictions can be seen in a 
reform movement committed to addressing inequality within an economic system that 
caused such disparities. From an international standpoint, the conflict arose from a 
nation with a long-standing anti-imperialist tradition coming to grips with its new role as 
a global power. However, Dawley sees the attempt to reform American government by 
middle- and working-class Americans as short-lived. According to him, the immediate 
postwar period saw a return by ruling elites to laissez-faire economics and social 
repression.4
With the vision and leadership of Herbert Hoover, the U.S. Food Administration’s 
food conservation campaign reflected a particular brand of progressivism, one in which 
the heavy hand of the state was avoided in favor of a government program shaped by 
experts that relied on the voluntary cooperation of the public. Joan Hoff Wilson was one 
of the first scholars to place Hoover and his career as both a private and public figure 
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within the context of the progressive movement. From his earliest days as a child of a 
Quaker family in rural Iowa, to his coming of age in California as a student at Stanford 
University, to his experiences as a successful mining engineer, Hoover developed the 
belief that a country populated with intelligent citizens committed to a philosophy of 
“cooperative individualism,” and guided by a corporate state, would allow the United 
States to emerge as a powerful, modern nation. Such an arrangement, in Hoover’s 
eyes, would allow decisions made by the federal government to be executed in a 
decentralized fashion, while also allowing the nation to preserve some of its best 
traditional values, such as individual liberty. According to Hoff-Wilson, the outbreak of 
the First World War accelerated the formulation of Hoover’s progressive political views, 
and his experience as the head of the Food Administration affirmed the efficacy of two 
methods that could be used to maintain a balance between the extremes of state 
socialism and monopoly capitalism. First, was the use of publicity to mold public 
philosophy, and the second was the utilization of voluntary decentralized groups to carry 
out nationally-coordinated programs. These methods would serve as the basis for the 
government’s program to promote food conservation amongst the American population.     5
Even before the United States had officially entered the Great War, Hoover had 
expressed to the Council of National Defense his concerns about a coming food crisis in 
Europe and suggested how America might factor into a relief program in the event it 
joined the war. His words provided keen insight into the ideas and attitudes that would 
 Joan Hoff-Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive, (Boston: Little Brown, 1975), 3-78; Robert D. 5
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guide both the formation and nature of wartime government food control in the United 
States. While a wartime emergency had created the need for active government control 
of both the production and consumption of food, a prevailing faith in the unique 
democratic nature of American society led experts like Hoover to advocate that such a 
program would be distinguished from its European counterparts. For while supporters of 
food control found it impossible to achieve the goal of feeding the Allies without 
suppressing consumption, the method of such supression would be “indirect.” Thus, 
while the governments of Germany and Belgium were relying on strict rationing 
programs to conserve food supplies, the conservation of food in the United States would 
rely on the voluntary cooperation of its citizens.6
Hoover gladly heeded his nation’s call and quickly began gathering data on the 
food situations facing the Allies. For three weeks he consulted with officials from Britain, 
France, and Italy. What he found was troubling. A combination of poor harvests, a 
diversion of agricultural manpower and a disruption of normal trade networks had put 
the nations of England, France and Italy on the verge of famine. Food supplies would 
not last beyond September if imports from the United States were not dramatically 
increased. By the end of April--before he even arrived on American shores--Hoover, 
then labeled as head of the “American Food Board” was explaining to the American 
public what was to be expected of them. He asserted that Americans needed to engage 
 The Council of National Defense was created by the Wilson Administration in the summer of 1916. It 6
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in “rigorous self-sacrifice” to reduce their consumption of food by “economizing” and 
eliminating waste. For Hoover, the stakes could not be higher.7
In addition to the immediate needs of a wartime emergency, food control for 
expert administrators like Hoover had broad implications, not only for American society, 
but for the rest of the world. Looking simply beyond the war’s outcome, Hoover argued 
that the future stability of western nations hinged on achieving the goal of reducing food 
consumption. Failure to solve this problem, he warned, “may possibly result in the 
collapse of everything we hold dear in civilization.” For the U.S. specifically, there were 
economic and moral advantages for such a program, and the two were closely linked. 
He emphasized the “importance of reducing extravagance and waste” to prevent the 
overall costs of war from causing deeper problems for the American economy. 
“Furthermore,” claimed Hoover, “the moral advantage of a disciplined people in 
preparation for after-war competition is of great importance.” Thus, by making their 
kitchens less wasteful and more efficient, American citizens would not only be helping 
its nation achieve victory in war, they would also be helping the U.S. position itself as a 
legitimate power in the postwar global landscape.8
Hoover arrived in the United States at the beginning of May and quickly 
established a headquarters at the New Willard Hotel in the nation’s capital. On May 
19th, both President Wilson and Hoover issued statements outlining in detail the 
executive branch’s plan for food control. The president also presented his reasons for 
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requesting such unprecedented powers to regulate the nation’s food system. The 
statements reflected a strong belief in the ability of a democratic society, composed of 
an informed public and led by expert government administrators, to overcome obstacles 
with as little disruption and inconvenience as possible. This was a prime example of 
progressive thought put in action. In general, the powers were to be used in order to 
prevent misunderstandings and assure cooperation from all aspects of the food chain, 
from farmer to consumer. With these powers, the president sought the ability, through 
the U.S. Food Administration, to do such things as prevent speculation, control prices, 
prohibit wasteful use of foods, and, only if necessary, take direct control of certain 
aspects of the system. In this way, governmental authority could be focused and used 
sparingly, reserved only for the “small and selfish minority” that refused to “put the 
Nation’s interests above personal advantage.”9
Hoover also stressed that such powers needed to be granted to the president by 
Congress so that a competent administration could be established. For him, there were 
two general aspects to competent war administration: a centralized and single 
responsibility (in this case, food control) followed by a delegation of this responsibility to 
a number of decentralized administrative organs. In explaining his vision for wartime 
government food control, Hoover presented his particular take on progressive reform. 
He laid out what he called the “five cardinal principles of food administration,” which 
reflected the view that the food problems facing America could be solved with a limited 
government response. He stressed that the solution rested on the effective coordination 
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of existing institutions and the unified cooperation of a willing public. First, Hoover 
discouraged the use of terms like “food dictator” or “food controller” to describe his role. 
Only “food administrator” accurately reflected his position. He made it clear that 
personal gain was not a driving force behind him getting involved. “My ambition,” he 
claimed, “is to see my own people solve their own problem.” Second, he asserted that 
most of the goals of the Food Administration could be accomplished using existing 
agencies. The third cardinal principle according to Hoover was community-based food 
conservation. Fourth, that most of the “important positions” of the Food Administration 
be filled with volunteers. The final principle was the need for the agency to be 
independent and under the direct control of the president, while also cooperating with 
other departments like Agriculture and Commerce.10
In describing the organizational structure of the agency itself, Hoover envisioned 
that the U.S. Food Administration would be divided into four branches: one to oversee 
and regulate the production and distribution of a few “critical commodities,” another that 
would coordinate the cooperation with food administrations at the local and state level, a 
third that would oversee cooperation with Allied nations  and a fourth branch that would 
serve as a department of “domestic economy.” It was this with department that the 
government would interact directly with the American consumer. While Hoover made it 
clear that he hoped his work would result in the overall reduction in the consumption of 
food in the United States, he tried to assure the public that the government would not 
force Americans to go hungry. Waste and extravagance were the main targets, while 
practices such as substitution and buying locally would be stressed over outright 
 “Hoover Suggests Nation’s Motto: ‘Eat Plenty, Wisely, Without Waste,’” New York Times, May 20, 1917.10
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deprivation. “We do not ask that the American people should starve themselves,” said 
Hoover, “but that they should eat plenty, wisely, and without waste.”11
One aspect of the Food Administration that both Wilson and Hoover stressed in 
their initial public comments on the subject of food conservation was the temporary 
nature of the agency. Government food control was clearly characterized as an 
emergency war measure, and Americans did not have to worry about continued 
intrusion into their eating habits once the hostilities ended. “All control of consumption,” 
assured the president, “will disappear when the emergency has passed.” To further 
bolster this claim, Wilson pointed out that the staff of the Food Administration would 
serve on a volunteer basis, without financial compensation of any kind. “There need be 
no fear,” said the president, “of the possibility of a permanent bureaucracy arising out of 
it.”12
Such assurances not only reflected a concern of a permanent and intrusive 
expansion of federal power, it also reflected a providing faith among progressives like 
Wilson and Hoover in the ability (and willingness) of members of a democratic society to 
sacrifice in times of emergency. The culture of voluntarism surrounding the U.S. Food 
Administration was something that was heavily stressed. “I believe that the whole 
foundation of democracy,” claimed Hoover, “lies in the individual initiative of its people 
and their willingness to serve the interests of the Nation...in this time of emergency.” 
Hoover actually made it a condition of his acceptance of the position of head of the U.S. 
Food Administration that he and his assistants receive no compensation. In Hoover’s 
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mind, what was being asked of him and what he was going to be asking private citizens 
to do in their kitchens was no different than what was being asked of men that were 
risking their lives overseas. “Those who can not serve in the trenches,” he said “can 
show their patriotism in no way so fully as in this service, and I feel that we have as 
much right to call upon them to serve...as we have a right to call upon our men to serve 
in the trenches.” All that was needed to receive the cooperation of the public was an 
information campaign that would educate the American people and show them what 
was needed. According to Hoover, Americans would gladly sacrifice “if they understood 
the need and were satisfied with the soundness of the methods proposed to accomplish 
the results.”13
The challenge of food conservation and the solution proposed by the Wilson 
administration was also placed within the broader ideological context of the war itself: 
democracy vs. autocracy. The food emergency provided a test for the nation’s people 
and its democratic institutions, and in Hoover’s opinion a positive response to his 
program would prove to the entire world the legitimacy of the American way of life. For 
while the citizens of European nations like Germany faced starvation despite living 
under strict rationing programs, the U.S. Food Administration’s program could show 
that, under a democracy, people could sacrifice and save on their own terms and 
conserve while still living comfortably. For Hoover, cutting back on wasteful food 
consumption meant more than merely winning the war:
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I hold that democracy can yield to discipline and that we can solve 
this food problem...and that to have done so will have been a 
greater service than our immediate objectives, for we have 
demonstrated the rightness of our faith and our ability to defend 
ourselves without being Prussianized. 
If conservation could not be achieved through the voluntary cooperation of the American 
people, the very worth of democracy would be called into question. If the nation could 
not heed the call of food conservation, “it is better to accept German domination,” 
asserted Hoover, “and confess the failure of our political belief.”14
Despite the unwavering faith in the nation’s ability and willingness to sacrifice in 
the name of democracy and self-defense, Hoover faced a number of obstacles as he 
formulated this plan of food control, the most important being the scarcity and high price 
of food. If food prices rose to the point of causing widespread unrest, the ability of the 
nation to conserve and fulfill demand would be greatly compromised. Much in the same 
way an industrial workers’ strike could threaten to bring war production to a grinding 
halt, nationwide food riots could halt American food exports and push our European 
Allies closer to the brink of famine. Social disruption had to be avoided at all costs if the 
nation’s kitchens were to be converted to maximum efficiency.15
There were a number of forces conspiring to put pressure on the American food 
system by the spring of 1917. An increase in demand came not only from the military 
forces being assembled at home, but also from our overseas allies. War conditions had 
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cut the domestic production of food in places like Britain and France, while the 
revolutionary events in Russia and the German U-boat attacks had cut off access to key 
external supplies of foodstuffs. The situation was made worse by that fact that poor 
growing conditions in the agricultural regions of the U.S. in 1916 and 1917 had reduced 
the available supply of key crops.16
However, by the time Hoover arrived in the nation’s capital to begin putting the 
pieces of his administration in place the rising cost of food was already a major concern 
for many around the country. In fact, a small wave of food riots had already broken out a 
few months earlier in a few major northeastern cities. On February 19, the working class 
districts of Williamsburg and Brownsville in Brooklyn, New York erupted as a group of 
women shoppers attacked peddlers at markets, overturning and setting fire to their 
carts. The women rioters, whose number approached three thousand according to news 
estimates, were protesting food prices. A similar episode occurred three days later in the 
working class neighborhoods of Philadelphia, where a mob of women fought with 
retailers upon hearing news of dramatic price increases for items such as fish and 
onions. The women claimed robbery and responded by pouring kerosene on the 
merchandise. In both cases the police was called in to quell the unrest, and a number of 
the protesters were arrested.17
A few days after the riots in Brooklyn, the New York Times sent a reporter into the 
Lower East Side of Manhattan to report on conditions facing working class families as it 
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related to food prices. While there was no evidence of widespread starvation, it was 
clear that the advancing cost of food had put added pressure on the already limited 
resources of thousands of working families. The result was widespread suffering that 
created anger and resentment towards vendors whom they saw as conspiring against 
them. A few women who admitted to participating in demonstrations shared their 
experiences. Two were self-described as “better off” than the majority of the 
neighborhood residents--one was a housewife whose husband was a watchmaker and 
the other was a forewoman at a local factory--yet their stories displayed how food prices 
contributed to their suffering. With a food budget of $1.25 per day, one of the women 
said that current prices made it difficult for her to feed her entire family. The other had 
kept detailed records of price increases. Eight months prior two pounds of onions cost 
$0.06, while four pounds of potatoes cost $0.08. Customers were now paying five times 
that amount for the same products, and despite the higher prices, the quality of the food 
had declined.18
In response to the unrest, a number of actions were taken at different levels to 
not only find a cause, but to work towards a solution. On the evening of the New York 
riots, a group of peddlers called a mass meeting at New Plaza Hall in Brooklyn. The 
meeting was primarily an attempt for the peddlers to get out their side of the story and 
answer the charge that they were the cause of high prices. Hours before the eight 
o’clock meeting the hall was filled to capacity and a crowd of fifteen hundred gathered in 
the streets outside. During the meeting the peddlers asserted that they were not to 
blame. They were paying equally inflated prices to wholesalers, with one vendor 
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asserting that he had struggled to make a paltry seventy-five cent profit the previous 
week. To further bolster their claim that vendors and consumers were in the same boat, 
a committee of five was appointed to speak directly with the New York mayor and 
appeal for “drastic action” to control prices.19
Another meeting, this one organized as a general protest against food prices in 
the city, was held the next day at Forward Hall in the Lower East Side. With a crowd of 
over five thousand attempting to fill the space, the atmosphere reflected the emotional 
nature of food prices for the working class. According to reports, the gathering was on 
the verge losing control and was “one of the wildest seen in New York in many years.” 
Gates that had been placed outside to hold off the overflow eventually gave in and a 
rush from outside poured in. There were reports of children being trampled and clothing 
being torn, while shouts from the crowd denounced capitalism as the major reason why 
the working class was struggling to buy food in the “greatest, richest city in the world.” 
Order was restored at the gathering long enough for the attendees to adopt a plan of 
action, which included a demonstration on Wall Street and the appointment of a 
delegation to demand that the city government appropriate $1 million to purchase food 
for distribution at cost. In late February in Manhattan the Mothers’ League called a 
mass-meeting in Madison Square to protest the price of food. Once again, the marchers 
were primarily of the immigrant working class, and all expressed their anger and 
frustrations at not being able to feed their families on the wages they were earning. At 
one point the protestors decided to march on the Waldorf Astoria hotel to take their 
concerns directly to the governor. However, they were greeted with barricades, and after 
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the crowd grew more restless, the police was called in to break up the gathering by 
force.20
The events in New York and Philadelphia became a national issue, and the riots 
were discussed and debated on the floors of both houses of Congress. Congressman 
William Borland of Missouri called the riots a disgrace and demands were made to give 
the Federal Trade Commission the power to investigate the nation’s food situation and 
the alleged manipulation of prices. One important distinction of the current situation 
according to the likes of Borland was the type of people who were suffering. “These are 
not the wives of idlers who are now complaining of the lack of bread,” asserted the 
Congressman. Rather, it was the deserving poor, those working and not depending on 
handouts, that was struggling to put food on the table. The New York Times expressed a 
similar sentiment. Describing what it called “a demonstration of hunger for the poorest 
amid plenty for most,” the Times argued that the loudest cries were not coming from the 
unemployed, but from workers who earned. They merely possessed an “inability to buy 
what the accustomed wage ordinarily supplies.”21
One theory of a possible cause of the unrest that was circulating and that the 
Times acknowledged was a plot by German officials and sympathizers to promote 
discontent and class warfare within American society. Claims were made that the 
leaders of the recent food riots had received payments from the German government to 
ignite the unrest. The federal government actually launched an investigation to examine 
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such claims, but found no evidence that the accusations had any basis in fact. A more 
valid cause for the rising prices according to the Times was an ever-increasing demand 
for American foodstuffs from abroad. Since this demand showed no sign of slowing 
down, the editorial suggested that a reduction in wasteful consumption be practiced 
among those that could afford to do so. “Wasters of every degree are the worst enemies 
of the poor,” claimed the Times. It advised that individuals that had the capacity to 
purchase freely should “take advantage of the many opportunities to economize.”22
As it became clearer that the cause of rising prices was at least in part due to 
demand overseas, those struggling to purchase food began calling for government 
action that would solve the problem. While the general consensus was that the wartime 
conditions required the relatively drastic measure of government food control, some 
media outlets called for a long-term system of food administration. While entities like the 
New York Times urged the wealthy to economize, groups like “Feed America First” 
called on the federal government to place an embargo on food shipments to European 
countries. In the wake of the New York food riots “Feed America First” held a meeting in 
St. Louis and urged nationwide demonstrations to spur government action. The leader 
of the St. Louis meeting predicted revolution in America if the government failed to take 
action to control food prices. While episodes in the nation’s largest cities were receiving 
the most attention, the rising cost of food was a problem that was affecting people, 
especially the working class, in all parts of the country. Increasingly, social 
commentators as well as political leaders were drawing parallels between the current 
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conditions facing the United States and the “bread riots” that had immediately preceded 
the revolution in France at the end of the eighteenth century.23
While the federal government failed to heed the calls for an embargo on food 
exports and failed to take any action beyond floor debate, a number of local and city 
government made attempts to alleviate the suffering caused by high prices. In the days 
following the Philadelphia food riots, butchers in the city vowed to stop selling meat until 
prices were reduced, and a group of the women declared a “school strike,” in which they 
kept their kids home from school because they were too weak to study and attend 
classes due to a lack of food. In response, a law was passed in Philadelphia that 
allowed the city to purchase food products and sell them directly to the public at cost. In 
Baltimore, Maryland, the government implemented a program in which twenty-four 5-ton 
trucks from various city departments were sent into the countryside to purchase 
foodstuffs directly from farmers. The money paid to the farmers was taken out of the 
city’s contingency fund, and officials hoped that the action would cut market prices by 
twenty-five percent.  24
City officials in New York responded first by ordering the Health Commissioner to 
conduct a study on food conditions. He examined four issues as they related to the 
price of food, and his findings were published in a report that was released on February 
25th. First, the commissioner looked for evidence of hoarding or speculation by 
surveying the stores of perishable foods within the city. He found that, in general, the 
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amount of perishable foods held were no more than usual, and thus hoarding could not 
be the cause of the high prices. He also investigated the claim that retailers were 
pushing up prices by comparing wholesale and retail prices of staple foods. His findings 
showed that retailers were making no more than a reasonable profit and thus could not 
be blamed for the cost of food either. He then looked at the overall export of staple 
crops from 1914 to 1916. The findings supported the claims made by the Times editorial 
which pointed to demand abroad as the major culprit. Figures showed that there was a 
dramatic increase in the amount of food going overseas while at the same time no real 
corresponding increase in production. This, according to the commissioner, was the 
chief cause of rising food prices in New York.25
Despite finding the source of rising prices, the report called into question the 
actual seriousness of the food situation facing working class residents of New York. 
While continuing price increases could lead to a crisis, there appeared to be no current 
emergency in the food situation. Indeed, some left-leaning media outlets criticized the 
“highly colored” accounts from the mainstream press. They suggested the motivation 
behind such exaggerated reporting was to either portray the working class as a threat to 
internal security, or to somehow awaken the nation to the growing threat posed by the 
Central Powers. The final matter examined by the commissioner involved a detailed 
study of the economic condition of a sample of over twenty-five hundred families that 
were under the supervision of the city’s Health Department. While investigators did find 
that in general families had experienced a reduction in the amount of food consumed, 
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they found “no complaint of want” in over 1800 families. “It was not uncommon,” claimed 
the report, “that the surroundings or equipment of the home contradicted the claim of 
urgent need for relief.” If a family had experienced food insecurity it was the result of 
unintelligent or uninformed purchases based on habit and racial customs. The report 
gave an example of a family of eight on a $15 per week food budget “indulging in the 
luxury of imported Italian cheese at $1 a pound.” According to officials, if a working class 
family was struggling to keep food on the table, it was just as much their own fault as 
anyone else’s.26
Thus, the report concluded that the present conditions could not be altered by 
any system of direct relief given by the city. The most effective solution involved a 
combination of expanding existing programs like the school lunch program, relaxing 
laws that restricted the sale of certain types of food like skim milk and bob veal, and a 
public education program in “matters of the selection and preparation of food.” An 
example of the latter was evident almost immediately after the report was issued when 
the city began what it called a “rice crusade,” which was an organized drive by the city 
to get citizens to purchase more rice. Rice at the time was cheaper than other grains, 
but was thought to not be popular among much of the working class. Children in the 
public school system were given a circular entitled “Facts About Rice” to take home to 
their mothers. “Use the information given in this circular to make your dollar go further,” 
urged the handout. It touted the food value of rice, claiming that it had “more strength-
giving material” than the more popular potato. The flyer also included preparation 
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suggestions, and asserted that, when combined with cheese and lentils, rice created a 
dish that could take the place of more expensive meat and potatoes.27
Food prices continued to be a major issue as Hoover assumed the position of 
prospective food administrator, and he was quickly confronted by the challenges he 
would face as he tried to balance the needs of the Allies with the realities at home. In 
order to more effectively transport food supplies overseas, Hoover had contemplated 
using steamers of the United Fruit Company, which transported fruit from Latin America. 
However, by the spring, New York City appeared once again to be on the verge of social 
unrest. On the Lower East Side, the food committee of the East Side Protective 
Association claimed that food prices were continuing to soar and warned of impending 
riots if prices were not checked. Responding to Hoover’s proposed plan, Maurice 
Eckstein, a representative from the New York Mayor’s Food Supply Committee, urged 
him to reconsider. Eckstein claimed that city officials had been fighting off unrest since 
last February, and to take away the steamers would “bring us face to face with a 
situation already difficult to combat.” Ships such as those of the United Fruit Company 
helped provide cheap food to the city’s working class, and Eckstein urged Hoover to 
“use your good offices to prevent a single vessel carrying bananas to this country from 
being diverted to any other services.”28
Congressman Fiorello LaGuardia from New York discussed before the House of 
Representatives the extreme conditions associated with the food shortages in his 
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district. A number of charitable organizations in the city had contacted LaGuardia to 
report on the situation and advocate for the passage of food control legislation. Since 
the beginning of the year, the price of potatoes had increased by seventy-five percent, 
while bread was fifty percent more expensive. Even the most staple of products had 
become so expensive that workers were becoming ill due to lack of food. What 
LaGuardia found particularly troubling was that complaints were not only coming from 
his poorer constituents. Food insecurity was beginning to creep into the ranks of the 
middle class. “The meatless diet of the Siberian peasant and the rice meal of the 
Chinese cooly,” declared the lawmaker, “have supplanted the roast beef and the pie of 
the average American.”29
Not only had the increasing cost of food moved beyond the poorer and working 
classes by the spring of 1917, the issue of prices and the threat of unrest had spread 
beyond metropolitan areas like New York City. An editorial in the Wilkes-Barre Record 
claimed that local consumers and retailers were suffering high prices at the hands of 
food pirates, while a New Jersey farmer claimed the prices he was receiving for his 
crops were so low that it was almost not worth it for him to harvest and sell them. A 
president from a drilling company in Kansas contacted Hoover to explain conditions as 
he saw them in his home state. State and local attempts to control prices and prevent 
speculation were not working. According to him, various trusts were at the center of the 
controversy, and if federal action was not taken, things could get out of hand. “If some 
one don’t act soon,” warned the businessman, “the people will, and it won’t be the trust 
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they will break, but the necks of some of the leaders who are now working to destroy 
every common man and this country.”30
Concerned citizens throughout the country contacted Hoover to let him know 
about the suffering caused by high food prices and offer up what they viewed as the 
source of the problem. For many, it was a matter of the “moneyed” classes taking 
advantage of the “laboring” classes. The prospect of class warfare seemed all too real 
based on the letters of apprehensive individuals. “Each day that Congress delays action 
in the food situation,” warned one man from rural Virginia, “the man already made poor 
by the food grafter is becoming poorer and the oppressor richer.” The local newspaper 
had launched an investigation on food prices and caused a stir when it printed 
wholesale and retail prices. The editor of the Bristol Herald Courier requested the aid of 
Hoover after local retailers threatened legal action against the paper. Life for the 
working class had become unbearable in this town along the Tennessee-Virginia border, 
and observers claimed they were becoming “restive.” At meetings workers claimed that 
the food situation was draining their “patriotic enthusiasm.” For them, the “men of 
wealth” that were keeping food of their tables were a greater enemy than Germany, and 
they were on the verge of taking matters into their own hands. “I am frank to tell you that 
any day,” wrote John Dove of Bristol, “in this little city alone, a regiment could be 
 “Charges Local Food Piracy,” clipping, Wilkes-Barre Record, June 13, 1917, from letter, C.E. Ferguson 30
to Hoover, June 13, 1917, Records of the U.S. Food Administration, Record Group #4, 12HA-A11, Box 
490, National Archives, College Park, MD; “Evidence of Rascality Furnished by a North Bergen Farmer,” 
clipping, Hudson Observer, June 19, 1917, from letter, M. Foley to Hoover, June 19, 1917, Records of the 
U.S. Food Administration, Record Group #4, 12HA-A11, Box 490; Letter, J.C. Collins to Hoover, June 23, 
1917, Records of the U.S. Food Administration, Record Group #4, 12HA-A10, Box 489.
 36
raised...who would be glad to aid in...putting the fellows who have made life hard for us 
where they belong.”31
In the eyes of many, the best solution to the food crisis was government 
intervention, and calls for a food control bill of some sort were coming from various 
segments of American society. A local Council of Defense in Florida passed a resolution 
calling on Congress to give the president various powers as it related to the nation’s 
food supply, including the power to require all businesses and private households to 
furnish the government lists of food in their possession and even the power to 
confiscate food to distribute to people at cost. Arthur Capper, the governor of Kansas, 
appealed to Vice-President Thomas Marshall to advance government food control as a 
measure second only in importance to legislation dealing directly with the military. The 
governor felt compelled to act due to the constant appeals from people who were 
suffering from high food prices. An editorial in the New York American argued that 
government food control was the “country’s most urgent war need.” According to the 
paper, such legislation was perhaps the only way for the U.S. to preserve itself and its 
own people.   32
Thus, as Congress began to debate the legislation proposed by the Wilson 
administration the cost of food at home was front and center. Even before Hoover had 
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arrived in the United States from Europe, the bill that would become the Food Control 
Act began its journey in Congress. At the end of April members of the House Committee 
on Agriculture began consideration of possible legislation, while serious discussions 
over the food issue started in the Senate at the beginning of May. Some senators 
charged that the failure to act would eventually result in severe food shortages. “In my 
judgement,” declared Senator William Borah of Idaho, “the most serious and 
stupendous fact which confronts us today with reference to the question of war is that of 
food.” If the war were to last beyond two years and the public failed to respond by 
conserving food, the senator warned that the nation would “face a real famine.” In 
addition to encouraging the collective sacrifice of the American people, Borah and 
others felt the government also had to take action against food speculators, whom they 
felt were the primary cause of high prices and should be considered the nation’s true 
enemy. Borah went so far as to crassly suggest that the best way to deal with 
speculators  was to “string them to lampposts or put them behind prison bars.”33
The bill proposed by the president and his supporters bestowed upon the 
executive branch the power to regulate the supply and price of certain crops, such as 
wheat, through government corporations. In addition, the legislation called for the 
creation of a new agency that would not only work to control the production end of the 
food supply, but would also be involved in the elimination of hoarding and profiteering 
among retailers, as well as the promotion of conservation and substitution among 
American consumers. While Wilson and Hoover believed that achieving the goals of 
increased production and reduced consumption of food on a national scale would 
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ultimately require very little government coercion, the limits placed on the power of the 
president to forcefully tell Americans what they could grow or eat were blatantly vague.34
The legislation was reported from the House Agricultural Committee by its 
chairman Asbury Lever of South Carolina on June 11th and debate on the Lever Bill (as 
it came to be known) opened in both houses on June 18th. Lever, in his opening 
remarks, reminded his colleagues that the nation was at war with Germany, “the most 
thoroughly organized and autocratic military nation on the face of the earth.” Reflecting 
the belief that success in modern warfare relied just as much on home front efficiency 
as it did on battlefield strategy, the Congressman asserted that an unorganized 
democracy had no shot against an autocracy like Germany. To achieve such 
organization, Lever felt steps needed to be taken that would encourage production, 
streamline distribution and encourage conservation. Without the executive authority 
granted in the proposed bill, “the same chaos and confusion and waste and lost motion 
and manipulation and sky-rocketing prices of the past few months will only be 
exaggerated and increased.” While acknowledging that the powers granted were 
unprecedented, Lever followed by arguing that the challenges facing the nation were 
unprecedented and speculated that if the powers were not granted, Americans should 
be prepared to “have them assumed by the German Kaiser.”35
While the food control bill’s namesake declared that all Americans should be 
prepared to sacrifice by conserving food for our Allies, he also pointed out the problems 
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surrounding the price of food at home. According to Lever, the high cost of food was 
part of an overall dramatic rise in the cost of living over the past decade. Generally 
speaking, the numbers backed up the lawmaker’s claim. From 1907 to 1916, retail 
prices increased thirty-nine percent. The wages for the average American worker, 
however, were not keeping up. Wages in the U.S. over the same period had only 
increased nineteen percent. Lever relayed the message he received from a woman in 
Philadelphia, who could not afford the twenty-two cents to purchase a pound of the 
humble shin of beef, a product that previously cost two cents per pound. “Twenty-two 
cents per pound for a soup bone,” wrote the struggling woman, “may make dangerous 
men and women out of ordinarily peaceful and good citizens.” The solution according to 
Lever was food control. To support his claim, he pointed out the fact that food prices in 
war-torn countries like Germany and England, where famine was imminent but also 
where food control measures were already in place, were equal to or less than prices in 
the U.S..36
Despite the fact that Lever’s opening comments on his food control bill were 
warmly received by most of his fellow House members, a vocal minority, composed of a 
mix of Republicans and southern Democrats, was quick to assert itself by calling into 
question many aspects of the proposed legislation. Representative James Young of 
Texas was one of the first to express misgivings about the bill, and his views would 
come to be reflected by many of the bill’s critics. He argued that the legislation was 
unconstitutional and that if passed it would essentially permit the president to bring a 
food dictator to the nation’s capital. The powers granted by the Lever Bill were too 
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general and vague in nature, and thus potentially too far-reaching in their scope. “No 
American citizen,” argued Young, “knows when he wakes up in the morning whether 
overnight he has not become a felon under the provisions of the bill.” In his eyes, the 
government should keep away from the actions of producers and consumers and focus 
its attention on the middlemen and distributers, who were the main source of high 
prices. Once the government successfully brought prices down, Young argued, the 
patriotism of American consumers and farmers would kick in and allow the nation to 
feed the Allied countries without any further government interference.37
In the Senate the bill was introduced by Democratic Senator George 
Chamberlain of Oregon, and Senator James Reed, a Democrat from Missouri, led the 
opposition. Echoing much of Congressman Young’s sentiments, Reed expressed 
concern about the vagueness of powers granted by the bill to the president beyond the 
reach of Congress. Such powers, claimed the Senator were “greater than has ever 
been exercised by any king or potentate of earth and broader than that which is 
exercised by the Kaiser of the Germans.” Senators Hardwick of Georgia and Gore of 
Oklahoma also called into question the constitutionality of the measure, in particular the 
role of food administrator, which was to be filled by Hoover. Rather than an 
administrator, the bill would create a “food dictator,” who could theoretically fix prices 
and control supplies. Gore proclaimed that, unless major changes were made to the bill, 
he could not vote for it. “I cannot support features,” exclaimed the senator from 
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Oklahoma, “that put the control of all the nation’s food supply in the hands of one 
man.”38
Reed expressed misgivings about Hoover specifically, pointing out the fact that 
he had spent much of his adult life abroad, which called into question his qualifications 
for dealing with such important questions affecting the American people. He concluded 
his opening comments with the following dramatic declaration:
I protest against the bill as a mistake, and economical mistake. I 
protest against it as an offense against the Constitution of the 
United States. I proclaim it to be an invasion of our Bill of Rights. I 
declare that it will produce that paralysis of business and energy 
which will make it impossible for us to finance the armies of the 
world and to feed the nations who are our allies in the great 
struggle now engulfing mankind.
Thus, the Lever Bill would not only threaten the very sanctity of American democracy, if 
passed it would produce an outcome in direct opposition to its intent. It was clear that 
the Lever Bill was up against determined opposition in both houses, and observers 
predicted that the legislation would not make it out of the House without the addition of 
amendments that would check the power of the head of the Food Administration while in 
the Senate it was a real possibility the measure would face a filibuster.39
The White House appeared to be well aware of the potential roadblocks its 
proposed legislation would face, so the president attempted to seize the upper hand in 
the public debate over the issue of food control. The same day that debate over the 
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Lever Bill opened in both houses of Congress, President Wilson served notice to critics 
of the measure in an open letter to Congressman Borland. Wilson first wanted to set the 
record straight on the primary goal of the  bill. He asserted that references to the 
legislation as a “Food Control” bill was inaccurate and misleading. The objective of the 
Lever Bill, according to president, was not to have the government control food 
supplies, but to seize control away from speculators. He went on to issue a warning to 
critics. Their actions would not only potentially be seen as unpatriotic, but they would 
also contribute to the continued suffering of the nation’s working class. By delaying 
passage of the Lever Bill critics such as Senator Reed and Congressman Young were 
opening themselves up to the charge that they were putting the interests of a few above 
the interests of the nation as a whole. Further, they could be seen as the major cause of 
even higher food prices. He closed by drawing a line in the sand, marking the date of 
July 1st as a deadline for final approval.  40
Meanwhile, Hoover did what he could to keep tabs on the public debate over the 
Lever Bill. In the days following its introduction on the floors of Congress, Hoover’s staff 
provided him with periodic memorandums that contained press clippings from the 
nation’s major papers and a summary analysis of the press coverage surrounding the 
legislation. The prospective head of the U.S. Food Administration was told that most of 
the “big Eastern papers” supported government action, while several editorials and 
cartoons had shown that “our effort to bring the situation home to Congress” had been 
appreciated by the country. Should Hoover decide to more directly influence public 
debate using the press, several editors had expressed the “utmost desire to cooperate.” 
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Further, he was told that the Food Administration could “easily place a column of 
instructions to the American public in regard to food conservation and get all of it 
printed.” Not only was such a relationship viewed as key in getting the Food 
Administration measure passed, it would continue to have importance once the Lever 
Bill became law. Agencies such as the Newspaper Enterprise Association, which 
reached nearly 9 million readers daily and gave enthusiastic support to the Food 
Administration, would end up becoming “an invaluable agency for the distribution of our 
publicity matter.”41
Despite the appearance of a concerted campaign by the press to bring pressure 
on Congress to pass the Lever Bill, Hoover was also informed of efforts by certain 
interests that might be negatively impacted by the measure to prevent its passage. 
While most of the editorial coverage of Senator Reed’s attack on the Lever Bill was 
“scathingly critical,” the New York World and the New York Evening Sun supported 
Reed and filled their pages with sharp disapproval of the Food Administration measure. 
While the New York World in its coverage warned of a food dictatorship and widespread 
hunger if the Lever Bill became law, the Evening Sun declared that the bill would create 
a “political, social, and economic revolution...a despotism.”42
As stated previously, the supporters of the Lever Bill recognized and appreciated 
the point that the measure created a considerable increase in centralized power. 
However, whereas critics felt this increased power threatened to undermine democracy, 
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supporters like Hoover felt such temporary action was necessary to preserve 
democracy in the long run. To get this point across to the public, Hoover looked to 
history. He contacted Ida Tarbell, the well-known progressive journalist who was then 
serving in the Women’s Committee of the National Council of Defense. “A great deal is 
being said about the undermining of democracy by passing legislation of the nature of 
the Lever Food Bill,” wrote Hoover. He looked to Tarbell, whom he considered an expert 
on the life and words of Abraham Lincoln, for examples of references made by the great 
Republican leader on the necessity of increased centralization of authority in the federal 
government during times of war. Hoover thought that such information would be helpful 
to “bring home to our people that these emergency methods have not shaken the 
foundation of the Republic hitherto and have the sanction not only of experience but of 
our greatest national leader.” After providing Hoover with a number of specific examples 
from the Civil War president, Tarbell advised him that he could “say as strongly as you 
wish that Mr. Lincoln believed that any amount of centralization necessary to save the 
country in an emergency was justifiable and to him it would be unthinkable that the 
Lever Food Bill...would undermine Democracy.”43
The day after debate on the Lever Bill was opened in Congress, Hoover 
appeared before the Senate Agricultural Committee. He once again emphasized the 
need for food control legislation given the extraordinary circumstances both at home 
and abroad. Americans were facing increasing food prices and decreasing supplies 
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while our allies were facing famine and defeat at the hands of the dreaded Germans. 
Hoover felt any question of whether the Lever Bill should become law were answered 
given such desperate conditions. He claimed that under normal circumstances, the 
United States could only supply sixty percent of the needs of the Allies. If the forty 
percent deficiency was to be made up, cooperation from both sides of the Atlantic was 
needed. Americans needed to make their kitchens more efficient and less wasteful, 
while the people of the Allied nations needed to continue their self-denial. Failure to act 
on the Lever Bill would not only result German victory in Europe, but also social 
disruption at home. Hoover claimed that the revolution that recently kicked off in Russia 
was at least in part the result of food problems, and if its political leaders failed to act, 
the United States could face a similar fate.  44
Given the relatively minor resistance to the measure in the House, it is no 
surprise that the Lever Bill passed by a vote of 365 to 5 on the twenty-third of June. 
However, the bill had been amended to include a prohibition provision that halted the 
manufacture of liquors for the duration of the war and authorized the president to seize 
existing stocks of distilled spirits. In addition, the amendment prohibited the use of any 
foodstuffs in the manufacture of all alcoholic beverages. As a result, the measure faced 
much stiffer opposition in the Senate, and debate over the Lever Bill dragged on well 
beyond the July 1st deadline that had been established by President Wilson.45
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There were several issues that prolonged the Senate debate. In addition to 
consideration of the House prohibition amendment, members debated the inclusion of 
amendments that covered non-food items such as steel, cotton and other commodities. 
Critics such as Senator Reed continued to question the very constitutionality of the food 
conservation measure, especially as it applied to the proposed government involvement 
in Americans’ consumption habits. In a blistering speech delivered in the middle of July 
on the Senate floor, Reed persisted in his assault on the proposal that one man have so 
much control over the nation’s food supply. He set his sights on the mining engineer and 
“launched the bitterest attack he has yet made upon Herbert C. Hoover.” Calling Hoover 
an “arch gambler,” Reed questioned his loyalty to America and accused the former head 
of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium of rigging food markets to drive prices down 
in Europe, an action the senator claimed had consequently driven food prices up in the 
United States.46
Reed once again questioned Hoover’s ability to relate to the American situation 
since he had lived abroad for so long, working on various mining operations throughout 
South America, Europe and Asia. “He’s been so long away that he is quite a stranger 
here,” claimed the senator from Missouri. He suggested it was within this climate of 
overseeing operations and ruling over scores of foreign workers in remote sites that 
Hoover acquired the knowledge and desire to be “supreme boss to regulate the diet of 
the American people.” Further, Reed took issue with Hoover’s self-described political 
leanings, pointing out that he had been quoted as describing himself as “a liberal--not a 
Republican, or a Democrat, or a Populist, but a Liberal.” It was due to these misgivings 
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that Reed proposed an amendment to the Lever Bill that would create a board of five 
individuals to replace the single head administrator. As another jab to Hoover, Reed 
suggested a further provision that all five members had to be resident civilians. With this 
assault Reed made it clear that the Lever Bill would be facing a steep uphill climb in the 
Senate.47
Amid the Congressional debates, the criticisms, the amendments and substitute 
bills, Hoover worked diligently to ensure that the Lever Bill reached the president’s desk  
in its original form as quickly as possible. Hoover’s concern was evident from his 
correspondence with the White House as the measure slowly made its way through 
Congress. Hoover continued to stress the importance of the voluntary nature of most of 
the conservation measure and informed the president that he had received word that 
the proposed bill had been well-received from several food trade organizations. “If we 
apply the powers of the bill,” assured Hoover, “it will be with the approval of most of the 
well-thinking men in the trade as against the selfish and avaricious members.”  48
The president’s chosen head of the Food Administration expressed particular 
alarm with the proposal first brought forth by Senator Reed that would replace a single 
head of the agency with an advisory board. Such an arrangement, according to Hoover, 
would “destroy the whole question of the imaginative side of leadership of yourself and 
sense of volunteer service in the interest of the Nation, which is absolutely critical in 
order to amass the devotion of the people.” Bills that contained such a provision were 
offered up by Senators Hollis and Gore, and Hoover quickly advised the president to 
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distance himself from these substitute measures. In order to inform lawmakers that the 
Lever Bill was still the preferred legislation of the White House, Hoover constantly had 
memos drawn up that illustrated the various shortcomings of the substitutes. Most 
importantly, an agency led by a commission would be dangerously slow to react. A 
three- or five-member board would likely require unanimous decisions and lead to 
inefficiencies and internal friction, which, according to Hoover, would undermine the 
unity of purpose that was required in a time of war. Further, members of a committee or 
advisory board would likely require some level of financial compensation. Hoover 
reminded the president why he decided to come home and serve as the head of the 
Food Administration on a volunteer basis. “For me as a volunteer making sacrifices,” 
said Hoover, “to ask the most modest household to join in this sacrifice meets a 
response entirely unapproachable from a paid servant of the Government.”49
Indeed, despite the fact that the Lever Bill had yet to be passed, Hoover had 
already begun asking American households to sacrifice. Back on June 16th, Wilson 
instructed the food crisis expert to begin the construction of a voluntary conservation 
program aimed at the public. “While it would in many ways be desirable to wait 
complete legislation establishing the food administration,” wrote the president, “it 
appears to me that so far as voluntary effort can be assembled, we should not wait any 
longer.” By the middle of July, the Food Administration had created “voluminous 
propaganda” on issues of conservation of waste, but at the time Hoover was concerned 
about its effectiveness and ability to “keep in proper tune.” He hoped to bring in George 
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Lorimer, editor of the Saturday Evening Post, to oversee future propaganda operations. 
While Hoover expressed frustration, Wilson urged patience for the procedures of 
Congress. The president assured Hoover that he was watching the proceedings 
carefully and assured his chosen administrator that the Lever Bill would emerge from 
conference “with practically the provisions we have all along urged.” “It is a tedious and 
vexatious process,” lamented Wilson, “but necessary to be endured.”  50
While Hoover was largely working behind the scenes throughout the summer to 
advocate for passage of the Lever Bill, the editorial pages of the New York Times very 
publicly expressed its support for the administration’s food conservation measure. The 
arguments made by the nation’s most influential daily mirrored Hoover’s and the bill’s 
various Congressional champions. Depicting the bill as a war measure, the Times 
described the nation’s current position as “perilous” and argued that food conservation 
was “essential” to ensure the country’s safety. The Lever Bill, they argued, was a “war 
measure as essential to our success as army and navy extension.” While the powers 
granted the president were real, the editors felt they were necessary given the demands 
of war and the unbearable food situation. “In these abnormal times,” wrote the editors, 
“the expedient of careful food administration must be resorted to.” The Times cited the 
support of organized labor as proof that the public was lending its support to the 
measure.51
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When it came to commentary on the opponents of the Lever Bill, the media at 
first virtually ignored those who criticized the administration’s plan for food conservation. 
The Times confidently predicted that passage of the measure was assured if 
Congressional opposition was “nothing more serious than the oratory of Senator Reed.” 
Labeling the Missouri lawmaker as a “chronic objector,” the paper asserted that all of 
the arguments that were brought forth by Reed had been soundly discounted. However, 
as the president’s July first deadline came and went and the very nature of the Lever Bill 
faced threats from various amendments and substitutes, the tenor of the Times 
argument grew more urgent. The paper argued that amendments covering items such 
as alcoholic beverages, cotton, and steel were largely the work of obstructionists who 
wanted to make the bill as unappealing to as many people as possible. “Lobbying has 
not been more scandalous in Washington in a long time than since this bill reached the 
Senate.”52
Part of the problem, according to the Times, was that opponents of the bill had 
effectively launched a coordinated campaign to confuse the public about the bill’s 
purpose. The editors expressed regret over the fact that the measure was widely 
referred to as the “Food Control Bill” and not given a name such as the “Food 
Conservation Bill” that not only better reflected the purpose of the legislation but would 
have also led to a clearer comprehension by the general public. However, opponents of 
the bill had seized control of the debate, and as the nation celebrated its independence 
the fate of the Lever Bill was still very much in the air. On July 5th, the Times argued 
that continued delay was imperiling the safety of the nation, but expressed hope that the 
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Senate would “give its mind only to the country’s need” and pass the bill by the end of 
the week. As the pressure mounted, Hoover made an attempt to ensure that the limited 
work already being conducted by the Food Administration was such that it could not 
provide fuel to the firestorm being created by his critics. He instructed his staff to send 
all conservation propaganda to the office of Edgar Rickard for censorship. “There are so 
many currents that need to be guarded against,” wrote Hoover, “that for the present I 
think the whole office better go through one hand.” One issue he was particularly 
concerned with was associating the work of the agency with one person, so he ordered 
that terms such as “Hoover’s pledge” and “Hoover’s Rules” be removed from all forms 
of publicity. The message that the government’s suggestions for altered food behavior 
was coming from one person would only confirm the worst fears expressed by the likes 
of Senator Reed. “Nothing,” warned Hoover, “is or will be more fatal in the long run.”53
However, the Times’ hopes were not realized. The Lever Bill did not pass the 
Senate until July 21st. Further, the original character of the legislation was drastically 
altered by amendments, including a provision for fuel and fertilizer control, limitations on 
the licensing power of the Food Administration, and, most importantly, the replacement 
of a single head for a committee of three. Hoover quickly let the president know that the 
bill passed by the Senate was inadequate and prepared a series of memos that 
addressed the shortcomings of the structure of administration proposed by the Senate 
bill and provided specific alterations that were required to “affect adequate food control.” 
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Further, while Hoover continued to follow the lead of the president by keeping quiet and 
allowing the legislative process to play out, he feared that the delays in Congress and 
continued rising food prices might be incorrectly laid on the Food Administration. “I think 
we should reserve the right to say something rather loudly, later on,” declared Hoover, 
“as we may have to face a perfect storm from the consumers of this country.”54
The Senate food bill was sent to the joint Congressional committee on July 25, 
and the legislation once again became bogged down over details. The major sticking 
point was the nature of the agency’s leadership, House leaders maintained a single 
head was the best approach while a powerful faction in the Senate led by Reed 
continued to push for a three-man board. As July came to an end, the president became 
more active in the legislative process, meeting with lawmakers to try and break the 
deadlock. The Senate finally agreed to accept a single leader for the Food 
Administration in exchange for the addition of a provision that would subject the 
president’s choice to Senate confirmation. However, the House faction resisted, fearing 
that Hoover would not be confirmed. Wilson once again spoke up and expressed his 
strong opposition to any bill that did not allow him to choose the head of the Food 
Administration. The Senate finally agreed on the final day of July to eliminate the 
provision setting up a three-man board to head the agency.  55
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While this cleared the way for Hoover to become the head of the Food 
Administration, the joint committee continued to butt heads over one remaining issue: 
an amendment that called for the creation of a Congressional War Advisory Board. 
Supporters of the amendment, mostly from the Senate, believed it was a way to check 
the power of the president in executing of the war, while the provision’s opponents 
argued that such a board would not only reduce the role of Commander-In-Chief to a 
mere figurehead but also negatively impact the efficient execution of the war. It had 
been a month since the deadline established by the president was eclipsed, and as the 
debate dragged on, things became more heated. Senators Gore and Reed continued to 
assail the Lever Bill and Herbert Hoover, while the legislation’s supporters responded 
with attacks of their own. The likes of Gore and Reed were compared to anarchists and 
their actions labeled as obstructionist. In delaying the bill’s passage, critics of the Lever 
Bill were accused of supporting the cause of the enemy by limiting the ability of the 
president to effectively execute the nation’s war strategy.  56
The Lever Bill finally emerged from the joint conference bill on the third of August, 
minus the Advisory Board amendment. In fact, with the exception of provisions for fuel 
and fertilizer control, all amendments added to the original Lever Bill were eventually 
eliminated. The House quickly passed the measure by a vote of 357-0. The bill was 
approved by the Senate five days later with a vote of 66-7. The law granted the 
president the authority to create the U.S. Food Administration and to choose its head 
officer. In terms of the specific powers granted to the agency by the legislation, the 
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language was purposefully broad and vague. In addition to being given the authority to 
“organize the service and self-denial of the American people” regarding food 
conservation, which will be the focus of this study, the law also gave the agency limited 
power to control the distribution of certain foodstuffs at the wholesale level, as well as 
monitor and prevent hoarding and speculation. The Food Administration was also 
granted a limited ability to exercise control over the import and export of foods through 
the War Trade Board, as well as over the purchase of food by the Allies. President 
Wilson signed the bill into law on August 10th, and on the same day issued an 
Executive Order officially establishing the U.S. Food Administration and naming Herbert 
Hoover as its head.   57
In many ways, the measure was unprecedented. Never before had the federal 
government had so much control over what people were eating. Despite the vocal 
objections from those who feared the expansion of executive power, the extreme 
conditions created by a global war combined with an unwavering faith in American 
democratic institutions, allowed supports of the Lever Bill to eventually gain the upper 
hand. A major obstacle had been overcome and the president now had the power and 
authority to influence and guide the production, distribution, and consumption of the 
nation’s food supply. However, while the U.S. Food Administration possessed the ability 
to directly impact production and distribution, the goal of conserving food by altering the 
nation’s food consumption habits would have to be achieved with the voluntary 
cooperation of the American public. In order to achieve this objective, Hoover and the 
Food Administration employed a massive publicity/education campaign that set out to 
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reach each and every American in all possible settings, from the kitchen to the station, 
from the state fair to the movie theater. The next chapter will begin the examination of 
this conservation campaign by looking at U.S. Food Administration propaganda that was 
geared towards the American home.  
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Chapter 2 - “Awakening the War Consciousness of the American People”
Even before the United States had officially declared war on Germany, Herbert 
Hoover recognized the importance America’s food supply would play in the ultimate 
outcome of the conflict. War mobilization, as well as the destructive impact of warfare 
itself, had dramatically reduced the productive capacity of America’s future allies, 
England, France, and Italy. In addition, the conditions at sea had made it difficult for 
these nations to secure a reliable flow of foodstuffs from outside sources such as 
Australia, Canada, and Argentina. According to Hoover, if the United States were to 
enter into war with Germany (and by the Spring of 1917 it was looking more and more 
likely), its immediate and primary objective would be to provide an adequate food supply 
for its partners overseas.1
In order to achieve this goal, Hoover and his advisors believed that the 
consciousness of the American public had to be awakened. This chapter focuses on the 
aspects of U.S. Food Administration propaganda that targeted the emotions of the 
American public. It will examine how a large portion of the agency’s message regarding 
the need for food conservation emphasized such stirring themes as patriotism and 
individual sacrifice. It will show how Food Administration propaganda sought to militarize 
the home front and secure total support from a population that was not directly affected 
by the conflict. To accomplish these goals, the government would rely heavily on the 
expertise from an emerging modern advertising industry that was based on appealing to 
people’s emotions to sell a product or idea. The result of such a relationship would not 
only impact wartime food control propaganda. The Food Administration’s program was 
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also an important factor in expressing the idea that total social cohesion was needed to 
achieve victory in modern war. Additionally, the nature of the Food Administration’s 
propaganda machinery would sow the seeds of a relationship between government, 
advertisers, and experts in such fields as nutritional science that would take on greater 
importance in shaping American food culture during the twentieth century. 
The subject of government propaganda in the United States during the First 
World War has received a good bit of attention from scholars. Particularly, historians 
have examined the tensions that existed between a growing federal government that 
required universal support among the population for the war effort, and an American 
public that held a general skepticism towards a powerful central authority and a specific 
ambivalence towards the nation’s involvement in the First World War. Rather than 
reliance on measures that forced compliance with wartime measures, the U.S. 
government, and the various associated local, state, and private institutions, relied on 
“coercive volunteerism” to mobilize American society for war. Chris Capozzola and 
Robert Zieger have both looked at how the combined efforts of the government and 
private patriotic organizations militarized the home front by bringing the war to the 
people and created a climate in which Americans, even those not committed to military 
service, felt obliged to volunteer for the war. Capozzola concludes that this emphasis on 
“civic volunteerism” not only formed social bonds and emphasized political obligations, it 
served to organize public life and helped Americans feel a sense of collective identity.2
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Looking specifically at the actions of the Food Administration, one can see all of 
these forces at work. In addition to simply conserving food for the sake of sending 
supplies overseas, Food Administration officials were also committed to using the power 
of their agency to help create a collective national purpose as well as a general positive 
attitude towards the war effort itself. Additionally, some within the Food Administration 
saw their situation as an opportunity to foster long-lasting changes to the everyday 
habits of the American public. The belief among many was that the food conservation 
campaign could serve as a launching point for a longer-lasting campaign that promoted 
more efficient and economical behavior within every household. In her recent study of 
American food culture during the early twentieth century, Helen Veit contends that the 
war provided an opportunity for progressives, obsessed with the practice of moral 
behavior through rational science, to use the power of the federal government to 
change the way people ate. The Food Administration would bring together all of these 
strains of thought to produce a propaganda campaign that aimed to both shape the 
immediate wartime food choices of Americans and influence the nation’s food culture on 
a more permanent basis as a means to create a more modern, efficient society.        3
During the summer of 1917, while the Lever Bill was still being debated in 
Congress, Herbert Hoover and his staff began working tirelessly on crafting a message 
that would resonate with the American public. As previously stated, Hoover essentially 
saw the program of food conservation as playing out in two general stages. First, the 
government had to gain the attention of the American people and convince them that a 
food problem indeed existed. It would only be after such an awakening that the public 
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would then be receptive to specific instructions on changing their food behaviors. “If we 
can secure the emplacement of this idea in the minds of the people,” claimed Hoover, 
“the sequent suggestions of constructive order which we may make will fall not only on 
a receptive mind but upon a convinced intelligence.” The primary focus of this chapter is 
this first step: namely, the nature and extent of the portion of propaganda that dealt 
specifically with the way in which the government, via the U.S. Food Administration, 
worked to generate a message that would convince the public that a problem existed 
and arouse the volunteer spirit of the nation.4
Addressing the Council of National Defense in the Spring of 1917, Hoover shared 
his ideas regarding the issue of possible government food control in the United States. 
He acknowledged five different phases or levels of repression, each representing a 
different level of compulsion. There was the “rough rationing” which had been employed 
with sugar in England, where the government restricted what retailers could access and 
make available to consumers. The German government had implemented a system of 
coupon rationing, which restricted what consumers could purchase at stores. The 
government could also issue cards to each household, listing set maximums of certain 
foods that could be purchased. The most dramatic measure, however, would have been 
strict rations being distributed through government-controlled stores and kitchens. A 
system that had been implemented in war-torn Belgium, and thus a measure that 
Hoover was quite familiar with.  5
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The final approach proposed by Hoover, and the one he felt best fit American 
society, was the indirect repression of food consumption. Essentially, the government 
would work to cultivate a certain food behavior among its people without compulsory 
measures. Hoover wanted to avoid a system of compulsory rationing. Rather, he 
believed it was possible to convince Americans to voluntarily follow government 
guidelines. There were two primary reasons cited by Hoover for favoring indirect 
repression, or “voluntary cooperation,” over government-directed compulsion. The first 
was the economic burden that would come with administering and enforcing a 
compulsory rationing program. The second consideration placed the USFA program well 
beyond the immediate task of merely providing nourishment to a needy population. It 
reflected the overwhelming confidence Hoover and his progressive colleagues had in 
the fundamental nature of United States and its people. It was the opportunity to prove 
the ultimate worth of American-style democracy on a world stage. Rather than be forced 
to alter food behaviors at the command of some central authority, the American people, 
with the guidance of the federal government, would willingly, and freely sacrifice at the 
kitchen table to help defeat the autocratic German regime.
In order to keep with his guiding philosophy of “voluntary cooperation,” 
Americans would be looked upon to willingly alter their eating behavior to fit the needs 
created by the wartime food crisis. There were several ways in which such indirect 
repression might be achieved, all of which became part of the official program of the 
U.S. Food Administration. The first involved the total suppression of certain imports, 
such as exotic fruits and vegetables. The second would be the suggested limitation of 
consumption via themed ordinance, such as “meatless” and “wheatless” meals and 
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days. The government would also encourage the alteration of the production of certain 
foods, especially breads. Finally, Hoover stressed that the government should 
encourage the use of certain substitutes in place of foods deemed vital for export to 
Europe. One example he provided was the promotion of using vegetable fats in place of 
animal fats, and in order to make such products more appealing, the government could 
work to change the name of the product from the unappealing margarine to something 
more familiar like “nut-lard.”6
 To achieve such objectives, government-sponsored propaganda, or as it was 
often referred to, “publicity,” was extremely important. Especially in this case, where the 
government was not demanding nor imposing a particular set of behaviors. Rather, the 
government would advise the public. It would awaken and then enlighten Americans via 
what Hoover termed “educational regulation.” The U.S. Food Administration would make 
the American people aware of the global food problem, it would create an environment 
whereby Americans remaining at the home front would feel an obligation to comply, and 
it would education the population on how exactly to follow government guidelines and 
why such measures would ultimately not have a negative impact on the their health or 
well-being.  7
Convincing people to cut back their consumption of staples such as bread, meat, 
and sugar, especially in the name of a war that was not wildly popular, was a fairly hard 
sell. However, rather than portray the food situation as a burden, Food Administration 
propaganda attempted to characterize it as an opportunity to serve the nation. The 
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American household, and in particular the kitchen, became a battlefront. Even if they 
didn’t join the military and ship off overseas, or didn’t volunteer their services to various 
home front initiatives, Americans left behind could fight the war with their food choices. 
To accomplish such an onerous task, the government looked to an emerging modern 
advertising industry for assistance. Working closely with a number of advertising 
executives, the Food Administration generated a publicity campaign that utilized a 
variety of mediums that reached every part of American life, public and private, from the 
movie theater to the dinner table. The goal was to make people willingly change their 
habits without forceful government intrusion. The government did, however, find ways to 
make their presence felt in the American kitchen without assertive incursion.
The results of these forces coming together as the United States entered World 
War I would not only help shape the national consciousness as it related to American 
involvement in the conflict, it would also have a lasting impact on how the nation viewed 
its food system and perceived its food culture. Through the actions of the United States 
Food Administration and its various propaganda initiatives, food became much more 
than mere sustenance, or an indulgence, or even the expression of a particular culture. 
What someone ate became an expression of that person’s patriotism, of his or hers 
commitment to the nation and the war effort. Moreover, the institutional machinery that 
was created to generate this new approach to food would have impacts far beyond the 
war. For the first time, a relationship between the government, the advertising industry, 
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and nutritional experts was established that would continue throughout the rest of the 
century and generate the cultural force that has come to be known as “nutritionism.”8
In order to stir the emotions of the American population, the government called 
on the leaders of the nation’s advertising industry to help craft a message that would 
awaken the public consciousness. Amidst the triumph of mass consumerism during the 
early twentieth century, American advertisers had transformed the way goods were 
marketed to the public. As the frugality and thrift of pre-industrial consumer behavior 
gave way to the impulse and pleasure of modern shopping, the advertising industry 
became experts at targeting customers through emotionally-charged advertisements. 
Experts from various fields were called upon by the government to help mobilize 
American society for the war effort, and the Food Administration was no exception. 
In July of 1917 the J. Walter Thompson Company, headquartered in New York, 
was tapped by Hoover to serve as “advertising counsel” for the Food Administration.  
Though at the time the exact nature of the work was unclear, the company had already 
made explicit their objective to “make every piece of printed matter interesting, human, 
and attractive.” The company’s vice-president, Charles Raymond, came to the nation’s 
capital to oversee the Food Administration’s ad campaign. The services of the nation’s 
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most talented poster artists had already been secured, and talented ad copy writers 
prepared the material. The Food Administration quickly reached out to all of the nation’s 
newspapers and magazines to secure their cooperation to help promote what was 
dubbed “the biggest advertising campaign in the history of America.” Within a month, 
however, the advertising agency was able to formulate a more specific plan, and on the 
eve of the Food Bill’s passage in early August, the company produced a detailed report 
on the proposed advertising campaign for the U.S. Food Administration. While 
acknowledging the success already achieved by the Food Administration in “arousing 
the American public to a consciousness of the need for personal effort in food 
conservation,” the ad agency reported on how the current program might be enhanced, 
as well as pointed out potential weaknesses in the campaign that might be addressed.9
The report gave a detailed assessment of all forms of printed media that was to 
be employed. While the use of press notices was viewed as economical and able to 
reach a wide-ranging audience, it was criticized for not having the ability to connect 
directly with individuals on a personal level. In addition, the ephemeral nature of the 
news was a drawback, since the message of food conservation needed to remain within 
the public consciousness. Describing the news as more or less a form of entertainment, 
the report concluded that the use of press releases should be expected to do nothing 
more than generate a passive response and thus should be used as nothing more than 
an “accessory aid” to the propaganda program. Mediums such as posters, billboards, 
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and direct mail were also viewed critically. Posters could merely enhance an idea 
already conveyed, while direct mail, though more personal in nature, would be too 
costly and inefficient. With regard to the use of local organizations to arouse interest, 
once again the report viewed the potential impact as limited, both in terms of reach and 
durability.
The primary mode of printed publicity, according to the officials at J. Walter 
Thompson, was the use of advertisements in newspapers and magazines. They likened 
the work of the U.S. Food Administration to that of a commercial business trying to 
influence the behavior of potential customers. Press releases, posters, and other forms 
of media discussed above, according to the report, “would be the last that a progressive 
manufacturer would use to change the buying habits of the American people.” The use 
of commercial-style ads would allow for the combination of vibrant display and 
information, which, if printed in the various papers and magazines, could potentially 
reach the average American five times a day. It was also believed that the use of ads 
would lend an air of prestige and sincerity, and that such advertised propaganda could 
“be made interesting without conveying the idea that the reader has been unwittingly 
‘sold;’ for there is no deception involved in an open, honest, straightforward appeal.”  10
To supplement these ads, the report suggested that the Food Administration also 
periodically send out “official bulletins” of information, complete with the signature of 
Hoover, to be published in participating periodicals. In terms of style, it was advised that 
the majority of the space be a standard form, while the design and nature of decorative 
borders and opening statements be left to the discretion of each periodical. Such 
 Thompson report.10
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authoritative messages had the potential of becoming a “national event, to be looked for 
and read almost as one’s duty.”11
The themes of duty and service would come to permeate much of the 
propaganda generated by the U.S. Food Administration, and the task of convincing the 
American people to voluntarily alter their eating habits was itself compared to a military 
operation. Described as “entrenched in their customary habits as though in a military 
operation,” the public’s resistance had to be met with “corresponding and sufficient 
forces.” “What is needed,” argued the report, “is enough heavy artillery to annihilate 
opposition to a raid.” The Food Administration was advised to expect the message of 
food conservation to “encounter very great popular inertia.” In essence, the food control 
program of the U.S. Food Administration was to fundamentally, if only temporarily, alter 
national customs. In order to overcome the great obstacle of breaking people of their 
established beliefs and habits concerning food consumption, Americans remaining at 
home would have to better appreciate the immediacy and meaning of the war itself. The 
authors of the report used the language of war to describe the current state of the 
American public.12
However, the Food Administration was also keen to avoid making their message 
too militarized. An effort was made to avoid certain phrases, such as “food control 
army,” in describing the Food Administration and its voluntary members. Hoover 
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believed that focusing too much on war war imagery and language might ultimately turn 
off the main target of their message, the American housewife.  13
Upon the formal establishment of the Food Administration, a Public Information 
Division was created within the organization to deal specifically with the creation and 
distribution of propaganda. The department, also referred to as the Education Division, 
was headed by Ben Allen. Allen, a journalist and fellow Stanford alum, had worked 
closely with Hoover and the Commission for Relief in Belgium while he was with the 
Assoicated Press in England. Within this division were sections that dealt specifically 
with various avenues of publicity, including the news press, the motion picture and 
advertising industries, retail displays, and a number of different specialized publications, 
such as women’s, farm, and religious journals. Each section had a designated leader, 
and it was expected that these leaders would consult and work closely with the various 
experts that had been placed on staff. In addition, a great deal of autonomy was given 
to state and local Food Administration representatives. Hoover did not want to “force 
publicity” from the top-down. The material that came from Washington was limited to 
that of “first importance,” while additional efforts were to be handled by local officials. 
While the task of generating the propaganda was diffused, the ultimate release of 
information was tightly controlled from the top. To ensure a consistent message, and to 
make sure all information conformed to the latest policies, all final materials produced 
from the division were to pass first through Allen, and then on to Hoover’s office for 
approval. It was also established that Allen would handle any and all personal 
interactions with the news press, and all incoming calls from the press were to be 
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forwarded to him. However, despite the level of control taken on by Hoover and his 
office, it was also stressed that Food Administration propaganda needed to portray the 
agency as an institution comprised of the nation as a whole, not a singular personality. 
The division was under strict orders to avoid the use of Hoover’s name and likeness as 
much as possible.  14
On the day the Food Control Act was signed into law by President Wilson, the 
Public Information Division presented the government’s plan to present their message 
to the American people. Using the input from experts of various fields including home 
economics, nutrition, and public health, the agency aimed to cultivate among Americans 
a “new conception of national duty that will lead them to change their habits of living.” In 
creating the blueprint for food conservation propaganda, there was a conscious effort 
made to tap into the collective psychology of the population, to show that the food 
situation is serious, to cultivate an interest in conserving food, and to instill the belief 
that restrained eating habits would help win the war. In order to reach as many 
Americans as possible, Food Administration propaganda utilized every form of media. 
The agency worked closely with the nation’s newspapers, magazines, and journals. 
Editors for publications such as Today’s Housewife, Woman’s Home Companion, and 
the New York World joined the ranks of the Food Administration, ensuring that the 
government’s message would find its way to the pages and columns of the nation’s 
leading periodicals. It also displayed its message on posters and billboards, sponsored 
public lecture tours, and worked closely with the burgeoning motion picture industry. The 
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Food Administration also called on the country’s network of private institutions and 
organizations to spread the word. Churches, fraternal orders, patriotic societies, and 
labor unions were among the many groups that were utilized by the government to 
reach individual citizens at the local level. Special efforts were also made to cultivate 
open communication with hotels, restaurants, and other public eatings spaces, as well 
as food retailers, to ensure that they were also projecting the message of food 
conservation to their patrons.15
Much of the Food Administration’s publicity was geared towards generating an 
emotional response that would lead to compliance with their program. At the heart of 
this message was the idea that the food conservation program was a vital part of the 
nation’s overall war strategy. Thus, the language, and imagery, of war, was a central 
theme in Food Administration propaganda. it became essential to convey the idea to 
Americans that what they were eating in their homes became as important to the war’s 
outcome as what the soldiers were doing in the battlefields of Europe. The goal of the 
Food Administration was to foster a spirit of collective sacrifice at home, and associate 
food conservation with patriotism. 
Perhaps no other Food Administration official more clearly expressed the idea 
that practicing food conservation was an exercise in national service and the ultimate 
expression of patriotism than Dr. Vernon Kellogg, a Stanford biologist who had worked 
with Hoover in Europe on the Commission for Relief in Belgium. Kellogg joined the Food 
Administration staff as a nutrition expert and coordinator with Allied efforts. Writing in the 
Atlantic Monthly in November of 1917, Kellogg in very great detail presented to the 
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American people the “food problem” that not only threatened the United States, but the 
entire world. Citing an exhaustive string of figures, Kellogg explained how and why the 
Allied nations faced such dramatic shortages, and how and why it was up to the United 
States to solve the problem. By the United States taking on the duty of feeding its Allies, 
food conservation had become a patriotic service. Thus, the ultimate outcome of the 
war depended on the American people and their level of patriotism. “We are patriots 
enough to stand up with the right music, to float the flag, and to yell when the soldiers 
go by,” declares Kellogg, but “are we patriots enough to stand without flinching when 
our pockets and appetites are touched? We shall see.” His words expressed the hope 
that the Food Administrations work would produce a psychological effect and inspire 
patriotism by making the war real for those on the home front. The conservation 
program, according to Kellogg, offered the opportunity for universal service in a great 
national endeavor. “Patriotism and food!” exclaimed Kellogg, “Winning a world war by 
eating corn and chicken instead of wheat and beef!” He went on to convey the hope that 
this endeavor might have consequences that lasted beyond the end of the war. 
“Incidentally,” wrote Kellogg, “it may mean much fore for the years after the war; we may 
get the food-saving habit—and the habit of patriotism.”16
The use of vivid, patriotic imagery to sell the idea of food conservation was an 
extremely important aspect of Food Administration propaganda. One way this was done 
was through the publication of hundreds of different posters which were distributed 
nationwide and prominently displayed in various public settings, including schools, 
government buildings, train depots, and retail outlets. The posters all relied on symbols 
 Vernon Kellog, “Patriotism and Food,” Atlantic Monthly, November 1917, pp. 577-588; Vernon 16
Kellogg and Alonzo Taylor, The Food Problem (New York: Macmillan Co., 1917), 210.
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and slogans to stir the emotions of the American public through a combination of 
patriotism and fear. Uncle Sam, the American flag, and Lady Liberty were commonly 
featured. In one example, Lady Liberty, draped in the stars and stripes, looks straight 
ahead with arms outstretched and asks the viewer to “Be Patriotic” by signing the food 
pledge card. Additionally, militaristic imagery such as the battlefield or the trench were 
often presented to associate more directly people’s actions at home with the war being 
fought overseas. For example, one poster showed a colorful basket of fruits and 
vegetables imposed over an outline of American soldiers lined up for battle, with the 
caption, “Food is Ammunition - Don’t waste it!” Women and children in particular, as 
major groups that made up the home front, were targeted by Food Administration 
posters, and the overall theme of the publicity material reflected such gendered, middle-
class values as honor, duty, and efficiency. Posters were not only an effective way to 
elicit an emotional response from those remaining on the home front, they will also be 
used, as will be discussed in the following chapter, as an educational tool to show 
Americans how exactly they could follow the government’s food conservation program. 
Scholars have also noted that many of the same themes and techniques used by the 
government during World War I to promote their food control agenda will be used again 
to promote government food rationing during the Second World War.  17
One particular public venue that would play an important role in spreading the 
message of the Food Administration through vivid imagery was the motion picture 
theater. Although still in its infancy, the film industry was one the government hoped to 
 Tanfer Tunc, “Less Sugar, More Warships: Food as American Propaganda in the First Wold 17
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work closely with to reach the American public. A section specializing in motion pictures 
was organized within the Educational Division and headed up by Arthur Friend, an 
executive with Famous Players-Lasky Corporation, a prominent motion picture 
company. By 1917, there were over eighteen thousand theaters throughout the country, 
and the medium was recognized as being particularly effective in generating an 
emotional response from its audience. In the days leading up to the passage of the 
Lever Bill, Friend, working with John Wylie of the Moving Picture World, reached out to 
leaders of the film industry with the hopes of establishing a relationship in the realm of 
wartime food conservation. In a letter addressed to the nation’s leading manufacturers 
and distributers of moving pictures, the Food Administration sought to enlist the services 
of the film industry while also urging caution. The letter expressed an appreciation of the 
willingness of film makers and distributers to help the cause, but also stressed the 
importance of such efforts lining up with the message coming from the Food 
Administration. “Errors in messaging,” warned the agency, “would result in confusion 
and wasted effort.” As a result, the government asked that the industry hold off on 
releasing any film that attempted to address the issue of food conservation until “a plan 
of propaganda is worked out that is fundamentally sound in every particular.” The Food 
Administration concluded the letter by stressing its willingness to consult and advise 
motion picture producers regarding content relative to food conservation.18
The government also reached out to the nation’s film houses and motion picture 
theaters to request their participation in the program. Indicating the Food 
 Letter, John Wylie to Arthur Friend, August 8, 1917, Educational Division, 12HA-F13, Box 506, 18
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Administration’s plans to produce “an interesting series of motion pictures showing how 
‘Food Will Win the War,’” the government expressed a strong desire to have their work 
shown in every theater across the nation. Participating picture houses could consider 
themselves members of the Food Administration. Beyond the benefit of claiming 
membership in this government agency, the Food Administration stressed that other 
perks could result from cooperating. “You will not only be doing your country a helpful 
service,” declared the government agency, “but you will win for your theater a higher 
respect in your immediate community.” Additionally, a sense of gratification would result 
from the material contribution to “the greatest cause in our history.” In response to their 
request, the Food Administration received a number of letters from motion picture 
exhibitors expressing their willingness to assist. Theater owners and managers from 
large cities and small towns alike wrote letters of thanks for being given the opportunity 
to serve. A number of them also proclaimed that the motion picture was the one medium 
that could reach the greatest number of Americans. One theater owner went further to 
suggest that the motion picture audience would also be receptive to the Food 
Administration message, noting that, in general, his audiences were “very enthusiastic” 
whenever news reports on the war were shown on the screen, especially when 
accompanied by patriotic imagery such as the American flag.”19
 Letter, USFA to Motion Picture Exhibitors, September 7, 1917, Educational Division, 12HC-19
A4, Box 505, Record Group 4, National Archives, College Park, MD; Letter, W.L Sheibley to 
Arthur Friend, September 28, 1917, Letter, Ernest Stewart to Friend, September 25, 1917, 
Letter H.L. Beach to Friend, October 2, 1917, Letter, A.J. Salter to Friend, October 3, 1917, 
Letter, F.V. Thompson to Friend, September 27, 1917, Letter, J.H. Pillis to USFA, September 25, 
1917, Educational Division, 12HC-A4, Box 505, Record Group 4, National Archives, College 
Park, MD.
 74
In terms of involvement with the actual production of moving pictures, the Food 
Administration was active on a number of different levels, from reviewing, altering, and 
approving films from various private companies, to producing and distributing films and 
slides of their own. It was clear from the beginning that the government saw the 
potential impact this emerging industry could have on getting their message out to the 
American public. Hebert Hoover was contacted directly by an individual from Illinois who 
told of his plans to produce a motion picture that embraced subjects such as increasing 
the production of coal, the appeal to Americaʼs youth to join the armed forces, and the 
conservation of foods, all of which were to be “embodied in one huge dramatic picture.” 
He told the Food Administrator’s head of his intent to use, as a visual effect, a banquet 
scene set in a hotel, “at which Corn bread is used, instead of Wheat.” Hoover 
responded with keen interest to the “plan for incorporating food propaganda” in the film, 
requesting a copy of the script and offering assistance if it “conform[ed] to our policy.” In 
early August, before passage of the Lever Bill, the Motion Picture Division of the Food 
Administration was contacted by a member of the Vagabond Players, a small 
community theater out of Baltimore, Maryland. The troupe had produced, under the 
supervision of the Baltimore City Food Commission, what they dubbed a “food 
conservation movie,” and had reached out to the government agency to gauge its 
interest in using the film as part of their propaganda campaign. Entitled Fighting at 
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Home, the picture’s story focused on one of the central themes of the Food 
Administration’s message - that of food conservation as national service.  20
The movie’s plot centered on the tale of a young man, named Fred, who was 
denied the opportunity to join the military and fight overseas. Despite being rejected by 
the military for reasons beyond his control, Fred is initially labelled a “slacker” by many 
in his community. However, he is quickly inspired by the message of food conservation 
being pushed by the government, which declared that “the agricultural army at home is 
just as important as the actual army in the field.” Thus, Fred finds a way to serve the 
nation’s cause and fight the enemy by following and promoting the government’s food 
control program. He initiates a number of food conservation measures in his community, 
including the organization of canning classes and lectures on food issues, the formation 
of a community food market, and the promotion of home gardens among his neighbors. 
The climax of the film comes when Fred is confronted by corrupt local politicians, whose 
food profiteering racket was being threatened by his actions to conserve food and cut 
prices. Though initially looking to “beat some sense” into the young patriot, the 
profiteers are shamed into a change of heart by Fred when he poses the following 
question: “The men, fighting in the trenches, are making the supreme sacrifice for their 
country. Shall we, who stay at home, sacrifice nothing?” In response, the men declare 
their intentions of becoming true patriots and following Fred’s lead. Initially viewed with 
suspicion and scorn by community leaders due to his lack of military service, the young 
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man eventually wins their respect and admiration for his conservation work. As a result, 
he is made an honorary officer in the government’s “Food Army.” Finally, to further 
heighten the emotional appeal of the film’s message, the patriotic efforts of the film’s 
protagonist win for him the girl he loves.21
Despite not being the product of a major film producer, the film’s quality was 
good enough for nationwide release, declared the theater company representative. The 
movie had already received the approval of some noted industry experts, and two of the 
most popular film houses in Baltimore had agreed to show the moving picture. Arthur 
Friend, head of the Motion Picture Division in the Food Administration, expressed a 
strong interest in the project, and quickly made arrangements to view the picture in 
Washington.  Overall, Friend found the movie “rather interesting,” and felt that it had 
promise to become part of the agency’s propaganda campaign. However, he also 
pointed out that some changes would have to be made in the film’s captions if it were to 
be adopted by the Food Administration. First, in order to comply with the objective of the 
Food Administration’s head that propaganda avoid as much as possible the use of his 
name or likeness, any mention of Herbert Hoover was to be removed. Stressing the 
institution over the individual, it was advised by Friend that the film increase the 
presence of the Food Administration itself by giving more screen time to its slogans and 
symbols throughout. Additions to the film’s dialog were also made to further coordinate 
the movie’s message with that of the government’s. For example, during the film’s final 
scene, the Food Administration adds the following proclamation issued by the 
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government to the hero of the picture: “Fred, you have proved that you can be a patriot 
without wearing a uniform.”  22
Over the course of the next several weeks, the two parties engage in protracted 
negotiations as the theater company tried to ensure proper distribution and the Food 
Administration attempted to ensure that the proper revisions were made to the film’s 
story. Finally, at the end of November the Food Administration contacted the Vagabond 
Players to express its interest in purchasing the film outright from the theater company. 
The government stressed its desire to close the deal quickly and essentially told the 
Players to name their price. Further, the agency stated that the purchase would include 
the transfer of all rights to the film, and any further changes to the movie’s content 
would be done by the Food Administration. They planned to produce six copies of the 
picture and distribute it to theaters across the country. Finally, on December 7, the 
purchase of the film was finalized, and the film was to be sent to Arthur Friend’s offices 
in New York City so final revisions and duplications could be made. This, however, is the 
last known communication concerning Fighting at Home. It is not known whether the 
film was ever given its full release by the Food Administration. However, its story clearly 
reflects the desire on the part of the Food Administration to, not only portray the food 
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conservation program as an opportunity for national service, but to further place such 
service on the same level as participation in the military.23
Another example of the Food Administration’s work with the film industry involved 
a collaboration with more established members of the motion picture community. In 
August of 1917 representatives of Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Drew, a famous comedy act, 
contacted Arthur Friend to express their desire to show their newest film to Hoover. The 
duo claimed to have worked with the Food Administration’s own Dr. Wilbur to compose 
the film’s story, the result being that it contained  “considerable food propaganda treated 
in a manner to send a message home to the American people.” Entitled The Patriot, the 
moving picture was shown to Food Administration officials at a private screening on 
August 16 at the Savoy Theater in D.C., before its public release. Although the specific 
details of the film’s plot are not known, it is clear that the government approved of its 
content, as it helped organize and promote screenings of the picture throughout the 
country in the summer and fall of 1917. In one example, the Food Administration 
contacted the society editor of the New York American, urging him to publicize a local 
meeting of household servants. The goal of the gathering was to equip the cooks and 
food handlers with the tools that would allow them to “do the real war service of carrying 
out the suggestions” being made by the Food Administration. The highlight of the 
meeting was to be the public premiere of The Patriot. Although the government did not 
own the film, it frequently instructed Drew on where to send the picture for screenings, 
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and there’s one example of Drew requesting permission from the Food Administration to 
show the film at a number of meetings.24
In another instance, the Knickerbocker Film Company of New York requested the 
approval of the Food Administration for a list of films with titles such as “A Bride With 
Brains,” “Wasteful Winnieʼs Awakening,” and “As Good as Wheat.” These films, 
according to Knickerbocker, “treat[ed] the subject of Food Conservation in a practical 
way by giving the actual demonstrations and, at the same time, have human interest 
touches and events which might occur in any home in the United States.” If films were 
produced to meet the policy of the Food Administration, they would receive an official 
approval. This process of obtaining the Food Administrationʼs stamp of approval could 
become tedious and involve various rewrites and reshoots to an existing film. In an 
exchange with the Universal Film Manufacturing Company concerning a picture starring 
May Irwin, the Food Administration suggested extensive changes to make it conform to 
government regulations. The film had Miss Irwin making “freedom bread,” but she 
clearly used four cups of wheat flour to one cup of cornmeal. The entire scene would 
have to be changed to show a greater proportion of the wheat substitute. Such 
interactions show how deeply involved the Food Administration was with the private film 
industry and how concerned it was with promoting a carefully crafted message.25
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However, despite having limited involvement in the actual production of moving 
pictures early on, by the end of its first year the Food Administration had begun 
experimenting with making its own films. In August of 1918 the agency partnered with 
Arthur Friend’s Laskey-Paramount Company to produce a cartoon relating to sugar 
consumption. Noting that it had previously only produced slides that were shown prior to 
feature films and that, in their own words, were “not altogether satisfactory,” the Food 
Administration distributed this short animated film to a number of state food 
administrators as an experiment. It wanted these local officials to screen the movie and 
then provide feedback to the central office in D.C. on how it was received by the public. 
The Food Administration was also keen to explore the possible use of new film industry 
technologies to spread their message of conservation. Around the same time the 
agency was experimenting with producing their own films, Ray Wilbur was reporting on 
demonstrations he witnessed of equipment that synchronized film with sound by 
simultaneously using a phonograph and moving film projector. He further stated that 
both exhibitors he met with were anxious to make the technology available to the 
government for use in its propaganda campaigns. Wilbur apparently came away 
intrigued with its possibilities. “Since new things will be required if there is to be a very 
striking impression made upon the public,” declared the Food Administration official, 
“this scheme is well worthy of careful consideration.” Wilbur believed that the technology 
could be used to show various speeches by the likes of Hoover and President Wilson, 
which, when combined with “a number of actual, well-chosen war pictures, would make 
a very strong appeal.” Though securing the use of the new synchronized pictures would 
cost a considerable amount, he suggested that the financial burden could be spread 
 81
amongst all of the government agencies involved in generating propaganda, since they 
would all benefit from the technology.  26
Motion picture houses, as well as other types of theaters, were also used by 
speakers who addressed audiences on the issues of food control and conservation. 
Although no formal public speaking division was ever created by the Food 
Administration, the agency worked closely with other organizations, both private and 
governmental, to arrange the use of speakers. To ensure that the message conveyed 
was one that adhered to the Food Administration’s principles, it periodically published a 
bulletin which contained a broad collection of facts, figures, and slogans that speakers 
were encouraged to use in their public addresses. As early as July of 1917, when the 
Food Control Bill was still being debated in Congress, speakers working on behalf of the 
government stood before audiences armed with a number of specific talking points 
concerning the food problem and the proposed solution. By October, the Food 
Administration had distributed over forty thousand pieces of literature to fifty-seven 
hundred speakers throughout the nation. The Home Conservation Section had 
conducted a complete survey of the nation, reaching out to the officers of a number of 
local organizations for a list of expert speakers in their respective communities. A 
registered list of over twelve thousand potential speakers was complied by the Food 
Administration. The government wanted speakers to stress the immediate causes and 
effects of food control at home, and the fact that the outcome of the war depended on a 
government-led conservation program. Speakers were also instructed to focus on the 
more fundamental aspects of the food problem and its solution. The proposed program 
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of voluntary cooperation in democratic America would be put up against the program of 
rations, decrees, and bread cards found in autocratic Germany. Quotes such as: “To fail 
in unity of purpose would be the undoing of America,” and “To fail in self-control would 
be a betrayal of democracy,” were included in the bulletins.27
Such points were stressed even more for speakers once food control legislation 
was passed and the Food Administration was officially organized. Speakers were 
instructed to stress food control both as an opportunity for ordinary citizens to serve, 
and as a major test for American democracy itself. A typical passage delivered to 
audiences was as follows:
Food Administration is an adventure in democracy staking the 
issues of war on volunteer effort. By self-control, not by decree; 
By cooperation, not by compulsion; To provision our associates 
in the war sufficiently by conducting our own households wisely. 
Americans were told that the conflict went beyond the immediate boundaries of the 
current war. It was a battle of autocracy versus democracy, with “one system or the 
other commanding civilization in the next stage of the world.” The government’s call for 
food conservation, unlike its calls for military duty, was a form of service all Americans 
could partake in, and it was expected that all Americans, regardless of social or 
economic status, would partake. Attaining a unity of purpose was essential. “War will not 
tolerate slackness,” stressed one talking point, “neither sloth for fighting nor 
extravagance of living.” Wasteful consumption from the wealthy would promote class 
dissent and undermine the needed sense of unity. The goal was to unite all of society 
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under the banner of thrift. Such “universal service” paved they way for “universal 
peace.” Success in this undertaking was linked to the broader objectives of the nation’s 
involvement in the war itself, as laid out by Wilson himself — “making the world safe for 
democracy.” Further, if Americans could save enough food to defeat the German threat, 
it would prove that democracy was safe for the rest of the world.28
In addition to organizing its own speaking engagements, the Food Administration 
also worked closely with the Committee on Public Information to secure the services of 
the famous Four-Minute Men to deliver the message of food control to Americans. On at 
least three different occasions, the Food Administration provided to the Division of Four-
Minute Men a special bulletin for its twenty-five hundred speakers. In early July 1917, a 
full month before the Food Administration was officially organized, Hoover relied on 
existing Four-Minute Men, and they were instructed to “bring home the fundamental 
necessity of the personal service of each man, woman, and child” to follow the 
government’s lead as it related to food behavior. The Food Administration was also very 
cautious to ensure that the correct tone was used by the Four-Minute Men. While it was 
important that speakers portray the food situation as a serious and important matter, 
they also had to keep the audience engaged and avoid creating a sense of 
hopelessness. Speakers were encouraged to make the audience laugh at least once. 
“Do this,” proclaimed the director of the Four-Minute Men William Blair, “and you will be 
remembered all summer and it will be a pleasure to eat one-half of what has been 
customary - not a deprivation.” The personal obligation to serve was stressed, while the 
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actual role of the government was to be downplayed. It was up to each person to be 
their own “food controller,” the Food Administration was merely pointing the way. The 
speakers were also encouraged to portray the food crisis as an opportunity for 
Americans to reform wasteful food behaviors. Four-Minute Men were instructed to 
deliver lines such as, “Now is the time to lay your double chin on the altar of liberty; you 
don’t need it anyway.”29
In addition to wanting to reach Americans with the message of food conservation 
as they traveled by bus or train, read the paper, or attended the moving picture house, 
the Food Administration also wanted its presence felt inside the kitchen. There was a 
strong belief shared by Hoover and his associates that in order for their plan to succeed, 
the food problem had to “be brought to each door step.” One important way this was 
accomplished was through the implementation of a Home Card campaign. For those 
individuals who decided to participate, such a program not only served as a constant 
reminder of what was expected of them with respect to food choices, it also provided an 
opportunity for the government to more explicitly present to ordinary American citizens 
an opportunity to serve by actually becoming a “member” of the U.S. Food 
Administration. Perhaps more than any other aspect of the food conservation program, 
the Home Card campaign expressed how the war would fundamentally change how the 
government would come to influence how Americans ate. 
The campaign was actually begun in the summer of 1917, and remained part of 
the Food Administration’s program for much of the war. The primary target of the Home 
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Card, and the food conservation program as a whole, was the American housewife. In 
June President Wilson pointed out that while Congress was still bickering over food 
control legislation, American women were growing anxious in waiting to do their part. 
The president advised them that the best way to help was by “enlisting in the service of 
the food administration and cheerfully accepting its direction and advice.” Soon after 
taking control of the government agency, Hoover made a direct appeal to the women of 
America. The language of service and war imagery was present throughout the 
government’s appeal to women. By registering for membership in the Food 
Administration women would be “entering directly into national service.” While the 
country’s young men risked their lives in the battlefields of Europe, those that remained 
at home could “fight by helping the fighter fight.”  30
Hoover rather matter-of-factly declared that it was up to the housewives of the 
United States to feed the rest of the world and ensure victory for the United States and 
its allies. While the head of the Food Administration was quick to point out the difficulty 
of the task ahead, he also expressed a faith in the American public as a whole, and the 
American housewife in particular, that they would willingly do whatever was asked of 
them. The keys, according to Hoover, were not only informing the public of the current 
food crisis abroad, but also making them aware of the food problem at home. While 
across the Atlantic access to nutrition was severely limited, a practices of a relatively 
large portion American households had helped in earning “the deserved reputation of 
the most wasteful housekeeping in the world.” Once again, the situation is portrayed as 
an opportunity, one in which the nation’s women could “make our country a model of 
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economical management throughout the world.” In addition, the language of war and 
service is used to compel action. Addressing American women directly, Hoover asserted 
that they “now face the immediate duty of taking up arms in your household.” “The wolf 
is at the door of all the world,” declared Hoover, and the outcome of the war itself was 
on the shoulders of the women of the nation.31
To organize the American women in “a great army,” the Food Administration 
asked each of them to become an actual member of the government agency. This was 
described by Hoover as being “one of the most important factors in the Administration’s 
plan.” By becoming actual members of the Food Administration, citizens would become 
a more receptive audience, and a general feeling of cooperative support could be more 
easily cultivated. The tiny pledge cards, approximately the size of a modern business 
card, were distributed through various channels, including religious organizations, civic 
groups, and local food conservation boards. The registration campaign began on July 
1st, but it wasn’t until the autumn of 1917 that a major, nationwide drive for pledge card 
distribution was organized. The drive was to last for seven days, from October 27 to 
November 4, with the goal of distributing tens of millions of pledge cards to the 
American people. General guidance came from Washington, but implementation was to 
be handled at the state level. State Food Administrators oversaw the distribution, while 
subcommittees were formed at the local level to handle logistics. Making clear that they 
sought as members the individual in the home responsible for handling the food, the 
card read as follows: “I am glad to join the service of the food conservation for our 
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nation and I hereby accept membership in the United States Food Administration, 
pledging myself to carry out the directions and advice of the Food Administration in my 
home, insofar as my circumstances permit.” The card also asked individuals to provide 
certain household details such as number of residents, the occupation of the 
breadwinner, and whether or not the house has a garden or employs a cook.  32
There were no dues or fees required to become a member of the Food 
Administration, and those that joined and provided a mailing address would receive a 
Home Card of Instruction to hang in the kitchen. The card was double-sided, with one 
side providing a detailed explanation as to why Americans were being asked to 
sacrifice. It explains in detail the food crisis facing the Allied nations, as well as the 
reasons why the United States as a result has to send more of its food overseas. The 
flip side of the Home Card contains at the top the phrase: “What You Can Do to Help 
Win This War.” It then went on to explain in detail what is expected of Americans with 
regard to consumption of specific foodstuffs, including wheat, beef, pork, dairy and 
sugar.  In addition to the card that hung in the kitchen, Americans that signed on with 33
the conservation program were also given a card that was to be hung in a window for 
public display. This particular aspect of the Home Card campaign was based on a 
practice in England, in which cards, bearing the phrase “This House Has Given A 
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Soldier To Fight,” were displayed in the windows of families of soldiers. In large, bold 
letters, the Food Administration window card advertised that the inhabitants were 
members of the agency and contained the official emblem of the government agency, 
which was composed of a United States shield surrounded by a wreath of wheat.34
In addition to the private home, the public eating spaces of America were offered 
the opportunity to sign a special pledge card. To be filled out by the manager of the 
hotel or restaurant, the signed card committed the space to observe the directives and 
regulations of the Food Administration. Each business was then provided an official 
placard that could be displayed as evidence of its membership. Though such an 
approach was certainly inspired by the belief that a great deal of compliance would be 
secured from progressive businesses that bought into the concept of national sacrifice 
and service, it is not unreasonable to think that there was a hope that even businesses 
more concerned with the bottom line would see compliance and the opportunity to 
publicize it as good business practice. The nation’s movie theaters were also given the 
opportunity to become members of the Food Administration. Those theaters that signed 
and returned pledge cards were sent a framed certificate that they were expected to 
display in the lobby.35
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The Food Administration looked to public venues such as moving picture houses 
to also promote the pledge card drive among individuals. In September of 1917 the 
Washington office reached out to the state Administration representatives to encourage 
them to appeal to their local motion picture exhibitors. In much the same way they had 
made their general appeal for support earlier in the summer, the Food Administration 
sought the help from the industry in promoting the drive by presenting it as an 
opportunity to “demonstrate their loyalty, their patriotism, and their absolute commitment 
to the principles of democratic government.” Further, they could prove the oft-made 
claim by the industry that the moving picture was the greatest power and force for good. 
In terms of specific plans for theaters, the Food Administration was to make available by 
the start of the drive on October 21 a collection of short newsreel clips from prominent 
studios such as Pathe and Universal. The clips showed events relating to the Food 
Administration, such as Congressional leaders voting for the Food Control Bill, the 
president signing the legislation into law, and Herbert Hoover leaving the White House. 
In addition, the agency had prepared two series of slides promoting the Pledge Card 
drive and food conservation in general that they expected the theaters to show before 
every feature. They were also asked to display official Food Administration posters, 
including the official “shield of service,” the slogan, “Food Will Win the War,” and the 
statement “Official pictures of the United States Food Administration are shown at this 
theater.” It was expected that that both the membership certificates and the posters be 
displayed “conspicuously” in the lobbies and “present an attractive appearance,” and 
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were to remain there for the duration of the war. The hope was that such displays would 
serve as advertisements for the Administration’s work in the film industry.36
The Four-Minute men were also once again utilized to deliver the message of 
food conservation and stress the importance of becoming members of the Food 
Administration. At the end of October the speakers were instructed to focus their talks 
on the food pledge drive and were once again provided a packet of information to guide 
their speeches. The goal of the speech according to Hoover was to inspire the nation to 
action and to “enlist as nearly as a possible one hundred percent of America’s twenty-
two million households in an army that will wholeheartedly support food conservation.” 
While patriotic appeals for sacrifice were powerful and certainly a central theme to the 
agency’s propaganda, the Four-Minute men were also encouraged to put a more 
positive positive spin on the Food Administration’s program. First, they were told to point 
out that the goal of the government was not to deprive Americans of needed nutrients 
nor the basic pleasure of eating. Additionally, it was to be stressed that the program 
involved no forced coercion from the government. Americans, unlike the Europeans, 
were given the freedom to choose compliance. Further, speeches were to proclaim that 
the Food Administration was looking out for the nation’s best interests, and the food 
control program not only offered an opportunity to serve the nation, but it also provided 
an opportunity for Americans to improve their lives. Audiences were told that if everyone 
joined in, the cost of food would go down. It was a chance to learn something new, “to 
change appetites, to cook differently, and thus feed your family better than before at less 
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expense.” Speakers were told to inform Americans that changing food habits was not 
just a war necessity, it was also a permanent necessity.37
In addition to the more practical arguments made above, the Four-Minute Men 
were also instructed to appeal very strongly to he audience’s conscience. Not only 
would changing food behavior to conserve be the practical thing to do, it was also the 
moral thing to do. Speakers were to emphasize the need for the nation to get back to a 
time when the waste of foods was a sin. “Implanting this concept,” proclaimed the 
instructions, “will eventually impact eating habits.” The prospect of butter, a foodstuff 
that needed to be conserved, being used in cooking would become so unappealing that 
the palate of the American man would actually come to prefer meat prepared with the 
less scarce vegetable fats. Such transformations would not only result in a nationwide 
spiritual cleansing, but it would have the added bonus of pushing the country towards 
healthier eating habits. Speakers were also encouraged to avoid discussion of broad, 
underlying factors causing the food problem. The point was to make the crisis as 
personal as possible. Thus, it was important to focus on how the Food Administration’s 
program not only provided an opportunity to prove one’s patriotism, but could also lead 
to such things as a reduction in the cost of living and better overall personal health.38
To further strengthen the association between food conservation and wartime 
service, the Food Administration also began offering in the July of 1917 the opportunity 
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for women to obtain an official Food Administration uniform. Just as those soldiers 
enlisted in the nation’s military were expected to wear the official government-issued 
regalia as part of their service, the those willing to join the “great food army” being 
assembled on the home front were given the opportunity to obtain their own “attractive 
service costume.” The leadership at the Food Administration called the women who 
chose to wear the uniform “a symbol of the Democracy and uniformity of purpose which 
inspires their service in the great Food Conservation campaign of the Government.”39
There were two options available to women who wanted to acquire the uniform. 
For a dime, the Food Administration would send a pattern, complete with a size chart 
and general directions for cutting and sewing. The body was to be made of a plain blue 
material of the regulation shade, while the cap and button-on sleeves of white pique. 
They could also purchase a pair of embroidered insignias, which were to be applied 
only to the uniform’s cap and the sleeve. The government was explicit in stating that the 
patches could not be used on other types of clothing or “any place but where 
designated.” This option, claimed the Food Administration, allowed “thrifty women to 
make the service uniform at home in a short time and at little cost.” However, many of 
the country’s clothing manufacturers also produced the uniform, and so women could 
also purchase the costume “off-the-rack” at department stores across the nation. Upon 
its launch, the Food Administration worked hard to promote the pledge card and 
costume and market them much like the newest fashions and latest fads, while also 
imbuing it with the messages of national service and patriotic sacrifice. Images and 
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reports of pledge card signings and women in uniform found their way into various 
forms of Food Administration propaganda. The agency frequently took the opportunity to 
publicize examples of women from all ranks of American society buying into the 
conservation program, from minorities and the working class, to the nation’s social and 
political elite.  40
Within a few weeks of launching this massive campaign, Hoover’s faith in the 
volunteer spirit of America’s democratic society appeared to be validated. By the first 
week of August in 1917, he could claim that over one million signed pledge cards had 
been received in Washington, while “many thousands” of Food Administration uniforms 
had been purchased. A woman from Missouri wrote Hoover to inform him that the ladies 
of her county had “registered liberally” for the pledge card drive. The response had been 
so enthusiastic that they had composed a song which they hope would further “enthuse 
registration.” Entitled “Woman’s War Cry,” the lyrics displayed that at least some of 
America’s women had clearly associated their call to conservation with a military 
exercise:
We will rally ‘round our boys and obey the nation’s call,
Shouting the battle cry of ‘FREED ‘EM!’
Eat more cornbread and less potatoes boil,
Shouting the battle cry of ‘FREED ‘EM!’
Our boys must have meat but we can do without,
Helping Hoover to feed ‘em,
If they the Kaiser beat we will have to get about,
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Doing our bit to help feed ‘em41
In addition, Hoover could point to actual numbers that suggested that Americans had 
already begun conserving food. He also claimed that he was receiving “splended 
cooperation” from the nation’s leading hotel and restaurant men, while various private 
organizations, including religious, fraternal, and patriotic groups, were “marching behind 
the food banner.” In addition to continuing the intensive publicity and pledge card 
campaigns, the Food Administration also had devised plans to foster the creation of 
“special, private ‘food organizations’” that could operate at the state and local level and 
coordinate with official state and federal Food Administration officials.42
According to Hoover, these early successes were due largely to the fact that 
Americans had been convinced that their sacrifice was key in determining the outcome 
of the war, while at the same time being assured that this sacrifice did not mean 
discomfort. By the time the Lever Bill had become law, Hoover felt confident enough to 
declare that “the necessity of intelligent conservation and substitution” had permeated 
the consciousness of the American people. However, evidence was also mounting that 
suggested Americans were not as receptive to the government’s program of food 
conservation as had been initially anticipated. Throughout the second half of 1917 the 
offices of the Food Administration were flooded with letters from citizens that took 
objection to the food conservation program for one reason or another. Additionally, the 
 Letter, Miss H. Trice to USFA, July 30, 1917, Box 490, 12HA-A11, Educational Division, 41
General Office, Record Group #4, Records of the USFA, National Archives.
 Letter, Hoover to Lawrence, August 3, 1917, 12HA-A11, Box 490, RG #4, National Archives. 42
Hoover cites statistics on garbage collections in the nation’s largest cities to support his claim of 
food conservation.
 95
agency itself took great pains to actively go out and gather as much information as it 
could regarding how the government’s message was being received by the public. 
Despite Hoover’s positive outlook on the overall success of the Food 
Administration campaign, the actual numbers showed that they were falling short of 
their own expectations. In the wake of the major pledge card drive held at the end of 
October, official returns showed that pledge card goals were reached in only thirteen of 
forty-eight states, while the agency was two million short of their overall nationwide goal.  
The Public Speakers Division, which had organized over one hundred events in the final 
ten days of September, received a report from the field on October 1st that attendance 
was poor. Word coming from state and local officials was also at times discouraging. 
Officials in Washington were told by a representative in Philadelphia that the pledge 
card was “hated apparently by everybody,” with local organizations complaining that 
they could not give them away. State officials also expressed reservations about the 
Food Administration uniforms, which was primarily based on concerns over affordability. 
The fear was that those that could not spare the money to purchase the uniform would 
be made to feel like they were not full-fledged members and thus less likely to go along 
with the campaign.43
By October of 1917 some media outlets were already writing about Hoover’s 
“Food Control Failure.” Writing in The Forum, noted food expert Alfred McCann 
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presented a frank criticism of both the Food Administration and Herbert Hoover himself. 
Proclaiming that the agency was “destined to leave the world no better than it found it,” 
McCann portrayed the Food Administration as an unnecessary expansion of 
government bureaucracy that had done nothing to stop the practices of hoarding and 
profiteering that contributed to ever-rising food prices. McCann also called into question 
the credentials of the agency’s leader, claiming that “an efficient department store 
manager would have done the job” as head of the Commission for Relief in Belgium 
“with precisely the same results.” The Food Administration at this point was only two 
months old, but McCann was already proclaiming that the nation’s “faith in Hooverism 
as a miracle-working religion is already on the decline.”  44
These developments reflected the overall ambivalence towards the war felt by 
many Americans. The fact that the nation was not universally behind the decision to 
declare war on Germany and enter the conflict is well-documented. Thus, it is not 
surprising to find that the public as a whole failed to fully buy into the program presented 
by the Food Administration. Such resistance can partly be explained by the growing 
fears of a central authority becoming a threat to individual liberty. These fears were 
aired both by concerned citizens and the political opposition to the Food Control Act 
detailed earlier. Historians have traced this stance against intrusive federal authority 
back to the rural post-Civil War South as southern farmer fought against government 
policies to modernize farming techniques. There was also a socioeconomic dimension 
to this resistance. Working class Americans believed the food control program was 
unfairly harsh, given that their economic situation already limited their food options. 
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Again, this reflected a broader strain in the war resistance that viewed the entire conflict 
as a “Rich Man’s War, and a Poor Man’s Fight.” Recent scholarship has found that, 
even in the rural South, a region noted for its martial tradition, resistance to the war and 
military desertion was fairly widespread.45
In the fall of 1917 the Food Administration examined some of the negative 
feedback it had received from the public since its inception. Based on a study of letters 
sent from Americans to Hoover and his agency, it was found that criticisms fell under 
one or more of twenty-three different categories. People felt that they were being asked 
to commit to a program that they did not fully understand, and the expectations that 
were understood were unrealistic. There existed among many a deep suspicion of 
government motives. Many Americans objected to what they felt was “blind obedience 
to the government.” “Fear” and “confusion” were two words that commonly appeared in 
letters to the Food Administration throughout the summer and fall of 1917. A number of 
letters expressed the concern that the food conservation program was merely a first 
step in a process that would eventually involve government confiscation of food from 
private homes. According to them, the pledge card drive was a way for the government 
to compile a list of names and addresses of future targets. The National American 
Woman Suffrage Association wrote to Hoover’s office and said that among the many 
objections they had noticed locally in New York was the fear that card signees would be 
required to send food away from their homes regardless of their needs. The Committee 
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on Public Information even informed the Food Administration of a report from a local 
CPI women’s committee in Missouri in which the existence of a widespread fear that the 
pledge card campaign was part of a secret program to “take people out of their homes 
and send them to France and various other places.” The lack of specificity in what 
exactly was expected of each American caused a great deal of frustration among the 
public. For some, the wording of the pledge itself was a problem. The final line that tried 
to limit an individual’s sacrifice to what his or her circumstances could permit provided 
an open door for many to opt out of the program altogether.   46
As early as July, a concerned citizen brought to Hoover’s attention a report from 
New Jersey which noted widespread complaints from local women in response to the 
pledge card drive. According to those surveyed by the newspaper, most women felt that 
current food prices were already forcing them to cut back on food consumption. Rather 
than waste time asking citizens to conserve, they argued that the government should 
focus its efforts on curbing practices from whole-sellers and retailers that were driving 
up prices. “Let the government stop the destruction of things to eat,” asserted one 
woman, “and we would sight these pledge cards with better grace.” Another concerned 
citizen wrote that the women of his neighborhood had destroyed their cards, refusing, 
as he said, “to jump into something blind-folded as it were.” A woman writing from 
Massachusetts called the pledge card idea “impractical and foolish.” Since the 
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government relied on voluntary compliance and lacked any real enforcement powers, 
she argued that it would be easy for insincere Americans to simply sign the card and 
“still continue to go on doing just as they have been doing.” There was even one 
example of a woman who had signed the pledge and joined the ranks of the Food 
Administration requesting to have her membership cancelled. After considering the 
requests being made by the government, she felt that she was not equipped financially 
to comply. “I live as cheap as any one can,” asserted the Virginia woman, “let those with 
ability do the work.”47
 Economic issues were certainly a common theme expressed in many of the 
correspondences from the public. While the food crisis certainly intensified existing 
class tensions within American society, it is also apparent that one of the unintended 
consequences of the Food Administration campaign was the creation of new stresses 
for those living within the lower segments of the socioeconomic ladder. Even before 
before the United States officially entered the conflict, the rising cost of living had 
caused hardship for millions of Americans. As discussed in the previous chapter, war 
caused prices to rise even higher, and a number of American cities had already 
experienced food riots. At the end of June, a reverend from Maine wrote to Hoover, 
expressing the view that current the current food program essentially punished poor 
citizens while those entities responsible for driving up food prices were being left 
untouched. He asserted that citizens would not heed government calls to serve as long 
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as this perceived dynamic existed. Patriotism would only be stimulated, according to the 
religious leader, when the government solved the food problems at home. Calling the 
food pledge drive “simply absurd and a great waste of time and money,” a man writing 
from the nation’s capital complained that it was nearly impossible for poor Americans to 
purchase enough food to avoid going hungry. Those Americans already struggling to 
avoid hunger on a meager diet of staples were often frustrated, and sometimes outright 
offended, by government requests that asked them purchase more expensive 
substitutes for wheat and meat such as cornmeal, fish, and fresh fruits and vegetables. 
According to a woman in Florida, the poor were being asked to sacrifice more than the 
wealthy. “Women of the working class have been skimping [sic] and saving and actually 
underfeeding our families for months because our incomes would not buy sufficient 
food,” wrote Kate O’Hare, “and all the while the food speculators were piling up their 
millions.” For many in the working class, it did not seem fair that the government asked 
them to not only give up their young men to fight overseas, but to also deprive their 
families at home, while large corporate interests seemingly made record profits.48
While economic issues might have had a larger impact on the public’s objections 
to the Food Administration’s conservation program than its leadership had anticipated, 
they were aware of the potential problems it might cause. From the beginning, some of 
the Food Administration’s propaganda focused specifically on the nation’s wealthiest 
segments in an attempt to ensure that they would participate as well. In a speech given 
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before the Smithsonian Institution, Hoover addressed the issue of class and its impact 
on food conservation. On the issue of food prices, he warned of even higher prices in 
the future if measures are not taken now to conserve food for the Allies. And while 
Hoover was speaking of the entire nation, rich and poor, when he stressed the unique 
opportunity for national service the food conservation program provided, he also took 
the opportunity to single out certain segments of the wealthier class. “We have had 
growing in this country,” declared the Food Administration head, “a class of the 
population given over to more or less idleness and a great deal of extravagance.” This, 
according to Hoover, had contributed at least in part to the growing class tensions. By 
following the government’s conservation measures, America’s idle rich could 
“demonstrate its fidelity to the national cause and its willingness to share its full portion 
of the national burden.”49
When it came to responding to the various questions and criticisms coming from 
ordinary Americans regarding the cost of food, the Food Administration created a form 
letter that in great detail pointed out the causes of price increases, the best solution, and 
the ultimate outcome of this solution. Rather than greedy food producers and 
middlemen, the cost of food was going up primarily because extra money was being 
paid to farmers to increase output despite labor shortages. In addition, various 
transportation and distribution issues, both at home and abroad, were making more 
difficult to get foodstuffs to market. The letter also pointed out that despite the recent 
inflation in prices at home, they were not as bad as what nations such as England and 
Germany had experienced. The best solution to this problem was for sacrifice at home. 
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“We must set aside habits of method and habits of taste,” declared the Food 
Administration, “forego all luxury and indulgence.” The result of such sacrifice would not 
only ensure victory and make the “world safe for democracy,” it would also help save 
democracy at home. In making its kitchens less wasteful and more efficient, America’s 
democratic society would be “saved from its former sins of extravagance and waste.”  50
In an attempt to ensure that members of the upper class bought into the 
government’s message of voluntary rationing, the Food Administration sent Dr. Alonzo 
Taylor out during the summer of 1917 on a number of speaking engagements with the 
nation’s wealthy. In a similar fashion to the publicity geared towards the general public, 
Taylor stressed to the audience the dangerous situation facing our allies. Facing both 
mental and physical stresses, the populations of England and France were “tottering 
and staggering” near the edge of defeat. To avoid such a disaster, the Food 
Administration official declared that a more intense and thorough participation by the 
American public in the spirit of the struggle. In other words, more Americans needed to 
follow Food Administration conservation measures. For Taylor, it was up to the nation’s 
wealthy to lead the charge. Citing his personal, first-hand experience living and working 
in the war zones of western Europe, he was convinced that the upper classes had a 
special responsibility to “serve as an example to our poorer classes.” Thus, he strongly 
urged those attending, many of which he considered close friends, to “adopt a different 
public and private attitude toward the war.”51
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In the wake of these meetings, a resolution was passed and publicly issued by a 
collection of upper class societies in which the country’s wealthier citizens asserted its 
commitment to follow the guidelines put forth by the Food Administration. Echoing much 
of what Taylor had discussed in his talks, the resolution stressed the importance of 
having the upper class serve as an example to the rest of the population, particularly 
within a system that relied on the voluntary cooperation of the people. “The standard of 
living is in large part determined by the classes of means,” declared the statement, 
“where standard of living is certain to be imitated by all classes of our population.” It 
urged sacrifice from all segments of American society and declared that the burden 
must be borne by each class, not just in accordance with mere numbers, but also in 
proportion to their abilities and responsibilities. In other words, those with the means to 
do so, should sacrifice more than the average citizen. The resolution concluded by 
urging all well-to-do Americans “in every way to stand as an example in patriotic service 
and saving.”  52
In order to convince Americans of all backgrounds that the wealthy had bought in 
and that burden of conservation was not left to the rest of the country, the Food 
Administration was quick to publicize expressions of compliance such as the one above, 
as well as when those words were put into action. The government distributed a number 
of photographs with accompanying captions for publication in newspapers and 
magazines throughout the country, showing how the rich and powerful were doing their 
bit. The focus of much of this type of publicity was on the matriarchs of these influential 
families. One such photo, entitled “Woman of Wealth Demonstrates the Drying of 
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Foods,” shows Mrs. Oliver Harriman, a “wealthy New York society woman,” operating a 
large food dehydration machine. The accompanying text also noted that Mrs. Harriman 
had made the extra effort to establish a food research laboratory in her home in order 
that she might help in the further preservation of food. Another example showed a Mrs. 
Vanderlip, the wife of a “well-known” New York banker, donning the uniform of the Food 
Administration while conducting conservation work. The caption noted Mrs. Vanderlip 
had gone so far as to install a complete system of food conservation in the kitchen of 
her summer home. However, the Food Administration was not above using its 
propaganda to shame upper-class Americans to action. One example of such a tactic 
can be found in a cartoon published by the agency for the nation’s newspapers. 
Entitled, “Forgotten Guests at Our Table,” the cartoon shows a gluttonous American 
heedlessly stuffing his face while reading the newspaper. Seemingly oblivious to his 
surroundings, the man pays no attention to the paper’s headline begging Americans to 
save food, nor does he seem concerned about the Allied and American soldiers and 
starving European adults and children that are also seated at his table. Here was a vivid 
and powerful condemnation of the waste and extravagance referenced by Hoover 
above.53
However, if the government wanted to steer the wealthy households of the nation 
towards food conservation, they needed to also target those individuals most 
responsible for putting food on the plates. The purchase, storage, and preparation of 
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food was largely handled by servants. Thus, the Food Administration in July of 1917 
organized a special division that would focus on the domestic workers of wealthy 
American families. “The conspicuous waste in the kitchen of the millionaires,” declared 
a government press release, “will stop as soon as the domestic employed by them learn 
that the food conservation movement is one of patriotism and dire necessity for the 
country.” Chosen to head up the initiative was Miss Florence Wardwell, a “member of 
one of New York’s oldest and most conservative families.” Wardwell had made a name 
for herself with her “efficient” work as a member of the Belgian Relief Committee. The 
plan was to visit many of the notable summer homes and resorts along the eastern 
seaboard, where Food Administration experts would instruct gathered domestic 
servants in “methods of food saving via entertainments, lectures, pictures, and other 
attractive means.” On Long Island, a meeting at the Garden Theater was attended by 
nearly twelve hundred servants who listened to speakers and watched the film The 
Patriot. By making such a publicized effort to impact the food consumption of the rich, 
the government was attempting to address the concerns that the directives of the Food 
Administration unfairly target the poor and working classes. “The woman who does her 
cooking and the woman who employs but one or two servants,” proclaimed the release, 
“can now feel comforted that she is not carrying all of the war-food burden.”54
While this initial look into Food Administration criticism was in many ways 
cursory, the agency spent the rest of 1917 trying to find out why the government’s food 
conservation campaign was falling short. The federal office reached out to all state and 
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local Food Administration representatives, asking them to report on reasons given by 
people who refused to sign the pledge cards. One thousand of the responses were then 
selected and a detailed report was composed for officials in Washington in January of 
1918. The report found that widespread opposition to the Food Administration and its 
campaign generally fell into six categories: (1) those that were not fully convinced the 
need for food conservation was urgent, (2) those that were fearful bad faith on the part 
of the government, (3) those that found the conservation measures interfered with their 
religious, political, or economic views, (4) those that lacked confidence in Hoover, (5) 
those with personal issues, in this case typically nutritional, that hampered cooperation, 
and (6) those within the poorer classes that believed the campaign was against their 
interests. In surveying the public, it was apparent that a widespread fear existed among 
the public that the voluntary, indirect nature of the current campaign was just a first step 
towards more direct government control over the food supply. The report also found that 
open opposition to the Food Administration was fairly widespread across the country. 
While dissent appeared to be most prominent in the states of Wisconsin and Ohio, only 
fourteen states nationwide reported little to no opposition.55
In general, the report’s authors asserted that Americans failed to grasp the nature 
and dimensions of, not only the food crisis, but the war as a whole. There was an 
overall sense of ignorance and apathy when it came to the assessment of the public’s 
war effort. The author went so far as to suggest that such evidence signaled an 
undercurrent of unrest and indicated that all of American society was failing to pull 
together. As it related to the food issue in particular, it was found that the public could 
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not conceive of the food supply as a quantifiable figure. Not surprisingly, much of the 
criticism came from American women. Many, particularly those of the middle- and lower- 
working-classes believed that they were conserving well before the Food Administration 
asked them to. Their economic realities had forced them to do so. The report indicated 
that Food Administration propaganda was itself at least partly to blame. With much of 
the focus of the publicity on the American housewife, a great portion of the population 
was being left out. As a result, too much pressure was being placed on the nation’s 
women.56
The end of 1917 found the Food Administration at a bit of a crossroads. Despite 
the grand efforts of the Food Administration, along with the help of various local and 
state organizations as well as private companies, Hoover and his agency still faced a 
public that had failed to sufficiently unify behind the militarized, patriotic message of 
food conservation as national service. As its own research had shown, Americans came 
away from the various publicity campaigns and pledge drives continuing to hold serious 
reservations about a government program that was asking them to voluntarily alter their 
food behaviors in the name of fighting a war. In the wake of these poor initial returns, 
Hoover actually considered making a move away from voluntary cooperation and 
towards a program of required rationing, something that the Food Control Act had given 
him the power to do. However, still holding on to the belief that an inspired and 
enlightened American public would prove democracy’s worth, he ultimately decided to 
continue with the program of indirect food control. The following chapter will examine 
how exactly the government responded to these shortcomings. Rather than focusing 
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primarily on the “why” of food control, the Administration’s propaganda beginning in 
1918 began to emphasize more the “how.” With the help of experts in the emerging 
fields of nutritional science and home economics, the Food Administration initiated 
various programs that instructed Americans on how they could best follow the 
guidelines set forth by the government. The results of this change in course not only 
encouraged greater compliance, it also had longer term implications for American food 
culture. 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Chapter 3 - “Promoting ‘Individual Reconstruction’ by Selling the Science of 
Eating”
While awakening the consciousness of the American people was a central theme 
to Food Administration propaganda, it was not the only one. Once the public was 
awakened to the presence of a food problem and made aware of their obligation to aid 
in solving that problem, messages that focused on topics of patriotism and self-sacrifice 
lost their impact. The objective of the Food Administration went beyond convincing 
people to merely acknowledge the appeals for conservation and perhaps periodically 
consume a “meatless” or “wheatless” meal. The goal of the Food Administration 
involved a fundamental shift in how people lived their lives. “In other words,” claimed 
high-ranking agency official and noted food expert Dr. Alonzo Taylor, “the entire internal 
life of the individual of every class is reconstructed on the basis of essential war needs 
and of the relation of all these factors in life to the carrying on of military operations.” An 
important factor in this process was the education of the American public. The Food 
Administration not only took great pains to explain why people were being asked to 
sacrifice, but they also inundated the population with the latest scientific knowledge to 
show that such sacrifices were perfectly healthy. This meant that the government relied 
heavily on the aid of experts from such fields as economics, geography, the biological 
sciences, and, most importantly, the emerging discipline known as nutrition to craft a 
large portion of their propaganda. It also meant cultivating partnerships with existing 
institutions tasked with enhancing the collective intellect of the nation, such as the 
nation’s schools and libraries. “The policy of the Food Administration,” declared its 
leader Herbert Hoover, “is built upon the widest publicity of facts…the educational 
forces of the country will aid incalculably in translating this policy into history.” Wherever 
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Americans went during the war, they were likely introduced to new dietary concepts 
such as the calorie, proteins, or vitamins. The impact of such a development would not 
only cause Americans to reconsider their wartime behavior, but also very likely 
contributed to the modern development in American food culture where the science 
behind foods took on increasing importance in determining how one should eat.1
Recent scholarship has focused on the influence science has had on the shaping 
of modern American food culture. Harvey Levenstein has explored how scientific 
advances at the end of the nineteenth century gave rise to a completely new conception 
of food, one that emphasized nutritional value over taste or cultural importance. Helen 
Veit, in her study of the rise of modern food culture, argues that a great deal of the Food 
Administration’s authority arose from this revolution in the science of food. By breaking 
down food to its chemical foundations, eating could be approached from a more rational 
or pragmatic place. The discovery and popularization of nutritional concepts such as the 
calorie and vitamin transformed food, argues Veit, into a variable that could be utilized 
“in a kind of cultural algebra” by social scientists and policy experts. If the public could 
learn to approach eating by considering a food’s component nutrients, they would be 
more prone to substitute one food for another if they had a similar nutritional profile. 
Such developments, according to Veit, would have a lasting impact on American food 
culture. Wartime government propaganda that touted the nutritional similarities between 
legumes (a food Americans were encouraged to eat) and meat (a food Americans were 
 USFA, “Conference of Educational Directors at Washington, 2/28-3/1, 1918,” March 1, 1918, 1
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encouraged to conserve), reinforced the idea that food choices based on science was 
more valuable than those guided by culture or tradition.   2
The focus of this chapter is an exploration of how exactly the Food Administration 
used its propaganda machinery to educate the American public on the “whys” and 
“hows” of is conservation program. It will examine how the agency relied heavily on the 
input from scientific experts in fields such as nutrition, as well as the country’s 
educational institutions, to craft and then present its message to the American people. It 
will argue that by attempting to suppress the psychological or cultural forces that had 
largely shaped prewar food behaviors of most Americans, while simultaneously 
promoting the physiological or scientific factors in dietary choices, the Food 
Administration played a major role in shaping modern food culture in the United States. 
For the first time Americans on a large scale would be asked to consider the nutritional 
content of food in assessing its value. This is an approach to eating that has only 
increased over time.
One big challenge in achieving “individual reconstruction” of the population was 
overcoming traditional American food behaviors and tastes. Part of the Food 
Administration’s propaganda thus sought to convince Americans, at least in part, to 
fundamentally change their attitude towards food. As a result of the war, the agency 
proclaimed that the value of food had come to take on a new meaning. According to a 
Food Administration release, food choices before the war had largely been based on 
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taste, with little consideration for quantities, or the kind of foods best suited for particular 
needs. The agency had made it their responsibility to provide Americans with the 
practical knowledge that would allow them to figure out how they could solve the food 
problem. An example of this can be seen with how the government approached the 
consumption of one of the staples of the American diet. From the start, the Food 
Administration had targeted wheat as a primary foodstuff that needed to be conserved 
in order that it could be shipped overseas. With substitution rather than outright 
restriction the major focus of the government’s propaganda, non-wheat grains such as 
barley were promoted as a viable stand-in. In June of 1917 a discouraging report was 
released that suggested Americans were not keen to follow such a guideline. An 
experiment, sponsored by the Food Administration, was conducted at a laboratory in 
New York to determine the viability of barley’s use in the “victory bread” being promoted 
by the agency. The French-Pancoast labs examined breads with various levels of wheat 
substitutes and found that as little as five percent barley produced a texture, color, and 
flavor “unsatisfactory to the taste of well-fed Americans.”3
In addition to changing long-standing food traditions, the Food Administration 
also found itself at times dealing with attitudes that had been created by the war itself. 
One example of this had to do with Americans’ increasingly negative views towards 
anything associated with Germany, its people and culture. This included foods 
commonly perceived as “German,” such as the hamburger and sauerkraut. While 
attempts were made to re-brand these foods by given them more patriotic, American 
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names like “liberty steak” and “freedom cabbage,” there were also calls to boycott the 
foods entirely. Such actions, especially abstaining from sauerkraut consumption, went 
against Food Administration guidelines, which promoted the use of vegetables, both 
fresh and preserved. “Men and women in their patriotic zeal,” commented Food 
Administration official and home economics expert Martha Van Rensselaer, “have been 
spreading a strong propaganda to discourage the use of a valuable foodstuff.” To deal 
with the issue, state representatives of the Food Administration were encouraged to 
stress two important points concerning the food. First, that the dish’s origins were more 
closely associated with the Dutch than the Germans, and second, that sauerkraut was a 
valuable food that added to the various ways cabbage could be used in meals. “No 
matter by what name it may be known,” stressed the Food Administration, “sauerkraut is 
a valuable food and its use should not be curtailed as a result of over-zealous and ill-
advised patriotism.” The campaign against this misplaced patriotism continued with 
pamphlets that included detailed recipes for making sauerkraut, as well as suggested 
meals that would compliment the dish.  4
Another important obstacle that had to be overcome was convincing Americans 
that the changes in food behavior they were being asked to adopt were not going to 
have negative consequences on their overall health. In order to achieve this goal, the 
Food Administration relied heavily on the input from experts in such subjects as biology, 
chemistry, physiology, and the emerging field of nutritional science. The intent was to 
generate propaganda that would encourage Americans, for the first time, to “know 
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something about food from a scientific perspective.” Housed largely within the Office of 
Home Economics at the Food Administration, these experts were tasked with 
“formulating and translating the scientific and economic data into workable terms for the 
classes of people for whom it is intended.” At times, Hoover would utilize the assistance 
of outside scientific authorities to strike at long-held perceptions. With his 
encouragement, National Geographic Magazine published an article that discussed 
recent research that challenged long-held views on the proper diet, namely the idea that 
consuming large quantities of meat was essential for providing energy and nutrients for 
hard work. Highlighting the potential problem things like tastes, culture, and habit pose 
to the success of food control, and ultimately the war itself, the article cited recent 
findings by scientists that found the peasant diet of southern Italians, comprised mainly 
of beans, olive oil, and vegetables, did not in any way compromise their health or ability 
to work. The article’s author concluded that Americans should set aside their desire for 
meat and consume more vegetables, knowing that doing so would not result in any 
nutritional deficiency. The Food Administration also utilized the popular press to answer 
more general questions ordinary Americans might have about food conservation. 
Immediately after the passage of the Food Control Act in August of 1917, the Woman’s 
Home Companion published an article prepared by the Food Administration entitled 
“What Must I Do?” The article provided readers (likely housewives) with tips on how to 
provide their families with a nutritionally-sound diet without going against the 
government’s conservation guidelines. Additionally, the article addressed and explained 
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other topics ranging from the dangers of hoarding food to the true meaning of food 
economy.    5
However, this type of propaganda mostly emanated directly from the offices of 
the Food Administration itself, often dealing with a particular topic or food. Throughout 
the war, the American public was bombarded with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
different types of printed material, with the goal of educating them about both the 
science of food and how to apply this knowledge in the selection and preparation of 
meals. Americans were presented with newspaper and magazine articles that 
introduced such fundamental nutritional concepts as the calorie, proteins, fats, and 
carbohydrates. Pamphlets containing detailed nutritional information about specific 
foods like corn or potatoes, along with accompanying recipes were constantly being 
distributed, as were bulletins that contained detailed answers to dozens of frequently 
asked questions about food, the science behind it, and its relation to the current war 
conditions. 
One prominent example of this approach dealt with the government’s attempts to 
change the public’s perception regarding wheat. As has already been noted, wheat was 
perhaps the most important food in America’s program to provide nourishment to its 
allies overseas. The Food Administration made a point to stress the various reasons 
why wheat had been so central to the conservation campaign, citing everything from its 
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ease of transport compared to other grains to, ironically, its compatibility with the 
traditional food culture and tastes of the Allies. To be successful, however, the agency 
realized that it had to address the “special psychological problems involved in the 
general problem of wheat conservation.” To that end the Food Administration convened 
a committee of experts from various fields of the nutritional and biological sciences, 
including the likes of Vernon Kellogg, Alonzo Taylor, and Raymond Wilbur. The panel 
concluded that reducing the consumption of wheat and replacing it with other cereals 
such as rye, barley, oats, and corn would result in no negative health consequences. 
They went on to state that any impact from the reduction of wheat in the diet would be 
more psychological than physiological. In a speech entitled “Wheat Not Necessary,” 
given in Washington, DC in March of 1918, Dr. Taylor stressed the need to abandon 
traditional tastes and take a more scientific approach to eating. Rather than an 
indispensable food, he characterized wheat as “an article of luxury.” From a scientific 
perspective, wheat possessed no nutritional advantage over other grains or cereals, 
and its desirability was merely the result of taste, and the desire for comfort and 
convenience. Any expert that objected to such a view was, according to Taylor, “either a 
crank or a slacker.” Finally, the above information was collected, along with additional 
material on the subject, and presented to the American people in the form of bulletin in 
May of 1918. Such actions clearly show the Food Administration’s committing to using 
science in order educate Americans and ultimately shape their food behavior.   6
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In order to house, curate, and organize the myriad of such material produced by 
both the government and private parties, the Food Administration established its own 
Home Economics Library. The library was to serve as a centralized resource for all 
matters relating to food control and set to “aid American women in solving their 
housekeeping problems.” The library housed a collection of tested and approved 
“economy recipes,” all of the government bulletins relating to food control published 
both by the Food Administration and the Department of Agriculture, food conservation 
posters, and a large selection of popular and scientific works on topics such as dietetics 
and home economics. The government also worked to make such information more 
accessible at the local level. In September of 1917 the agency announced a plan to 
connect with the nation’s public libraries. It requested that in each state, Food 
Administration representatives choose a qualified librarian to serve as a Library Publicity 
Director. They were then expected to solicit cooperation from all of the libraries in their 
respective states and monitor their activities. The Food Administration itself also opened 
up a direct line of communication with the public libraries through the distribution of a 
monthly bulletin entitled “Food News Notes for Public Libraries.” In the first edition of the 
bulletin, Hoover expressed his desire to have all libraries establish a “Food 
Conservation Section.” Such designated areas were to prominently display books, 
magazines, pamphlets, and all of the other types of printed materials that related to the 
food problem. The Food Administration head also encouraged libraries to arrange 
periodic talks for adults, as well as story hours for children, that would present the topic 
of conservation in an appropriate way. Hoover also suggested presenting graphic 
exhibitions that focused on a particular food-related topic, as well as organizing a 
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bulletin board that would prominently display the latest information available from the 
government. He stressed the importance of changing the collection each month in order 
to maintain public interest and assured the libraries that specific and detailed directions 
along these lines would be provided by the Food Administration in subsequent 
bulletins.7
The Food Administration not only attempted to accomplish this goal through the 
use of printed material that might reach the men and women at the home front, it also 
presented its propaganda in various public settings beyond the public library that were 
frequented by ordinary Americans. As already noted, the movie theater was an 
important tool that was used to present the emotional aspects of Food Administration 
propaganda. Private citizens in contact with the Food Administration also noted the 
value of the moving picture as an educational tool. “The movie screen is the one best 
medium to get in touch with the actual consumers,” noted film producer Frank Fox. A 
concerned housewife wrote directly to Hoover, suggesting the reason the Food 
Administration had failed to achieve total success in getting Americans to “Hooverize” 
was due to a lack of knowledge.  The reason for that, according to May Campbell, was 8
that the printed materials failed to reach all Americans. She urged the government to 
present the preparation of approved dishes on the movie screen. Having a Food 
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Administration expert show the audience when and how ingredients should be used 
would give women the knowledge and confidence needed to buy into the agency’s 
campaign. However, while the agency was quick to use the motion picture to awake the 
consciousness of the public, when it came to presenting particular educational 
information, it was much more cautious. Fearing the distribution of “grave errors” that 
could possibly undermine the overall food control campaign, the Food Administration 
urged the motion picture industry to be patient while the “many sides of the matter be 
given the most careful consideration and a plan of propaganda is worked out that is 
fundamentally sound in every particular.”9
As noted in the previous chapter, the government was keen to ensure that films 
addressing the subject of food conservation depicted scenes and presented information 
that conformed to the agency’s guidelines. When Food Administration officials were 
presented with moving pictures from private studios that did not line up with its 
messaging, it was not above demanding changes. If the studio wanted its film to receive 
the Administration’s “stamp of approval,” it would comply. In terms of materials made 
explicitly by the agency for moving picture houses, it was primarily limited to glass slides 
that were to be displayed daily between screenings of films. Agency officials were well-
aware of the limitations of this approach. The head of the Moving Pictures Section, 
Arthur Friend, discouraged the use of too much content in the slides. According to him, 
a movie audience would not be willing to sit and read such content. While these slides 
contained some educational material, such as a line or two on suitable substitutes for 
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foods such as meat and wheat, the Food Administration apparently was never able to 
produce the type of instructional films that were suggested by the likes of Ms. Campbell. 
The closest the government appeared to get was the production of an educational 
cartoon film on the subject of sugar produced exclusively for the Food Administration by 
the Lasky-Paramount Company. Noting that the use of educational slides had been “not 
altogether satisfactory,” agency officials sent out the film to a small number of films as 
an experiment. State Food Administration Educational Directors were to solicit feedback 
from viewers and theater owners and report back to the Washington office. It is not 
known whether the government took this approach any further. Given that this 
exchanged occurred near the end of the conflict, it is likely they ran out of time to pursue 
it fully, but it still shows the government’s interest in educating the public using this 
relatively new medium.10
 Another arena where the Food Administration was much more successful in 
educating the public on appropriate food behavior via visual demonstrations were the 
various state and county fairs, conventions and expositions, as well as a number of 
patriotic food shows, that were held throughout the country during the conflict. Such 
events allowed much more easily the presentation of “practical exhibits,” which were 
viewed as very valuable in the campaign to change food behavior; and unlike initiatives 
such as the home card campaign, exhibits and demonstrations were intended to reach 
men as well as women. “Exhibits do a lot to convert women,” proclaimed Food 
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Administration publicity expert Ben Allen, “and they are very much more valuable in the 
conversion of men, because men of course have not taken the time to read all the 
propaganda and this will catch the eye.”  11
Headed up primarily by the agency’s Home Economics Division, the public 
demonstrations and displays organized by the Food Administration at these events were 
the clearest example of how the government presented educational information from the 
nutritional and domestic sciences in an attempt to reshape the food behavior of 
Americans. During the spring and summer of 1917, well before the agency had even 
been formally established by Congress, Hoover had begun communications with the 
American Association of Fairs and Expositions, a group which represented the country’s 
fifty largest fairs and expositions. In July, a formal partnership between the government 
and the industry group was announced. The Food Administration intended on the state 
fairs to serve as “great food economy training camps,” demonstrating the various 
methods of conservation to millions of Americans. However, the status of the agency 
was still up in the air as state and county fair season approached at the end of the 
summer. Without the resources necessary to formulate and execute a full-fledged plan, 
Hoover was only able to provide the events’ organizers with some general guidelines. 
Most of the suggestions centered on the need to conserve wheat and the use of other 
substitute grains. Hoover discouraged the use of the term “war bread” to describe loafs 
using wheat substitutes and suggested terms such as “liberty” or “victory” in its place. 
The Food Administration also strongly urged the use of graphs, charts, and figures to 
illustrate points such as the amount of bread currently wasted in America. One particular 
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graphic exhibit suggested involved displaying a pile of sacks of flour to illustrate the 
amount of wheat that could be sent overseas if each person cut back a small amount. 
He also suggested the organization of baking contests that employed to use of grains 
such as corn in place of wheat. The purpose was to make clear, through the use of 
science and statistics, to each and every individual that small changes in their behavior 
could have a large impact.   12
By the end of 1917, the Food Administration had produced a pamphlet entitled 
“Graphic Exhibits on Food Conservation at Fairs and Expositions,” which provided 
extensive and detailed instructions for any group or organization that wanted to visually 
promote the government’s message of food economy. Suggested topics to focus on 
included the saving of wheat and meats, the efficient use of fats, and the demonstration 
of food preservation methods. The pamphlet went into great detail to provide tips on 
constructing the displays, including images and photographs. For example, the Food 
Administration suggested five different features for a “Save the Wheat Section.” The first 
involved the use of posters and visual displays to answer such common questions as 
“Why should we send the wheat abroad?” and “How can the actions of one make a 
difference?” The agency also strongly urged the demonstration of the making of “victory 
bread,” with an emphasis placed on proper measuring and mixing. In addition, they 
stressed that recipe cards for the foods on display be distributed to the attendees. It was 
made known that each and every recipe presented by Food Administration would be 
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Archives, 12HA-A11, Box 490; USFA Food Conservation Section, Press Release, July 5, 1917, 
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tested in its own labs under the direction of trained experts. It was also suggested that a 
lunch counter selling the foods being promoted be set up on site. The government 
stressed the importance of having all those working the booths wear the Food 
Administration uniform, and noted the significance of making the lunch counter clean 
and attractive, as well as the foods being of the highest quality. The pamphlet even 
included a list of suggested slogans that were to be used throughout. Examples 
included “”We can not preserve Freedom unless we conserve food,” and “Emergency 
Bread: It’s good to eat, And it saves the wheat.” The government wanted those visiting 
such exhibits to come away with the impression that food behavior it was being asked to 
adopt was easy to attain, good for health, and of service to the country.13
By all accounts it appears as if a large number of the thousands of fairs and 
expos held throughout the nation during the war presented at least some form of the 
information provided by the Food Administration. In addition, groups in a number of 
major cities organized expositions that dealt specifically with the topic. One such 
“patriotic food show” was held in Chicago during the spring of 1918. Its organization 
reflected the overall approach taken by the Food Administration in distributing its 
propaganda. An attendee noted that the purpose of the show was clearly to promote 
government food conservation, and the Food Administration had provided a good deal 
of guidance in its set up. A “food specialist” oversaw the exhibit and ensured each booth 
conformed to Food Administration guidelines. However, the event was organized by the 
State Council of Defense and managed in part by local prominent businessmen. It was 
 USFA, pamphlet, “Graphic Exhibits on Food Conservation at Fairs and Expositions,” 13
November 1917, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, from USFA Records, Hoover 
Institution, Box 11, Folder 19; USFA, “Conference of Educational Directors at Washington, 
2/28-3/1, 1918,” March 1, 1918, USFA Records, Hoover Institution, Box 48, Folder 3.
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funded not by the government but by selling booth space to commercial outfits. In 
addition to paying for the space, each business had to agree to allow its exhibit to be 
carefully censored. It was noted that there were a few instances where the “extravagant 
claims of the exhibitor were caught up and stopped.” The show was noted for its easy-
to-follow layout, which was divided into five main sections, covering proteins, fats, 
sugar, produce, and starches. A demonstration space ran down the middle of each 
section, with the food prepared offered as samples to those in attendance. The recipes 
for the foods being prepared were collected and made available in a Patriotic Cook 
Book. Overall, however, the show left an underwhelming impression for at least a few. 
One observer noted that the show’s “food specialist” wished a greater effort had been 
made to “show the exhibitors how they could make their displays educational and at the 
same time good advertising for themselves.”14
There’s little doubt that leaders in Washington learned about the shortcomings of 
the event in Chicago. Immediately after the Patriotic Food Show, the federal office of the 
Food Administration reached out to its state officials and requested that each adopt a 
“more definite program and creation of an organization” to deal more directly with the 
organization and presentation of exhibits. Reiterating the potential value of such events 
by expressing the belief that attendees rarely encountered such information in other 
settings, the agency pointed out that the headquarters had compiled information that 
could be helpful in organizing exhibits. The Food Administration also eventually took 
pains to address one of the largest potential drawbacks of using large amounts of food, 
 Mary Swain Routzahn, “The Chicago Patriotic Food Show: A Brief Review of its Main 14
Features,” April 1918, New York: Department of Surveys and Exhibits, Russell Sage 
Foundation.
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both those being requested to conserve in displays and those being urged to consume 
as substitutes. It was clear that by suggesting the use of things like bags of wheat in 
displays to encourage economy, or by holding cooking demonstrations for appropriate 
foods that might not be eaten, the Food Administration opened itself up to the potential 
of bad publicity or public backlash. Relaying this concern to local officials, the federal 
office referenced a recent exhibit plan it had received that called for the presentation of 
fifteen tables of cooked food. Noting that such a plan was “not in line with the program 
of food conservation,” leaders in Washington urged state directors of home conservation 
to come up with more desirable ways to demonstrate and dispose of such items. Some 
suggestions provided included the establishment of a conservation cafeteria booth, 
where the public could purchase foods made via demonstration. This is similar to the 
“lunch counter” idea proposed in the pamphlet mentioned above. They also suggested 
giving such foods to local charities, or auctioning it off with the proceeds going to a 
group like the Red Cross.        15
Food control propaganda not only targeted the hearts and minds of the American 
housewife and other adults occupying the home front, it also sought to shape the 
outlook of the nation’s youth. In his recent examination of American government 
propaganda during World War I, Robert Gross shows how children became critical 
targets. Linking the wartime campaigns to recent advances in mass marketing 
techniques, Gross argues that children’s lives were politicized during the war in a way 
 USFA to Federal Food Administrators, April 13, 1918, USFA Records, Hoover Institution, Box 15
49, Folder 11; USFA Home Conservation Division to State Directors of Home Conservation, 
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University Libraries, #23/2/749, Box 17; USFA Home Conservation Division to State Directors of 
Home Conservation, June 27, 1918, NYS College of Home Economics Records, Series IV, 
USFA Records, Cornell University Libraries, #23/2/749, Box 17.
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that had never been seen before. In no other interaction is the Food Administration’s 
emphasis on providing useful information in their propaganda clearer than it was with 
the nation’s schools. Hoover and his associates realized from the start that if the 
government was going to succeed in educating the public on issues relating to the 
wartime food problem, they were going to have to get their message into American 
schools. Additionally, the program was seen to have the potential to shape thoughts and 
behavior well beyond the immediate needs of the war. Discussing the matter with 
President Wilson, Hoover stated: 
We feel that, by taking advantage of the war emotion, we here 
have an opportunity of introducing intelligibly into the minds of 
children, not only fundamental data on nutrition, but also of 
being able to probably secure its permanent inclusion in school 
curricula, and, therefore, feel that it is a matter of 
more than ordinary propaganda importance.  16
Further, the food control propaganda geared towards schools was once again viewed 
as an opportunity to impart additional messages regarding the virtues of democracy and 
the responsibilities of citizenship in the “cooperative society in which they live.” The 
classroom was viewed as a training ground for proper citizenship, where personal 
responsibility could be stimulated within every child and a deeper appreciation of the 
meaning and aims of American democracy could be learned.  17
 Robert N. Gross, “‘Lick a Stamp, Lick the Kaiser:’ Sensing the Federal Government in 16
Children’s Lives During World War I,” Journal of Social History 46 (2013): 971-988; Herbert 
Hoover to Woodrow Wilson, August 21, 1917, , USFA Records, Hoover Institution, Box 5, Folder 
7. 
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Thus, in the summer of 1917 the Food Administration announced the creation of 
the Educational Department within the Food Conservation Section. Even though 
Congress had yet to pass legislation officially creating the Food Administration, the 
provisional agency did what it could to cultivate a relationship with the public school 
system. Using this existing machinery, government looked to educate not just the 
nation’s students in effective food conservation but the entire population as well. In 
addition to being a place for classroom instruction, the government also identified 
schools as important community centers. The Food Administration noted that schools 
had already been used as a meeting space for the broader community to engage in 
various patriotic services, such as the making of surgical dressings that could be sent to 
treat wounded soldiers overseas.  18
Efforts to engage with American schools began at the end of June. Hoover 
contacted Charles Richard Van Hise, noted progressive academic and president of the 
University of Wisconsin, and requested that he attend the upcoming gathering of the 
National Education Association in Portland, Oregon. The plan was for Van Hise to act as 
an unofficial representative of Hoover, both speaking to the general session on the first 
day of the conference and holding a series of smaller information sessions throughout 
the week. The objective was to introduce the food problem to the nation’s educators and 
make them aware of their importance in spreading the government’s message 
regarding food control.19
 U.S. Food Administration Food Conservation Section, press release, July 13, 1917, Hoover 18
Institution, Records of the United States Food Administration, Box 11, Folder 4; .
 Charles Van Hise to R.L. Wilbur, June 23, 1917, Hoover Institution, Records of the United 19
States Food Administration, Box 46, Folder 9.
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As the summer of 1917 came to an end, and American schoolchildren looked to 
return to the classroom, the president, at the urging of Hoover, reached out to the 
officers of the nation’s public schools and encouraged them to adopt the upcoming 
program and associated materials that would be presented to them by the Food 
Administration. After speaking generally about the unique challenges the global conflict 
presented to the American people and their institutions, the president stressed that, in 
addition to its soldiers overseas, the civilians at home needed to learn the “lessons of 
war.” Schools were urged to increase the time and attention devoted to instruction on 
such issues. Several weeks later, the Food Administration issued a leaflet directed 
specifically at the nation’s teachers. Identifying them as a “powerful factor in the life of 
your country,” the government stressed the unique position teachers were in to reach 
the nation’s children with the message of food conservation. However, teachers were 
not only being asked to enlighten their students, they were being called on to awaken 
the entire country. Hoover expressed his confidence that the teachers understood the 
food problem and appreciated the importance of transmitting “exact information” to the 
population in order for the Food Administration to gain their support. Where other facets 
of food control propaganda might have fallen short, the agency asserted that teachers 
could serve as the missing link by reaching the mothers of their students. Educators 
were asked to “enlist every family in the army of the Food Administration and make 
them effective agents in winning the war.”20
 Woodrow Wilson to School Officers, August 23, 1917, Hoover Institution, Box 47, Folder 5; 20
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The government also suggested some very basic guidelines for teachers to 
consider before a full-fledged program could be presented. Just as in the propaganda 
directed towards the general public, educators were encouraged to stress the concepts 
of conservation, substitution, avoidance of waste. It was believed that one particular 
venue where these ideas could be effectively presented to schoolchildren was the 
cafeteria. Teachers were instructed to closely monitor students during lunch. If students 
were eating a meal provided by the school, the staff was told to engage with them on 
how the food provided was linked to conservation efforts. If a child brought his own 
lunch, teachers were to urge children to be efficient by bringing no more than would be 
eaten. Working on the assumption that nearly every student had a brother, father, 
cousin, or uncle serving overseas, the government also stressed the importance of 
making personal connections by pointing out that food behavior at home impacted the 
diet of American soldiers overseas.21
By August the Food Administration had begun to organize “definite courses of 
instruction for all of the schools, primary as well as secondary, on nutrition and food 
economics generally.” Hoover had initiated a joint project with the Bureau of Education 
in the preparation and distribution of a series of textbooks for students at all levels of the 
nation’s public school system. The Food Administration at this early stage also strongly 
considered the preparation of a specific course on the subject of food conservation for 
the nation’s public schools. While the other materials could be handled by the teachers, 
it was suggested that this particular course be administered by trained experts within 
the field. In addition, the Food Administration in the summer of 1917 worked closely with 
 USFA, “Young America’s Part,” 1918, Hoover Institution, Box 49, Folder 11.21
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the U.S. Commission of Education on a separate program that emphasized various 
aspects of wartime behavior. Entitled “Lessons in Community and National Life,” the 
government looked to highlight the immediate need of food conservation while also 
featuring its production and distribution during wartime.  22
Once again, however, the aim of the propaganda went beyond the lessons of 
wartime food behavior. This particular set of materials also stressed broader issues of 
service and citizen responsibility.  According to the Food Administration, the lessons 
were to “teach children the privileges and obligations of the democratic form of 
government under which they live.” Speaking specifically about the program, Hoover 
highlighted the importance of stressing the interdependent nature of modern American 
society. Widespread cooperation on the home front was essential for victory and 
teaching about the rights and obligations of citizens was an important part of the 
process. Additionally, the goal was to not only make schoolchildren aware of the various 
changes that were to result from the war, but to also emphasize the need for continued 
efficiency once the conflict concluded. All of these actions were necessary, not just to 
secure victory, but also “in order to meet the fierce industrial competition that will follow 
the making of peace.” The “Lessons” were issued monthly during the school year by the 
Bureau of Education. The program was intended for students ranging from the fourth to 
twelfth grades, and the materials were modified accordingly to fit into three distinct 
groupings. While the government urged schools to set aside instruction time to present 
 Herbert Hoover to Woodrow Wilson, August 21, 1917, Hoover Institution; USFA, “Minutes of 22
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the “Lessons” as a separate course, it also acknowledged that the materials could also 
be incorporated into existing courses that dealt with topics such as history and civics.23
However, when it came to specific materials or courses on issues of food 
conservation developed by the Food Administration for America’s public schools, there 
was very little produced during the agency’s first year of existence. As will be discussed 
later, much of the effort in this regard was geared towards the higher education setting. 
The agency acknowledged this apparent shortcoming, forming an advisory committee to 
explore the “public school problem.” In March of 1918, responding to demands from 
school officials, the Food Administration announced plans to prepare a more elementary 
form of a course that had already been prepared and distributed to colleges and 
universities. The goal was to get the course materials out to schools by the end of the 
academic year, though there is no indication that this goal was ever accomplished. One 
of the few items known to be produced solely by the Food Administration specifically for 
high schools was the book entitled Food Guide for War Service. Described as a “simple, 
reliable statement of the food program of the government,” the book was intended to be 
used as a text of instruction. Published by Charles Scribner’s Sons in the fall of 1918, 
the book contained eight chapters, each exploring a specific food (such as wheat, meat, 
or sugar) as it related to the war effort. It approached the food problem and the 
government’s proposed solution, from a number of different angles. For instance, it 
touched on the global dimensions of the wheat supply, as well as the social and 
nutritional value of wheat and other cereals. The book not only attempted to explain why 
 USFA Public Information Division, Press Release Number 284, October 2, 1917, Box 47, 23
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students were being asked to modify their food behavior but also presented sound 
advice on how it could best be accomplished. According to Olin Templin, the book was 
not only valuable as “a method of cooperation with the government in winning the war,” 
its importance also rested in its “fundamental educational value.” Although the plan was 
to supplement the book with a laboratory manual that could be used in cooking classes, 
there is no indication that this was ever realized.  24
By the summer of 1918 a number of national education associations were also 
appealing for materials tailored specifically for elementary schools. In the wake of these 
requests, the Food Administration began the process of producing a text in a similar 
mold to the aforementioned Food Guide, but the book did not make it to press until the 
war was nearly over. Thus its overall message would be changed to fit the impending 
postwar climate. That does not mean, however, that the Food Administration completely 
neglected the elementary school. Whenever the government embarked on a specific 
food conservation campaign, the Food Administration distributed pamphlets containing 
suggested curriculum and activities to the nation’s schools. For example, in March of 
1918, the agency launched a national campaign that promoted the use of potatoes as a 
viable substitute for wheat in the conservation effort. In the elementary schools, 
teachers were told to include the discussion of the potato in various subjects, such as 
history and science. Additionally, instructors were provided with outlines for specific 
lessons on potatoes, and the government encouraged schools to do such things as 
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Institution, Box 374, Folder 1; Templin to Public School Systems of the United States, July 6, 
1918, USFA Records, Hoover Institution, Box 374, Folder 1; Templin to State School 
Superintendents, August 17, 1918, USFA Records, Hoover Institution, Box 374, Folder 1; 
Katharine Blunt, Frances L. Swain, and Florence Powdermaker, Food Guide for War Service 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1918), iv-22.
 133
highlight the food in school lunches, provide students with approved potato recipes, hold 
“potato essay contests,” and have local farmers come in and discuss the crop with 
pupils. The goal was to have children “go home enthusiastic about the potato situation; 
to arouse interest in the rest of the family,” and thus make it more likely that they would 
agree to follow the Food Administrations directives.  25
The government also sought to capture the minds of the nation’s youth by 
producing various children’s stories, plays, and fairy tales. Typically, these works 
centered on a specific issue or type of food. Once such tale centered on the adventures 
of Captain Sugar, who eagerly accepted his call to service in helping the Allies 
overseas. In his absence, the likes of the Maple Brothers, Miss Honey, and Mr. Corn 
(described as being “American to his very roots”) stood in for Captain Sugar at home to 
help with the “sweetening business.” There was also a play entitled “The Patriotic 
Potato” written by the Food Administration. In the play, the potato campaign had begun, 
and a young student named Tommy comes home from school expressing his dislike of 
potatoes and complaining about the assignment he was given to write a story about his 
least favorite food. After falling asleep, Tommy dreams that he is visited by General 
Potato. The general tells the child about the Potato Army of America, who is fighting for 
Uncle Sam against the Kaiser. He briefly recalls the history of the food, stressing that 
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the potato is an American food, not Irish as is commonly thought. He emphasizes the 
importance of the potato in determining the outcome of the war. “We are to take the 
place of honor on the home table,” says the potato, “in order that wheat may go to the 
front.” The General tells the boy that, by not liking potatoes and failing to buy into the 
campaign, he is a “slacker.” To avoid this label, Tommy needed to eat potatoes and 
avoid foods containing wheat. General Potato then offers to help the boy write a story 
so good that “everyone will want to eat potatoes and help win the war.” In response, 
Tommy enthusiastically proclaims his support for the campaign, declaring, “You can 
count on me to help you spud the Kaiser.” Upon waking form his dream, Tommy begins 
writing furiously and tells his mom that, rather than toast, he wanted potatoes for 
breakfast.26
During the Potato Campaign, teachers were also encouraged to read potato 
stories such as the Food Administration-produced “The Little Brown Prince” to students. 
The story, presented in the form of a fairy tale, begins in America, “long before the 
arrival of any white man.” The protagonist, a downcast potato, expresses his frustrations 
to the King of Vegetables. He laments that he is one of the homeliest members of the 
kingdom, and by spending most of his life under ground, he feels useless to the world. 
The King responds by assuring the potato that, despite the dullness of his current 
situation, in the future he will have a major role to play. “There will come a time,” 
explains the King, “when you will be exalted above most of the members of my 
kingdom.” He goes on to declare that the potato had been given eyes so that he could 
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look out for this “one great event.” After presenting this hopeful prophecy, the story 
briefly follows the potato over the proceeding years, tracing the arrival of Europeans to 
America, and the journey of the potato to Europe. Frustration for the potato grows until 
the present day, when the story tells of a “man king” from Germany determined to 
conquer the world. The time had come for the potato, and he works to grow vigorously 
for the United States in order to help the Allies defeat the Germans. The story also takes 
a moment to explain to the audience that potatoes are nutritionally a viable substitute for 
wheat, even citing a scientific study that showed how a child could receive as much 
strength from a medium-sized potato as they could a slice of bread. In the wake of his 
triumph, the potato was crowned a prince of vegetables, taking its place alongside 
Prince Wheat and Prince Corn. The fairy tale ended with a direct appeal to the children 
of America:
Every boy and girl can help this wonderful country in which he or 
she lives drive back the cruel king and his soldiers and win the war 
by asking mother to put more potatoes on their planes and by 
eating less bread made form wheat. They should also ask mother 
to make bread and muffins from potatoes.  27
Traditional fairy tales were also used in conjunction with cartoons produced by 
the Food Administration which aimed to drive home the message of patriotic 
conservation. Such materials were displayed in places such as the comic strip section 
of newspapers. In one example, entitled “Save Sugar, Children,” a young girl is depicted 
dropping her money in a collection box labeled “For the Children in Belgium and 
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France.” While conducting this act of charity she bids farewell until after the war to a 
visibly upset piece of taffy and box of bonbons. The cartoon includes the caption “A 
Penny here means a Bun ‘Over There,’” and in order to explain this concept to children 
it relates it to the English fairy tale, “The Old Woman and Her Pig.” In this story, a poor 
old woman, in an act of charity, gives a cat a saucer of milk, which unleashes a chain of 
events that result in the woman obtaining a pig at the market. Similarly, if American 
children choose to eat less sweets, fewer ships would be needed to transport sugar to 
the United States, and those ships could be used to send needed supplies to children in 
France and Belgium. “All because you little Americans said ‘none today’ to the lollipops 
and candy,” concluded the passage, “and started ‘white magic’ that reached across the 
Atlantic Ocean!” Another cartoon with the title “An Heroic Sacrifice” depicted a boy, and 
his dog, standing in front of a sweet shop with his hand raised, swearing to abstain from 
eating ice cream and candy for the duration of the conflict. These cartoons show that 
the Food Administration was willing to go outside the classroom to try to reach even the 
youngest Americans with their message of food conservation.   28
The agency also worked to foster cooperation between local institutions that 
dealt with children on a daily basis. One example was public schools and libraries. Food 
Administration officials believed the public library was more than just a reading room. 
According to the agency’s Library Section head Edith Guerrier it was the “educational 
extension department of the schools of the United States.” In September of 1918 the 
Food Administration announced a plan to have children more explicitly commit to 
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changing their food behaviors in order to follow the guidelines set forth by the 
government. Officials in Washington informed agents at the state level of the creation of 
a program to have public libraries work with local schools to have children sign their 
own pledge cards. “So far,” claimed the Food Administration, “the children of this 
country have not gone on record for food conservation.” The agency’s Library Directors 
in each state were instructed to reach out to all public librarians in their state, and have 
them secure the signatures of the children from the schools in their respective districts. 
It was suggested that the librarians propose to the school principals that they tell 
teachers during the week of Thanksgiving to connect the tradition of the holiday with the 
current situation in which Americans were sharing their food with the freedom-fighting 
forces in Europe. The students would then be presented with pledge cards similar to the 
ones very likely presented to their mothers and grandmothers several months earlier. 
Children could be told that by signing the pledge they were putting on record their part 
in the “great army of children who contributed services to their little brothers and sisters 
so far away.” The signed pledges were then to be returned to libraries, where they could 
be kept on file, or even put on display in the children’s rooms. Much like the pledges 
and home cards presented to the nation’s adult population, the children’s cards could 
serve as a strong visual statement of their commitment to the program.  29
While educational materials for primary and secondary schools were slow to 
emerge from the Food Administration’s national headquarters in Washington, other 
entities worked from an early stage to fill the void. Both local government institutions 
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and private individuals produced information intended for use in public schools on the 
food problem and its solution. Although the federal government was not directly 
responsible for producing these materials, the messages presented fell in line with the 
overall message that the Food Administration had crafted. As 1917 came to a close, the 
Department of Education in Texas was requesting that its schools cooperate with the 
government in the effort to save food. In December, it announced the publication of a 
series of fifteen lessons on the topic of food conservation that would be provided to all 
schools in the state that offered home economics courses. In addition to covering the 
general topic of eliminating food waste, the lessons emphasized the use of substitutes 
for such staples as wheat, meats, and fats while also covering practical preservation 
methods such as canning and drying. Another example was a book entitled Food 
Problems: To Illustrate the Meaning of Food Waste and What May Be Accomplished by 
Economy and Intelligent Substitution. The book was written by A.N. Farmer, the 
superintendent of schools in Evanston, Illinois, who had spent six weeks with the Food 
Administration in Washington during the autumn of 1917. Once again, the influence of 
agency’s philosophy was clearly present. Farmer saw his work as part of the Food 
Administration’s campaign in education, to “teach the nation the essential facts” of the 
food problem and the role Americans needed to play in winning the war and preventing 
global starvation. Success in implementing the program also had the potential of 
encouraging long-term character development among pupils, promoting such habits as 
thrift, self-control, and the spirit of cooperation. The book itself was marketed as both a 
handbook for teachers and a textbook for students. Regarding the material for pupils, 
the focus was on word problems that required arithmetic to solve, their aim being to 
 139
illustrate and force students to consider the factors that contributed to the “food 
problem.” It is difficult to determine how widely such materials were utilized, but they do 
illustrate how the message of the Food Administration’s education campaign extended 
beyond the federal government itself.30
As much as the Food Administration appeared to drag its feet when it came to 
the nation’s public primary and secondary schools, it was much more productive in its 
relationship with colleges and universities. The reason for this imbalance is not entirely 
clear, but the record does suggest a probable explanation. There is no question that 
Food Administration officials saw college students, especially those studying fields 
related to home economics or nutrition, as potential field agents, with expert knowledge, 
that could be used, either during breaks or after graduation, to help spread the 
government’s message on food conservation. Thus, at least in the early stages of its 
existence, it made the decision to direct most of its energy and resources to institutions 
of higher education. In August of 1917 the Food Administration reached out to all post-
secondary institutions in America to gauge their interest in aiding the government in 
their food control program. It announced that University of Wisconsin president Charles 
Van Hise had joined the Conservation Division with the main objective of organizing the 
food conservation program among the nation’s colleges and universities. Even at this 
early stage the Food Administration had already begun work on three different projects 
to provide information to colleges and universities. While the details were vague, one 
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still gets a sense of the intent and eventual direction the agency wanted to take in 
spreading its message among college students. The first was a syllabus for a set of 
lectures on food conservation designed specifically for the general student population. 
The second project was a syllabus for a more specialized set of lectures for students in 
fields such as nutritional science or home economics. Finally, the Food Administration 
aimed to produce specialized, periodic bulletins that focused on the global aspects of 
the food problem.31
For the most part it appeared as if the nation’s colleges and universities were 
eager to assist the agency in their campaign, as officials within the Food Administration 
mentioned the high level of demand for any and all materials that were available. By the 
autumn of 1917 the Food Administration had produced a two-part pamphlet that 
provided an outline for a course of lectures. Comprising five separate chapters or 
lessons, the lectures covered everything from the prewar state of conservation in the 
United States to a detailed description of the Food Administration itself. At this time Van 
Hise was also in discussion with administration officials about the preparation of a food 
conservation textbook that would be published by a private firm and could be used in 
appropriate college courses. Given that the majority of Food Administration propaganda 
directed at the general population was focused on the nation’s housewives, it is not 
surprising that the females on college and university campuses received particular 
attention. At the start of 1918, Hoover, in a letter addressed to the nation’s college and 
university presidents, expressed the need for well-informed college girls to help 
stimulate conservation throughout the country. The presidents were asked if their female 
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students were “receiving instruction insuring intelligent cooperation with the Food 
Administration.” Hoover also inquired if the schools were currently offering courses that 
would enable graduating females to “be of special service,” and concluded by asking 
whether the institutions would be receptive to guidance from the Food Administration to 
better achieve these goals. He assured the presidents that a specific plan of action 
would be sent to each institution within a few days.32
As indicated above, the Food Administration viewed the college campus not only 
as an important setting to shape the minds of all students regarding food control, it was 
also viewed as a potential source of experts on the topic that could help spread the 
message to the broader population. Enlightening the entire American population on the 
food situation was a “perfect task for the American college student” — obtaining 
knowledge to not only shape personal habits, but to lead others to do the same. Thus, 
female students studying various fields in the domestic sciences received particular 
attention. It was these women, according to Hoover, who were “being prepared to 
grapple with the problems concerned with food and the home.” He thus reached out to 
all departments of home economics in the country. The situation was presented as a 
unique opportunity to serve the nation. Once again, military imagery was used to drive 
home this message. Just as college men had been so important in filling the military 
ranks to fight the “war of arms”, college women were being asked to join the ranks in 
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fighting the “war of food.” “This splendid army of specially trained young women,” 
proclaimed Hoover, “is counted on by the Food Administration to give willing and 
effective service.” The agency’s head also emphasized the value of the students’ 
educational background in helping solve the food problem and assisting the nation 
achieve its ultimate goal of victory. “Issues that demand the rarest talent and the highest 
scientific training,” proclaimed Hoover, “merit their attention.”33
By all indications, it appears as if the nation’s colleges and universities were 
receptive to the idea of forging a relationship with the Food Administration. 
Organizations like the Deans of Women of American Universities, Colleges, and Normal 
Schools offered their full cooperation and “complete loyalty” to Hoover. However, 
despite the progress made in securing the assistance of the nation’s post-secondary 
institutions, by the start of 1918 there appeared to be growing frustration within the Food 
Administration that not enough had been done in the production and distribution of 
materials to college campuses. To date, only a small handful of pamphlets and a brief 
outline of three courses had been presented to the schools. The first course, entitled 
“Food and the War,” was to last four weeks, covering such diverse topics as an 
overview of the Food Administration, the fuel value of food, and the fuel needs of the 
body. The second course, which was called “Fundamentals of Food and Nutrition in 
Relation to the War,” was to explore government control of food and dietary values of 
specific foods over a three week period. The final course, “Use and Conservation of 
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Foods,” was also set to last three weeks and covered such topics as rations and the 
science of cooking.34
In order to increase the efficiency and productivity of the relationship with the 
nation’s colleges and universities, the Food Administration in March of 1918 announced 
the creation of the Collegiate Section within the agency. Its purpose was to “promote the 
cooperation of the institutions of higher education, and their students and graduates, in 
the work of the Food Administration.” It was also noted that the Collegiate Section would 
be assisted by the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Education in 
accomplishing its objectives. The section was to be headed by Olin Templin, then 
working as a dean at Kansas University, and the rest of the staff was made up of a 
variety of scholars and professionals in various fields of home economics and the 
biological sciences. Much like the organization of the Administration itself, the Collegiate 
Section in the nation’s capital was supported at the state and local level. In each state a 
chief of college service was to be chosen, while each college and university would have 
a director or liaison that served as a representative of the Food Administration on 
campus. At the time of its formation, the three courses prepared by the government had 
been refined and expanded to include detailed outlines for each lecture. The first 
course, consisting of sixteen lectures, was open to all college students, while the 
second and third courses were geared towards upperclassmen with backgrounds in 
appropriate fields such as chemistry and physiology. The final course consisted of sixty-
four laboratory hours, focusing on practical applications that would prepare students to 
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assist in Food Administration public demonstrations. Additionally, a condensed course of 
ten lessons had been prepared to distribute to the nation’s public schools.35
In order to provide additional legitimacy and credentials to those completing the 
specialized coursework and successfully passing the required exams, the Food 
Administration provided certificates to those students that completed these tasks. The 
goal, as indicated above, was to “prepare an army of exceptional young women, by 
intensive training, for such special service as may be needed by the Food 
Administration.” These services, as suggested by the agency, included assisting in 
public demonstrations, assembling and leading study groups in their neighborhoods, 
spreading the message of the Food Administration to children through reading stories, 
and helping with local library exhibits. To encourage qualified female students to engage 
in such activities, the Food Administration took out advertisements in publications. In 
one example, an insert, presented in the form of an article, was entitled “College Girls 
Give Vacation Days to Uncle Sam.” It presented the summer vacation, long perceived 
as a time for rest and relaxation, as an opportunity to engage in the intense work of 
helping the war effort. Reporting on the opportunities available to college women 
seeking to help, the article presented various images of girls engaging in activities such 
as tending fields, harvesting crops, and canning food. The piece declared that such 
efforts were the main reason American society had remained so strong despite the 
absence of so much of the nation’s “manpower.” It also claimed that their sacrifice was 
just as important as the soldiers fighting overseas. “These young women,” wrote the 
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Food Administration, “have dedicated themselves to their country no less than the boys 
who are fighting over in France today.”36
By the end of the academic year in 1918, it became clear to the Food 
Administration that college women were not the only students who needed to be 
reached on campus. In an address to males currently attending college, Hoover focused 
on the topic of service to country. Realizing that many of the young men he was 
speaking to were struggling with the decision to either stay in school or join the fight, 
Hoover recalled the successful work done by American college students who had 
volunteered for the campaign for Belgian relief, combining idealism and efficiency to 
successfully aid tens of thousands of war victims. He proclaimed that those currently 
attending college “face a special responsibility and duty,” which did not necessarily 
include military service. According to the Food Administration head, responding to the 
call of duty did not necessarily mean leaving campus. Hoover considered the nation’s 
college students as a “privileged class,” who possessed “an expanded mind, an uplifted 
spirit, and an understanding of the real meaning of patriotism.” Just as important to the 
outcome of the war was a “technically trained mind,” and thus he encouraged 
underclassmen to stay in school. Even upperclassmen were urged to “proceed 
cautiously” if called upon, and told to attempt to enter fields in the military that best 
suited their academic training.      37
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Not surprisingly, the Food Administration emphasized that one of the most 
important ways young men remaining at home could help in the war effort would be to 
follow its guidelines and help spread the message of conservation to the rest of the 
country. In May of 1918 the Food Administration distributed a flyer entitled “An Appeal to 
College” men and encouraged the nation’s college and universities to give it “proper 
publicity.” In explaining the motivation behind this new campaign, Olin Templin 
expressed the agency’s desire to challenge the common perception that the food 
problem was primarily the concern of women. “Men also must throw their influence 
heavily into the campaign,” declared Templin, “or disaster is inevitable.” It is difficult not 
to recognize the irony of such statements, given that the Food Administration itself in its 
propaganda over the previous year had at least a small role to play in cultivating such a 
perception. Regardless, this attempt suggests that, after nearly a year of work in trying 
to shape the minds and behavior of the American people, the government realized it 
had to broaden its message to include women as well as men. The flyer itself contained 
a series of slogans that attempted to portray the duty of conserving food at home as 
having the same importance as the boys fighting “over there.” “The battlefield is here! 
The battle is now,” claimed the Food Administration. College men were encouraged to 
become more informed about the food situation, carefully follow government guidelines, 
and “be aggressive agents of the Food Administration wherever you go.” Much like the 
propaganda geared towards women, appeals for college men to not only follow but 
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spread the message of food conservation was presented as an opportunity to not only 
serve the nation but to also improve the quality of their own lives.38
 As the summer of 1918 came to an end and schools were gearing up for the 
upcoming academic year, the Food Administration finally succeeded in the publication of 
proper text books for both elementary and college students. However, the college text 
offered very little in terms of new material on food conservation. Rather, Food and the 
War, was little more than an expanded and detailed presentation of the three courses 
that had previously been prepared by the Food Administration. In Part I, materials from 
the first two courses were compiled and edited by Katharine Blunt, a professor of food 
chemistry from the University of Chicago, while Part II, containing more practical 
applications of nutrition concepts in the preparation of food, was edited by home 
economics professor Elizabeth Sprague. In addition, the textbook contained copies of 
two messages from Herbert Hoover, as well as a forward by the agency’s Collegiate 
Section leader Olin Templin. The book for younger students, Food Saving and Sharing, 
appears to have been released even later in 1918, when the outcome of the war 
seemed rather certain. The overall message of the book, one in which the primary 
motive for conserving food was for humanitarian purposes rather than achieving victory 
in war, reflected a fundamental shift in the overall strategy of Food Administration 
propaganda. Even as the conflict wound down in the autumn of 1918, and victory for the 
United States and its allies grew more certain, officials within the Food Administration 
 Herbert Hoover, “The College Student and the War,” address, undated, USFA Records, 38
Hoover Institution, Box 47, Folder 5; Olin Templin to Presidents of Colleges and Universities, 
May 2, 1918, USFA Collection, Hoover Institution, Box 374, Folder 1; USFA, “Appeal to College 
Men,” pamphlet, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 1, 1918), USFA Collection, 
Hoover Institution, Box 374, Folder 1. 
 148
realized that the need for America to send large amounts of food overseas would persist 
during the postwar period. Thus, the need for Americans to continue to conserve food 
still existed. For their message to still resonate, the Food Administration would have to 
change its strategy alter the language of its propaganda. The next chapter will focus on 
this transition, which did not involve a dramatic transformation, but rather an increased 
emphasis on the theme that had been present in its message from the beginning.  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Chapter 4 - “Transitioning from a ‘War Consciousness’ to a ‘World 
Consciousness’”
In addition to cultivating a sense of national duty and intelligent efficiency, Food 
Administration propaganda also attempted to encourage food conservation among the 
American public by getting them to consider more intimately the global dimensions of 
the food problem. Americans were not only confronted with vivid militaristic and patriotic 
imagery and messaging to generate a sense of service and duty to their own country, 
they were also exposed to propaganda that sought to bring about a feeling of obligation 
and compassion towards the nations and people of America’s European allies. Thus, 
the efficient conservation of food was not only presented as an important weapon in 
waging war, it was depicted as a humanitarian exercise. The dramatic state of the food 
crisis facing the people (especially the women and children) of England, France, and 
Italy were regularly part of Food Administration propaganda. Attempts were made to 
also highlight the fact that our allies were making their own sacrifices at the market and 
the table in order to convince the American public that they were worthy of our 
assistance. 
Accomplishing this would mean that Americans in general would need to view 
both themselves and the country in a more global context. Given the social and political 
tensions that surrounded U.S. involvement in the war, the leadership of the Food 
Administration recognized that this would very likely not be an easy task. Hoover 
himself acknowledged the potential difficulty in getting Americans to view problems from 
beyond the confines of the nation’s borders. He lamented early on that most Americans 
had trouble understanding the world food problem. For many, the crisis began and 
ended with the price they had to pay for things like bread and meat. Few gave much 
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consideration to the plight of hungry civilians in England or France. “The popular view is 
too self-centered,” Hoover said of the people in the United States. “It does not look 
across the sea.” Thus, a major aspect of Food Administration propaganda was to at 
least in part encourage Americans to think more globally. Government officials such as 
Hoover believed that doing so would help Americans gain a greater appreciation of how 
what they chose to eat not only impacted the food situation of the Allied nations in 
Europe, but also how it could shape the outcome of the war itself. Additionally, placing 
the food problem in a global context can also be viewed as a way political leaders 
attempted to reorient American views towards the nation’s role in postwar global affairs.  1
This chapter will analyze the various ways in which the United States Food 
Administration, attempted to influence American food behavior during World War I. More 
specifically, it will explore the global dimensions of the propaganda produced by the 
U.S. Food Administration during the First World War. As part of its message, the 
government attempted to connect food conservation and substitution at home with the 
broader global struggle against German aggression. Not only did the Food 
Administration work closely with Allied food controllers and media outlets to portray the 
food situation in England, France and Italy as being extremely perilous, it also made 
sure the American public knew that the fruits of their sacrifice were going to a worthy 
recipient that was conscious and appreciative of American efforts. Rather than being a 
burden, the program created by the Food Administration offered the nation an 
opportunity display its strength and efficiency to the rest of the world. Such appeals not 
only reflected a belief amongst many within the political establishment that the United 
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States played a key role in shaping the outcome of the war itself, Food Administration 
propaganda also expressed a belief that the nation had an important responsibility in 
the postwar world. The global dimensions of the food problem, and the accompanying 
proposed government guidelines, can be found lingering in the background of even the 
earliest examples of Food Administration propaganda. However, as the war began to 
wind down in the autumn of 1918, it emerged front and center as the prominent theme 
in conservation publicity. By then the goal, according to Hoover, was to create “an 
intelligent world conscience” among the American people.2
The transnational dimensions of both propaganda during the Great War and food 
relief have been the focus of recent works from historians and other scholars. In the 
nineteen sixties, Mancur Olson explored the role of food supplies in determining the 
outcomes of the conflicts fought by an industrialized Britain, from the Napoleonic Wars 
of the nineteenth century to the Second World War. Regarding the Great War, Olson set 
out to explain how Britain, which relied heavily on food imports even before the outbreak 
of war and took no significant measures to stockpile resources in the event of conflict, 
was able to avoid widespread starvation and achieve victory. Adding further irony to the 
issue, according to Olson, was that Germany, unlike Britain, had taken steps during the 
early twentieth century to avoid a wartime food shortage and yet that is exactly what 
befell them in the final months of the conflict. Olson largely credits the flexibility of 
Britain’s political system, and the unity of its population, to generate the needed 
increase in domestic production and reduction of the overall consumption of food. This, 
combined with the eventual participation of the United States ultimately led to the victory 
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experienced by Britain and its allies. In his study of the First World War, Avner Offer not 
only stresses the importance of food in determining the outcome of the conflict, he 
assesses the role agricultural products played in causing the war, as well as its 
influence in shaping the peace. The industrial Atlantic economy, which had grown and 
developed throughout the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, had created the 
economic and political bonds that tied western Europe, especially Britain, to the United 
States. While this relationship was based on American exports of various raw materials, 
the single most important commodity was food. As industrial societies became more 
reliant on outside entities to provide such necessities, the global trade of food became 
the most important factor in shaping international relations.  3
Historians have also recently begun looking at the influence of factors such as 
nutritional science and humanitarianism on the development of international food policy 
over the last century. In his study of modern global hunger, James Vernon holds the 
common belief that the problem of food shortage, at least since the beginning of the 
industrial era, is one largely caused by inequalities of distribution and access. 
Predominant attitudes towards, and attempts to solve, the problem, according to 
Vernon, have gone through three phases over the last two centuries. The first viewed 
the phenomenon of hunger as a part of God’s master plan and thus not something that 
should be interfered with. In the second phase, hunger was seen as a symptom of 
moral failings of the individual, who had failed to learn the virtues of hard work. Finally, 
the “social” phase that emerged in the early twentieth century emphasized the social 
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and institutional causes of hunger and recognized the responsibility of all humankind 
that those suffering from hunger were at least in part the victims of political and 
economic systems. By World War I, the growth of biological and social sciences had 
brought forth a greater understanding of nutrition and emphasized that the political 
process could develop and implement practical solutions to the problem of hunger. The 
First World War would not only accelerate this process on the domestic front with food 
control policies, but would also do the same on the international front with both wartime 
and postwar food relief efforts.4
In his study of wartime publicity, Stewart Ross argues that the decision of the 
United States to declare war on Germany was at least in part due to the efforts of British 
government propagandists. He details a publicity battle on U.S. soil between the British, 
who wanted the United States to join the fray, and the Germans, who were for a least a 
time committed to keeping America on the sidelines. Such scholarship shows how, even 
before the United States officially joined the conflict, there was a flow of propaganda 
materials across the Atlantic. Additionally, recent scholarship has emphasized how food 
came to play an important role in shaping modern American foreign relations. By 
defining the value of food on the basis of a scientific quality such as the calorie, the 
subjective, cultural character of food was pushed aside as it became an instrument of 
statecraft. Beginning with the First World War and Hoover’s Food Administration, and 
continuing through the Cold War and even to this day, American food aid will be used as 
a key component of its foreign policy, especially as it relates to “less developed nations.”  
More recently Helen Veit has looked at how modern food culture, and the work of the 
 James Vernon, Hunger: A Modern History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) 1-17, 4
81-117.
 154
Food Administration in particular, helped shape how Americans viewed themselves 
within broader global community. Viet calls the Food Administration the nation’s “first 
foreign aid program,” one that not only aimed to provide immediate relief to people 
suffering overseas, but one that also hoped that the greater awareness of the global 
food crisis would spark a fundamental change in the wasteful consumption of food at 
home.  5
If the government wanted to present a single individual to represent this 
“intelligent world conscience,” to serve as a model for ordinary Americans to follow, they 
needed to look no further than Hoover himself. Despite Hoover’s attempts to keep 
himself as an individual out of the spotlight, his personal history and background 
received attention. Various American media outlets published profiles of the Food 
Administration leader, which largely portrayed him as both the prototypical patriotic 
American success story and a modern “citizen of the world.” Hoover was described as a 
“generous soul” and called the “embodiment of the efficient American.” His past career 
as a globe-trotting, problem-solving engineer in such far-off places as China, India, and 
Australia was emphasized, as well as his humanitarian actions during the early years of 
the war as the head of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. He was portrayed as a 
“young hero of today,” a “captain of industry and a master of men.” Hoover represented 
the modern man in its purist form, a social engineer with global sensibilities. However, 
despite possessing such talents and skills, the man himself was completely 
disinterested in personal wealth or glory. He was a modest man, a reflection of his 
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humble origins in rural Iowa. Rather than his own ego, Hoover’s concerns were with 
others. These traits were the very ones that Americans were encouraged to adopt in 
their efforts to conserve food. “We like to think that he is truly American,” noted one 
publication aimed at the nation’s youth, “because his interests and sympathies are as 
broad as humanity, because all mankind is his business, because in deed and in truth 
he is ‘a citizen of the world.’”6
Even after the creation of the U.S. Food Administration and Americans‘ fears of 
excessively-high food prices were not fully realized, food control early on was not 
readily accepted by all Americans.  In trying to analyze the problem from a social 
perspective, noted medical scholar Alonzo E. Taylor attempted to explain why food 
control was not producing intended results.  For him, the problem had deep 
psychological roots.  “In this country we have difficulty in the program of food 
conservation,” wrote Taylor, “because our people have not yet attained sacrificial 
consciousness for the carrying on of the war.”   The goal, argues Taylor, is to get 7
Americans to view every act of their lives as a positive military measure.  “When we 
have reached that plane,” concludes Taylor, “the whole problem of food control 
becomes simplified, because the motivation is there that makes it possible to carry 
through a repression applied to foods.”8
Thus, one of the U.S. Food Administration’s earliest and most important goals 
was to help American’s achieve Taylor’s “sacrificial consciousness.”  This resulted in the 
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careful crafting of propaganda that contained three very important messages: the Allies 
were facing a dramatic food crisis and needed America’s aid to win the war, the Allies 
were worthy and appreciative of the assistance, and the food program gave the 
American public the opportunity to show to the rest of the world the power of a 
democratic society.  Hoover used all of the tools at his disposal to get his message out, 
and he worked closely with government officials in England and France, as well as 
popular media outlets, in an attempt to get Americans to buy into the food program of 
the U.S. government.
Even before coming home to lead the Food Administration, Hoover presented to 
the American people a bleak picture of how the war had impacted the civilian population 
in Europe. In a National Geographic Magazine article entitled “Bind the Wounds of 
France,” Hoover described the devastation and misery he witnessed up close in his 
work as the head of the Commission of Relief in Belgium. “We are the only group who 
know if their suffering,” he wrote, “and who know of what confronts those people even 
after peace.” He stressed how desperately the regions of Belgium and northern France 
were in need of support and aid from the people of the United States. Not only were 
they in need, but they were worthy, as their suffering came from them fighting off further 
German expansion and upholding ideals Americans held dear. “France is sacrificing her 
manhood,” proclaimed Hoover, “on a pyre devoted to liberty and a pyre devoted to our 
protection.” From the start it was clear that the government wanted to generate a 
collective sense of sympathy towards the Allied populations.9
 Herbert Hoover, “Bind the Wounds of France,” National Geographic Magazine, 31 (May 1917)  439.9
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Upon returning to the United States in April of 1917, Hoover delivered a message 
to the American people that expressed the critical nature of the food supply in Europe 
and the important role that food behavior in the U.S. would have on the outcome of the 
war.  “The first and most important duty of the American people to their allies,” declared 
the head of the U.S. Food Administration, “is to economize on foodstuffs.” Failure to do 
so could jeopardize the entire Allied war effort.  Hoover portrayed the food situation as 
serious and predicted that their supplies would not last beyond the month of September 
if the American people did not step up and dramatically alter their food habits by 
reducing their current rate of consumption. Although England, France and Italy were 
reducing their consumption “by drastic steps” it was still not enough. Hoover argued that 
the ultimate solution could only come from “the elimination of waste and actual and 
rigorous self-sacrifice on the part of the American people.” Such actions were portrayed 
by Hoover as a display of patriotism, an opportunity for Americans who could not serve 
in the trenches to do their part in the war effort.   10
At this early stage in American involvement in the war effort, Hoover was not only 
attempting to highlight the European food crisis to get the public to think more about 
food conservation, he was also trying to shape the political climate that would ultimately 
determine whether the agency he was tapped to head would even be granted legitimacy 
by Congress. To help craft the message that Hoover and the U.S. Food Administration 
wanted to present to political leaders and the American public, he took a number of 
steps to ensure that the news coming from Europe to the U.S. fell in line with what they 
wanted to say.  One way to do this was to get the American papers to emphasize the 
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poor food conditions in the Allied nations in order to convince the public that their 
actions were needed.  In April of 1917 Sir William Goode, a British official, contacted 
Hoover to let him know that all American news correspondents in London had been 
contacted and were “no only glad to do everything to co-operate but really are extremely 
anxious for stuff.”  He stated that he had provided the AP and the United Press with 
various statements by members of Parliament on the food situation and was the one 
that arranged the aforementioned Kennedy Jones interview with the New York Tribune.  
At the time Goode also indicated that he was making additional arrangements to 
provide Daily Mail stories for various American newspapers.  One month later Goode 
contacted Hoover again and indicated that the U.S. Food Administration had planned to 
use a “publicity man” to syndicate articles by well-known authors on food conditions in 
England.   11
As the spring turned into summer, the future of the Lever Bill was still up in the 
air, and Hoover felt the need to do what he could to get momentum on the side of its 
passage.  Writing to Lord Northcliffe of the British High Commission, Hoover stressed 
the importance of maintaining an image of England as suffering from food anxiety.  He 
also expressed his dismay over recent comments by Northcliffe in which he stated that 
England had actually solved the food problem and suggested that he work quickly to 
“straighten out this impression.”  Northcliffe needed to insist that England was practically 
dependent on North America for her bread, and doing so “would be of extreme value to 
us in the work we are trying to do.”  Hoover responded to Goode’s efforts by showing 
 Letter, Sir William Goode to Herbert Hoover, April 27, 1917, United States Food Administration 11
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appreciation of his work so far, but he wanted more information that portrayed the food 
crisis with the addition of “anxiety also from France.”  Hoover showed his desire to 
portray that the Allies were anxiously awaiting action from the U.S. and that if “we have 
no food control to give [the Allies] valid assurances they will be in complete despair.”   12
Responding to Hoover’s request to get “some reflex action through the papers,” 
William Ampoole of the British Ministry of Food met with a number of the editors of the 
major British newspapers, including the Daily Mail and the Telegraph.  Ampoole 
reported to Hoover that the editors were very receptive and “only too glad to do anything 
both now and in the future.”  Ampoole also brings up a key point that will become a key 
part of the U.S. Food Administration’s message to the American people once their food 
control program is enacted.  Once the Lever Bill is passed, he argues that it will “be 
essential for us to show interest in, and gratitude for, its results in order to keep public 
opinion on your side, convinced that the sacrifices they are making...are essential to the 
Allies.”13
In May, Goode supplied material for an article to the New York Times.  It was an 
interview with R.W. Kindersley, Chairman of the War Savings Committee, whose 
objective was the promotion of voluntary rationing in England.  The purpose was to “tell 
the American public something of the way in which he runs his highly successful 
campaign.”  Kindersley expressed his appreciation of the American sacrifice and 
proclaimed that their actions were helping a nation that was worthy of its charity.  He 
spoke of his overwhelming confidence that the people of England would prove their 
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worth “as it always has done before when in a tight corner, that it would willingly and 
cheerfully comply when it knew the real facts.”  He ended his interview by pointing out 
the cultural ties that linked the two nations in this struggle by stating, “the whole English-
speaking world is now united.”14
Throughout the spring stories of the food emergency in Europe found their way to 
the pages of American newspapers. Goode sent the Chicago Daily News a copy of an 
article written by Mrs. C.S. Peel, the Director of the Women’s Service in the Ministry of 
Food. Peel described the conditions in England that had made it nearly impossible to 
obtain food. Even those with the means to purchase nourishment were struggling. “You 
can go out today with money in your pocket,” wrote Peel, “and fail to obtain a pound of 
sugar or a pound of potatoes.  Later, who knows but that you may fail to obtain bread?”  
She ended her article with a particularly dire assessment. “The Germans have planned 
to starve us, and...their plan is working with considerable success.” Later in the summer 
the British Ministry of Food “drew up” a statement for John Hodge, British Minister of 
Labour, that expressed his gratification towards the work of American labor leaders in 
trying to get the Lever Bill passed. Hodge went on to illustrate the importance of the 
food control legislation by discussing the need for U.S. assistance in the face of 
widespread food insecurity. “Every day’s delay,” warns Hodge, “now adds to our anxiety 
and uncertainty.”15
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On the Fourth of July, the U.S. Food Administration issued a press release 
entitled “Food Economy in England.” The release detailed the sacrifices of the Allies to 
show Americans, who were being asked to limit their consumption, that the English 
were worthy recipients of U.S. aid by doing their best to curb their intake as well.  “Is 
John Bull,” asks the article, “wearing his belt tighter than before the war?”  The release 
went on to provide a number of examples to assure Americans that John Bull was 
indeed tightening his belt. It cited a report from a well-known American journalist who 
had just returned home from England and stated that he went hungry during his stay. 
He could not get enough to eat in any hotel or restaurant and detailed the English 
government’s strict regulation of consumption and waste. For example, he reported that 
any household that was caught throwing even a piece of bread away was fined twenty 
shillings. The release also detailed the British Food Controller’s voluntary rationing 
campaign within the home, which asked to limit bread consumption to four pounds a 
week per person. Using a practice similar to the Home Card campaign in the United 
States, participants were also asked to place a card in their window, and by all 
appearances the campaign was widely accepted throughout the country. In cases 
where the evidence appeared to challenge the purported level of sacrifice by the British 
to cut food consumption, American government officials were willing to “cook the 
books.” While preparing graphic exhibits for upcoming state and country fairs that 
illustrated Allied food intake, estimates put actual British daily caloric intake at levels 
well above what was being recommended for the sake of the war. Wanting to give the 
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intake a much lower figure, Hoover contacted the British embassy in Washington to 
gauge whether it would “be inadvisable to furnish such information.”   16
Once the Lever Bill was and signed into law in August of 1917, Hoover moved 
quickly to solidify the communication lines between the U.S. and the Allies.  In a letter to 
Lord Rhondda, head of the British Ministry of Food, Hoover expressed his hope that 
through the U.S. Food Administration representative in the embassy in London, the two 
would be able to “work out an intimate co-operation.”  He also relayed his desire to 
continue working with William Goode, whose work Hoover found to be “of particular 
value…especially in the propaganda for conservation on this side, as the material he 
furnishes us is of daily use.”  In September Lord Rhondda called on Americans to send 
more food to the Allies.  His message attempted to convince the U.S. public that their 
actions were important and greatly appreciated by the Allied populations.  American 
homes, according to the Food Controller, “are helping to win the war just as surely as is 
the productions of munitions” and are “in a position to bring nearer the inevitable 
atonement for the brutal outrages in Belgium...the sinking of the Lusitania and other 
horrors.”  He went on to assure them that “there need be no fear that the sacrifices will 
be wasted here.”17
One of the reasons there was such an emphasis on highlighting the dire 
conditions facing the people of the Allied nations was that there was a belief gaining 
momentum amongst Americans that the food crisis in Europe was not as serious as that 
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being portrayed by the media and government officials. By the end of 1917 Americans 
were increasingly reading reports, especially from travelers returning from England and 
France, that food was plentiful and often cheaper than it was at home. In October of 
1917 the U.S. Food Administration released a series of articles by Fred Pitney, a “noted 
foreign correspondent,” on the food situation in France.  Not only did Pitney have 
access to official figures on the food supply from the French government, he had first-
hand knowledge of the situation since he had lived in the country for a period of time.  
Pitney addresses the popular perception held by some Americans who had visited Paris 
that the dire food situation had been overblown.  He argued that such individuals were 
likely only exposed to eating in hotels and restaurants where “one can always...order a 
meal and get it.”  In private homes, especially in the countryside, it was a different story, 
where French peasants “suffer in silence.”  The second article pointed out how and why 
the French Army received better food than civilians, as well the methods used to stretch 
out the rapidly disappearing food supplies.  This “deplorable situation,” according to the 
Food Administration’s note to the editors “is vividly pointed out in a way to secure 
sympathy and understanding of Americans.” The next month the U.S. government gave 
further details of the poor conditions facing the French people with the release of 
statistics on wheat and food production, which had decline by nearly half in the three 
years since the outbreak of war.18
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Later that month the Food Administration began making arrangements for a 
group of American officials to travel through England and France for the purpose of 
obtaining “first-hand information as to the food situation...for use in propaganda 
throughout the country.” The group, consisting of six men from various walks of life, 
including lawyers, and religious and business leaders, arrived in England on the fourth 
of December, made their way to France on the twelfth and other parts of western 
Europe throughout the rest of the month. They toured various operations that dealt with 
food, including municipal kitchens and farm training locations, visited agricultural 
regions and attended government-sponsored conferences and food control meetings. 
Upon their return at the end of the year, Hoover quickly began making arrangements 
with the State Department to set up speaking engagements throughout the United 
States. Officials who made the trip gave various details that attempted to show that 
American sacrifice was still needed. An official release from the Food Administration 
stressed that the group had worked hard to obtain a clear picture of the civilian 
experience and that the stories they would relay to audiences would be authentic. The 
words of the special commission would “not be in the form of official reports,” declared 
the Food Administration, “but in the more interesting style of the lecturer who has an eye 
for the human interest element involved.” One told of eating at a London hotel, “where 
the waiter gave you one thinly-cut slice of bread, a war bread composed of eighty 
percent whole-wheat flour and twenty percent substitute” while requests for extra sugar 
were refused. In France, farmland was destroyed and unsuitable for agriculture where 
“sections of that war stricken country are practically living under famine conditions.” The 
speaking engagement ended with a plea to the audience to continue their conservation 
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efforts.  “Food will win the war,” declared the speaker.  “It is up to you to decide whether 
it is to be German food or our food which is the deciding factor.”19
In addition to media outlets and public speaking tours, the U.S. Food 
Administration used other means to convince the American public that food 
conservation was needed in order to not only save a group of desperate (though worthy 
and grateful) allies but to also win the war and prove the righteousness of the American 
way on a global stage. Through the Administration’s Education Division, the government 
produced a vast amount of propaganda, including posters, flyers, pamphlets and motion 
pictures, aimed at changing the dietary habits of Americans. Reflecting on the 
importance of visual media, George Creel, who headed the government’s Committee on 
Public Information, stated, “I had the conviction that the poster must play a great part in 
the fight for public opinion. The printed word might not be read...but the billboard was 
something that caught even the most indifferent eye.” One example of this form of 
propaganda as it related to the U.S. Food Administration depicted the “Heroic Women of 
France.” It showed an image of French peasant women struggling in their attempts to 
produce food for their country. Underneath the image are quotes from the likes of 
Hoover and President Wilson, stressing the importance of American conservation to 
combat the horrible conditions overseas as well as the worthiness of the Allies in 
receiving this aid.  At the bottom, the poster asks, “Are you doing your part?”  20
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Film was also an important vehicle for presenting the European perspective to 
the American public. The U.S. Food Administration worked closely with Allied food 
control officials to produce a film that would touch on many of the major themes in the 
message to raise international awareness. To show that Britain was continuing to 
sacrifice even with American assistance and still needed more, a film on the British food 
situation was produced to be shown in American movie theaters. Included in the motion 
picture were scenes including a city park being plowed up by women driving Ford Motor 
tractors, the collection of boiled soup bones and used grease for the use in munitions 
production, and the use of cornmeal in the baking of “War Bread.”  The film ends with a 
cartoon image of a map of Britain placed within the borders of a United States map and 
the quote, “America can save a spare from her abundance.” Government officials hoped 
that viewers would leave the theater feeling that their sacrifice was needed in order to 
win the war, and further, that the beneficiaries of the American effort to save food were 
worthy.21
As the war continued into 1918, Hoover and the U.S. Food Administration still felt 
the need to continue its close relationship with foreign food controllers to help craft its 
message aimed at manipulating the food behavior the American people.  In January 
Hoover contacted a member of the British Ministry of Food informing him that the Food 
Administration was about to initiate a “more intensive conservation drive” in an attempt 
to save an additional seventy-five million bushels of wheat for export.  Thus, he 
requested a cable from Lord Rhondda “expressing the imperative necessity of this 
provision.”  Three days later Rhondda obliged with a message stating that unless the 
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U.S. sent required wheat to the Allies, he could not “take the responsibility of assuring 
our people that there will be enough to win the war.”  Rhondda then took the opportunity 
to appeal directly to the American people.  While acknowledging the sacrifice already 
made, he declared that it “now lies with America to decide whether or not the Allies in 
Europe shall have enough bread to hold out.”  According to Rhondda, Americans were 
going to answer the call.  “I am convinced,” declared the British official, “that the 
American people, if they know the truth, will not hesitate to meet the emergency.”22
One of Hoover’s top officials within the Food Administration, Vernon Kellogg, 
worked diligently to insure that the American press was telling the story of struggle and 
sacrifice of Allied citizens overseas. In a series of internal memos within the 
organization, Kellogg provided ideas for press stories that highlighted the food crisis and 
the steps being taken by the people of France and England to ward off starvation. In 
England, Kellogg told of how the government, still relying on the voluntary cooperation 
of citizens to conserve food, had begun a system of rationing of animal feed. While 
animals such as horses and milk cows were given a ration, others such as pigs and 
beef cattle received no feed and thus had to rely on grass, roots, and straw. Such a 
restricted diet would lead to livestock that was drastically underweight, and as a result 
the English would be eating meat with little or no fat. Kellogg also focused on the recent 
laws passed by the British government in an attempt to curb food waste. He claimed 
that while the U.S. Food Administration was appealing to Americans to voluntarily 
conserve food, England went further to make the wasting of food an offense legally 
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punishable by fine or imprisonment. Additionally, Kellogg worked to emphasize the 
plight of the French by detailing the recent implementation of bread rationing by the 
government. Given that bread composed nearly half of the French diet, this was a rather 
extreme measure. If Americans were made aware of this, Kellogg believed that 
Americans “may realize how far the French people are going in their efforts to restrict 
food consumption.” The hope was that upon this realization they would decide to cut 
back on their own wheat intake.23
While working on behalf of the Food Administration in Washington, Kellogg 
maintained his contacts in Europe from his time serving with Hoover in the Commission 
for Relief in Belgium. He made efforts to instruct American correspondents in France on 
how exactly to cover the social crisis for the audience back home. “Tell our people,” 
wrote Kellogg, “that the French are meeting the serious food situation which they are 
now facing with characteristic bravery.” He wanted reports that detailed how our allies 
were reducing food consumption in all ways while also struggling to increase their own 
domestic food production despite the manpower shortages. Finally, it was made clear 
that it was important to stress that American help was desperately needed to feed these 
people. The Food Administration also made efforts to increase its presence in France by 
appointing George McFadden, already serving as a representative of the War Trade 
Board, as a representative in Paris. He was tasked with assessing the food situation 
and reporting back to Food Administration offices in Washington.  24
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Additionally, the Educational Division of the Food Administration attempted to 
work directly with the French Food Control agency to coordinate propaganda. Not only 
was the plan to craft a particular message coming out of France for an American 
audience, but it was also done with the hope of publicizing in France the work being 
done in the United States to bolster the morale of the French public. In March of 1918 
Ben Allen, the head of the Food Administration’s Educational Division, approved of a 
plan to provide both French government officials and journalists information that would 
allow them to publish “frequent, interesting articles detailing conservation efforts in the 
United States.” In return, the contacts in France were asked to help provide information 
that would help in combatting the impression among Americans that “the French are not 
feeling any great food shortage.” It was believed that such attitudes were hampering 
conservation efforts in the United States. By May of 1918 the Food Administration was 
sending a number of copies of various types of propaganda, including posters, bulletins, 
articles, and other “interesting documents” to the U.S. embassy in Paris. In return, the 
French government had pledged to supply the Food Administration with publicity 
materials on the food crisis there to be used in propaganda in America. Throughout the 
spring of 1918 officials in France working on behalf of the Food Administration worked 
to encourage cooperation between the U.S. and France through both media and 
governmental channels.25
In addition to coordinating propaganda and media relations to shape the attitudes 
of its people, the United States Food Administration also worked in a more public 
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capacity to cooperate in the logistics and policies of food relief with its counterparts in 
England, France, and Italy. This began as soon as Hoover was tapped by the president 
to lead the proposed food control agency. In April 1917 while still in Europe, Hoover 
began studying Allied food conditions and encouraging cooperation between the nations 
in both the logistics of shipping food supplies and the process of propaganda creation.  
Hoover was very conscious even at this early stage of the importance that the 
appearance of cooperation amongst the Allies would have on the public mindset.  
During these meetings he expressed the need to “organize publicity upon [the] needs of 
importing Allies with [the] view to stimulating effort from the exporting Allies.” In England, 
Hoover met with the food control officials of the Allied nations and made a number of 
proposals for how the countries should work together to achieve their goals.  He 
stressed the importance of cooperation, and for him the first step towards reaching that 
goal involved the creation of an international board that coordinated purchases and the 
shipment of goods from the United States.  The ultimate goal in this regard was to try 
and prevent the various Allied nations from bidding against each other and driving up 
prices in America. 26
While this idea of cooperation had existed from the beginning, the formal 
machinery to ensure this process failed to materialized throughout the spring and 
summer of 1917. By the end of August, Hoover had grown frustrated with the situation, 
and he contacted the British War Office in London directly to demand the Allies create a 
common policy. Hoover threatened to embargo all American food exports if it did not 
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happen soon. “We simply cannot have our whole consuming population demoralized,” 
declared the Food Administration head, “and hate against the allies inflamed by this 
made competition between themselves.” Within a month, British Food Controller Lord 
Rhondda had announced the formation of the Inter-Allied Food Council. The Council 
consisted of separate agencies tasked with securing imports of specific foodstuffs, such 
as wheat or fats. It contained representatives from Britain, France, and Italy, and each 
nation employed a full-time executive to oversee the coordination of the purchase and 
importation of foodstuffs from the United States. 27
 Even though the United States was able to push its allies in a direction that 
streamlined the flow of foodstuffs across the Atlantic, when it came to the issue of 
controlling the food consumption of its people, American relief experts and government 
officials largely came away unimpressed with their European counterparts. Making 
matters worse was the fact that projected grain harvests for the end of the year were 
going to fall well short of expectations. That, combined with continued difficulties in 
overseas transport caused by German submarine warfare made it more important than 
ever that America’s European allies cut back on their grain consumption. One point of 
contention was the apparent lack of participation from the scientific community in 
shaping food control policy. Dr. Margaret Wilson, a Scottish immigrant working as a 
physiology professor at New York’s Hunter College, came away from a trip to England 
thoroughly unimpressed with how the food crisis was being handled. She noted that 
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scientific experts were out of touch with the public, and that as a result, “much 
ignorance and crudeness” was pervasive amongst the British public. As 1917 came to 
an end Food Administration officials were still lamenting the fact that the food control 
policies of the Allied nations had not “received the advantage of a clear-cut scientific 
formulation of the problem.”28
The lack of influence from scientific experts was just part of a more generalized 
critical assessment in which American officials concluded that the control of food 
consumption by its citizens was handled differently by the Allies. In November and 
December of 1917 Alonzo Taylor, acting as a representative of the Food Administration, 
traveled to Europe as part of a larger contingent sponsored by the House of 
Representatives. Upon his return Taylor provided his analysis of the systems of food 
control as carried out by the Allies. In general, Taylor found that in England, France, and 
Italy very little was done by the government to control consumption. Shaping food 
behavior was not taken seriously by any of the nations. “The point of food administration 
from the standpoint of the consumer’s conservation,” reported Taylor, “was always far in 
the background.” The matter was “left entirely to the unguided voluntary regime of the 
people.” This was certainly different from the “voluntary regime” of the U.S. government 
which relied heavily on the Food Administration to generate a particular message. The 
lack of guidance from government propaganda was also noted by an American working 
for the Commission for Relief in Belgium. John Simpson, working in Paris to coordinate 
propaganda between the U.S. and France, noted that, when it came to food control, the 
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French had fallen short. Government officials had failed to generate an appeal that 
resonated with the public. However, Simpson believed that could change if officials 
followed more closely the American model. The citizens of France that were at the time 
failing to buy in to food control measures “could be induced to do so if the problem was 
dramatized and pictured in the vivd terms of war and victory.” Unfortunately, even after 
initial efforts had been made to secure the cooperation of the French government, 
American officials were lamenting the poor state of its ally’s propaganda machinery, 
noting that it was in a “complete state of upheaval.”.29
Taylor even noted a recent study of England’s voluntary rationing system that 
had been conducted in London. The study found that the overall conservation of food by 
the British people was very slight if at all, and predicted that, despite the fears of 
potential class unrest and destruction of morale, mandatory rationing would soon be 
imposed by the government. U.S. officials also criticized that lack of cooperation 
amongst the European allies. “They do not trust each other,” noted Taylor. Officials from 
one nation were not willing to initiate a more aggressive conservation program because 
they did not believe that their allies would follow suit. Despite the presence of entities 
such as the Inter-Allied Council, Taylor concluded that “coordination and leadership are 
lacking.”30
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 The United States quickly stepped in to fill that leadership void. During the joint 
meetings on food control that took place during the House trip to Europe, American 
officials took the lead. According to Taylor the United States was “viewed in an entirely 
different manner” by its European allies, meaning there was little suspicion or distrust. 
To solidify its leadership and ensure that it had a role in shaping the food control policies 
of its allies moving forward it set forth in creating the Inter-Allied Commission on 
Alimentation. This new body was consisted of eight experts in the field of nutrition, two 
from each of the major allied nations. Based in Paris, the Commission’s main purpose 
was to make recommendations to the Allied governments in order to establish a level of 
consistency when it came to official food control measures. In addition to having a 
general feeling of leadership amongst the Allies, Taylor noted that another aspect of 
greater American involvement in coordinating food control recommendations was the 
additional advantage of it having a stronger scientific point of view. Experts on the new 
commission, declared Taylor, gave European scientists for the first time the “proper 
opportunity of impressing their viewpoint upon the food authorities of their own 
countries.”31
However, despite these developments, American officials still encountered 
obstacles when they attempted to exert more control over Allied policies. Facing 
increased domestic pressure over grain supplies and the fact that the Allied 
governments had done little to curb wheat consumption, Hoover sent American 
physiologists Russell Chittenden and Graham Lusk overseas in February of 1918 to 
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convince the Allies to cut their consumption of grain. They presented the latest scientific 
data obtained from experiments to officials from Britain, France, and Italy. They showed 
that humans could sustain health without negative consequence on a diet with restricted 
wheat intakes. Further, Chittenden and Lusk pointed out that the requested ration, a 
twenty-five percent reduction in current levels, was still higher than the current German 
ration, and there was no indication that the German people were struggling to maintain 
their health or support for the war effort. Despite these claims, the American 
representatives were met with resistance from the European food control officials. Citing 
the potential for social upheaval in response to a wheat ration, the Allies refused to 
implement the recommended restrictions. However, given that the U.S. ultimately 
controlled the amount of grains coming into Europe, the Commission agreed to a 
temporary policy in early 1918 that reduced the ration by ten percent.  32
Greater U.S. engagement with the rest of the world would continue even after 
American military commitments ended. As it has been noted, throughout the war the 
impact of the food problem in Europe was linked to the potential of defeat at the hands 
of Germany. However, as the war wound down and the outcome of the conflict became 
clearer, the threat of a food crisis was increasingly associated with the potential of 
postwar internal political upheaval. This shift was also notable in the propaganda 
generated by the Food Administration. While Hoover’s agency had always made a point 
to note the global nature of the food problem, the primary focus of the government’s 
message to the American public shifted from one of military action to one of 
humanitarian relief and global political stability. In a National Geographic Magazine 
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article, Frederic Walcott of the Food Administration discussed not only how Germany 
had used food as a weapon of conquest, but also how widespread famine could 
potentially be a source of internal anarchy and upheaval. Pointing to recent events in 
eastern Europe, Walcott claimed that food shortages were a primary cause of the 
Russian Revolution. He went on to declare that the conditions that led to the “abject 
anarchy” in Russia were contagious and were a threat to spread west. Presenting what 
the Food Administration referred to as a “Hunger Map of Europe,” as well as a number 
of charts and graphs, the article illustrated how the Allies faced dramatic shortages in 
various staple foods. According to Walcott, the only way to hold off a Bolshevik-style 
uprising in places like England and France was for Americans to reduce all forms of 
food consumption.33
As early as the summer of 1918 there began to emerge from the central offices 
of the Food Administration a desire to shift the overall nature of its messaging. In a note 
to the agency’s Educational Directors, an official urged that they stop using the slogan 
“Food Will Win the War.” Further, it was suggested that future propaganda avoid making 
“any statements by which it might be inferred that the service rendered by the Food 
Administration is on par with military service.” “Our job,” claimed one Food 
Administration official, “has changed from food helping ‘to win the war,’ to food helping 
‘to win the world.’” While it was noted that this change was in part due to the potential of 
better-than-expected crop yields in the upcoming harvest, as well as recent reports of 
increased casualties in the American military ranks, it also fell in line with an overall shift 
in the language of the propaganda that would increase as the war came to an end. 
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Around the same time, Hoover noted in a conversation with President Wilson how 
successful the Food Administration had already been in conveying to the American 
public how their sacrifice has aided the Allies. In other words, the Food Administration 
had shown Americans how they “had morally and effectually a pooling of food stuffs with 
the allied peoples.” To further enhance the idea that the Allies were “eating at a common 
table,” Hoover expressed to the president his desire to propose the idea of a “universal 
bread.” He believed that this would have a great unifying impact on the people living on 
either side of the Atlantic.34
As summer turned into fall in 1918, an Allied victory over the Central Powers 
appeared more and more within reach, and by October the Food Administration had 
arranged a publicity campaign that reflected this new reality. Despite victory, the need 
for food overseas would continue, and thus Americans were expected to maintain their 
adherence to conservation measures. Once again, the Four Minute Men were enlisted 
to present the government’s food program for the upcoming year. In a letter to the public 
speaking organization, Hoover presented the Food Administration’s talking points. The 
American public was to be informed that they had to continue saving food in order to 
“save civilization.” Speakers were encouraged to emphasize how dependent on the 
U.S. the rest of the world had become over the course of the conflict, both our allies and 
the people that were about to be liberated. This additional responsibility was to once 
again be portrayed as an opportunity. “It is perhaps our greatest privilege,” wrote 
Hoover, “that we are able to respond promptly and plentifully by simply exercising 
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forethought in our own provisioning and care in our consumption of food.” The Four 
Minute Men were also told to “appeal to the intelligence” of the people. Hoover 
expressed continued confidence in the willingness of the average American to “assume 
individual responsibility in this matter,” which to him was the greatest proof of the 
character and idealism of the nation. However, in the text of a sample speech provided 
to the speakers, there was an indication that Americans had yet to live up to Hoover’s 
expectations. “In the year to come,” asserted the government, “we must expect to share 
more equally with the allies and to shoulder a larger part of the burdens.” The public 
was to be made to realize that now, more than ever, Americans were part of a global 
community which ate “at a common table.”35
In November, with the end of the war now closer than ever, Hoover gave a 
speech that outlined how Food Administration policies would change given the “new 
world situation in food.” While Hoover noted the end of specific guidelines such as use 
of wheat substitutes and the practice of meatless days, he added that there would be no 
change in stressing the “vital necessity of simple living, of economy in all consumption.” 
Moving forward, the work of Hoover’s agency was to take on a more global nature. He 
noted that, while some of the postwar food problems, such as those facing northern 
Russia, were beyond the capacity of the United States to solve, Americans had to 
continue saving food. “We must realize,” noted Hoover, “that the specter of famine 
abroad now haunts the abundance of our table at home.” And while the Food 
Administration was viewed as being only a wartime measure, Hoover claimed that he 
and his agency were the only ones equipped to continue the needed work of stimulating 
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and guiding Americans in the task of postwar food conservation. In addition to the moral 
aspects of continued conservation, Hoover stressed the political aspects of the postwar 
global food situation. Americans were told that failure to successfully feed war-torn 
Europe could have broader ramifications. “If we value our own safety and the social 
organization of the world, if we value the preservation of civilization itself,” claimed 
Hoover, “we cannot sit idly by and see the growth of this cancer in the world’s vitals; 
famine is the mother of anarchy.”36
Much like they had done during the autumn of 1917, the Food Administration 
organized a massive week-long pubic awareness campaign towards the end of 1918. 
Called “Food Conservation Week for World Relief,” it was to be held in early December 
and would present this new phase of propaganda to the American public. Additionally, 
like earlier publicity efforts, the central office in Washington would provide the general 
guidelines, while the specific details would be handled at the the local level by Food 
Administration representatives. The federal agency began preliminary work for the 
campaign in mid-November, as Food Administration officials met with state assemblies 
and legislatures across the nation. Meetings were then held at the county level the 
following week, with Food Administration representatives meeting with prominent local 
business and political leaders to “conduct word of mouth propaganda.” It is clear that 
the government was determined to assure that all people and institutions involved with 
the propaganda campaign were on the same page with regards to messaging. In order 
to reach as many Americans as possible with this new message, the Food 
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Administration would once again call on the nation’s churches, libraries, and schools to 
engage with, and educate, the public on this new dimension of food conservation.37
In announcing the upcoming campaign, the Food Administration declared at the 
end of November in a press release that “every medium of reaching the American 
people” would be utilized to “bring before the public the change from a war basis to a 
world relief basis.” Put another way, the goal of the government’s propaganda shifted 
from cultivating a “war conscience” among the American public to developing a national 
“world conscience.” Conserving food was once again presented as an opportunity for 
the United States, one whereby the true spirit of American democracy could be 
witnessed by the entire world, including those recently released from “German 
oppression.” This would also mean providing assistance to people with which the U.S. 
was just recently waging war upon. Hoover shared with the American public that he, 
along with most of the nation, had mixed feelings about this prospect. However, he also 
stressed that the objective was not to provide full and complete relief for the former 
enemy, but to provide just enough aide to help prevent social and political upheaval. 
Additionally, the Food Administration claimed that only by feeding the starving people of 
Europe and beyond would the United States be able to establish its ideals on a global 
scale. Now that Germany and its allies had been defeated, a new enemy presented 
itself. Americans now had to send food overseas to prevent social and political 
upheaval. It was predicted that ten million deaths over the next year could result from 
the food crisis. One newspaper editorial quoted a Food Administration official who had 
claimed that by December of 1918 nearly every child in Poland under the age of seven 
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had died from a lack of proper nourishment. Hoover proclaimed that the whole of 
Europe could experience the same fate as czarist Russia. “The red scourge of 
revolution,” asserted the Food Administration leader, “is bound to spread.” Much like 
previous campaigns from Hoover’s agency, the “Conservation Week for World Relief” 
was to consist of various meetings and assemblies across all levels of society, each 
either headed by or directed by representatives of the agency.  38
During certain days of the week, specific social institutions were to be the focal 
point of government food conservation propaganda. On Sunday, the first of December, 
the nation’s churches were to kick off the campaign by making food conservation the 
focal point of their services. Every church in America was to receive a special message 
from Herbert Hoover, which was to be read to the congregation and serve as a basis for 
discussion. Such interaction was to “be reinforced by fresh cables from Europe” 
describing the dire food situation facing the people of the war-torn regions. On Tuesday, 
the plan was to hold coordinated public meetings at the local level, to be led by a Food 
Administration county representative. Wednesday was “Women’s Organization Day,” in 
which local women’s groups were to meet with government officials to discuss and 
promote further food conservation. Finally, the focus on Friday of Conservation Week 
was the nation’s schools and libraries.   39
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The Food Administration reached out to the nation’s libraries with its new 
message of global relief as early as mid-November when it asked them to “use every 
means of publicity at their disposal to carry this message into American homes.” Hoover 
himself reached out to the nation’s librarians in a letter published nationwide in various 
library bulletins. He began by thanking the librarians for their work to date, but also 
stressed that, despite the looming ending of the war, the work continued. “Your carefully 
prepared exhibits,” wrote Hoover, “have awakened many a thoughtless person to an 
intelligent interest in the part that food must play in winning the war.” It was now up to 
libraries to help explain the postwar food needs of the world, and the essential role 
Americans would play in fulfilling those needs. Within a week the offices in D.C. began 
coordinating with state-level Library Directors. They were instructed to engage 
immediately with local libraries to ensure their cooperation with the upcoming campaign. 
On the day set aside for libraries during “Conservation Week for World Relief,” each 
librarian was to gather staff and read to them Hoover’s message. Local libraries were 
also assured that updated materials reflecting the new program, such as a poster that 
stated “Teach Us to Share,” were being sent directly. The Food Administration also 
provided ten specific tips libraries could follow to help with the campaign while the 
specifics for the program of early December were still being worked out. These included 
giving prominent space to Food Administration materials already on hand and 
sponsoring talks on global food issues.40
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Libraries were also encouraged to hold specialized “Story Hours” for children 
throughout the month of December and specifically during the Conservation Week for 
World Relief. A Christmas-themed story produced by the Food Administration was 
distributed to libraries to use for this purpose. The “Christmas Story” once again 
provides a brief overview of the entire conflict in western Europe, focusing on the plight 
of Belgium and its experience with German occupation. It described the origins of the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium, its mission, and leadership at the hands of Hoover. It 
then went over the origins of the Food Administration and briefly discussed its wartime 
program. The story concludes by emphasizing the continued need for food conservation 
after the war and ends with a message from Hoover himself directed at the children of 
America. The words reflect the continued desire of Food Administration officials to 
shape, even among the nation’s youth, the thoughts and actions of its citizens. In this 
particular case, the moral aspects of food conservation are stressed:
It is It is a fine thing that even children can do their part in helping 
to save starving people and the best gift children can give this 
year is the promise that they will help by eating cheerfully the 
simple food their mothers give them and that they will not ask for 
care and paid and candy when babies across the sea 
have only hard, dry bread. By this pledge each little patriot will 
help the Food Administrator for America to save food for those 
who have no happy home, no quiet, pressures country and no 
food but that we save and send them.41
In addition to the nation’s libraries, the country’s schools were also once again 
aggressively targeted by the Food Administration as a setting that would be used to 
reach children with the updated message of food conservation. Government officials still 
regarded the task of getting Americans to conserve food after the war as “almost 
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altogether an educational one.” Olin Templin, the head of the Food Administration’s 
School and College Section, noted in mid-November that the end of the war had come 
unexpectedly quickly and expressed a level of uncertainty with how things would 
proceed as far as work with the nation’s schools regarding food conservation 
propaganda. While Templin expressed an appreciation for the need for continued 
conservation, the fact that the primary goal of creating a “war conscience” among the 
American people had given way to generating a “world conscience” was a source of 
frustration. Two of the five school books (one geared for colleges and the other for 
secondary schools) that had been developed by the Food Administration had already 
been produced and thus failed to reflect this change in messaging. A third, geared 
towards elementary school students and entitled Food Saving and Sharing, was about 
to be published, while the future of the two yet-unpublished books was up in the air, 
although it was clear that the Food Administration would have no part in their 
production.42
Templin and the Food Administration appeared to do little more than send a few 
form letters to the nation’s colleges and universities requesting their continued support 
for the government conservation program while stressing more the global humanitarian 
dimensions of the problem. However, when it came to American primary and secondary 
schools, they seemed to be much more engaged. Food Administration was able to 
modify the content of Food Saving and Sharing before it went to press to reflect the new 
outlook on the government’s food conservation propaganda. A full-page copy of the the 
“Hunger Map of Europe” was placed at the front of the book, while a brief message from 
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Herbert Hoover to the “Girls and Boys of America” was included in the forward. In this 
message the Food Administration head appeals directly to the nations youth to help 
“save the world from famine.” Also in the forward, was a poem by Sarah Louise Arnold 
entitled “Grace at the Table.” It included the following stanza: 
As we gather to be fed
Nations plead for daily bread,—
Fighting son and anguished mother,
Orphaned children,— all together
Pray to thee for daily bread.
At Thy common table, Father,
Ask we all for daily bread.
Additionally, the last two chapters of the book, “What We Have Yet to Do” and “The Little 
Group of One,” also stressed the new emphasis on food conservation as a global relief 
effort and on the concept of the United States leading the efforts to bring comfort and 
stability to the postwar world.43
By the end of November, the Food Administration had prepared a detailed 
program for the nation’s schools to follow for their designated day during the 
Conservation Week of World Relief. Copies of the program were distributed to every 
public school system in the nation. It began with a message to teachers from Templin 
who warned that “victory may yet be turned into disaster if intelligence and good will do 
not intervene.” Claiming that children have a special capacity to appreciate the global 
dimensions of the food crisis since “the world is soon to be theirs,” Templin urged 
teachers to “embrace this opportunity of enlightening and enlisting the young people” 
they oversee. The program itself was referred to by the Food Administration as a 
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“patriotic program,” declaring that all students “should share his country’s desire to 
establish and maintain Liberty and Peace throughout the world.” The major slogan to be 
repeated in schools around the country was: “Fighting Famine Over There; Saving, 
Sharing, Over Here.” School officials were urged to organize a “bright, snappy program, 
lasting at least an hour,” where students could “sing patriotic songs, salute the flag, and 
repeat slogans.” They were told to present a short play that emphasized the concept of 
the “common table.” In addition, posters illustrating the “Hunger Map of Europe” and the 
“Food Map of the World” were to be put on display in the halls and the classrooms. 
Schools were also instructed to promote local foods with the day’s lunch, as well as take 
the opportunity to incorporate the government’s message into the normal curriculum. 
For instance, the Food Administration suggested that social studies classes could focus 
on the economic and political dimensions of the postwar global food crisis, while biology 
classes might present nutrition facts.  44
Finally, the government provided to all schools, “The Home Message From Uncle 
Sam,” which was a pledge that all students were to sign and take home to their families. 
The text of the pledge were as follows:
You have been saying “Food Will Win the War.” You planted, you 
saved, and you shared, until the war was won. And now is your 
work ended? No. A greater work yet remains to be done. Starving 
Europe must be fed. Millions of hungry women and children reach 
out their hands to you. Remember their fearful need. Keep on 
saving. Keep on sharing. Waste not one morsel of food. It is sacred. 
You love your country. You have proved it in war; prove it now in 
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peace. America is pledged to fight Famine, and feed a starving 
world. Will you do your part? - A Messenger for Uncle Sam.      45
Even after the week-long campaign had ended the Food Administration continued to 
stress the importance of creating a school curriculum that promoted the “study of food, 
food values, and the food problem of the future in general.” It its Food Saving and 
Sharing text as a means to supplement such course work. It was clear that the 
government officials and experts who made up the Food Administration envisioned a 
future where the lessons of efficient conservation and intelligent consumption would 
continue to inform American food behaviors long after the immediate crisis was solved. 
“One of the most impressive of the lessons of the war,” wrote one Food Administration 
official, “is the necessity of every one know more about food.”  46
As 1918 came to an end, the government was still pressing the urgent need for 
continued food conservation amongst the American people. “The whole food program 
has been changed,” noted one Food Administration official, “from a war basis to a 
humanitarian or relief basis.” While the end of the conflict had opened up opportunities 
for other parts of the world, such as South America and the Far East, to step in and help 
with food relief, tens of millions of new people recently liberated needed to be fed. By 
this time Hoover, as well as the U.S. Food Administration offices, had been transferred 
to Europe to “study the actual needs” and deal more directly with the problem of food 
production and distribution in the war-torn areas. However, despite such rhetoric, it does 
not appear that the Food Administration engaged in any further propaganda campaigns 
 USFA, “Program For Schools, Friday, December 6th, 1918, Food Conservation Week for World Relief,” 45
November 1918, Box 374, Folder 3, USFA Records, Hoover Institution.
 Olin Templin to Educational Periodicals, December 19, 1918, Box 374, Folder 3, USFA Records, 46
Hoover Institution.
 188
after the start of the new year. In December, a group of Administration officials 
expressed a fear that a public backlash against the agency would result from recent 
changes in messages about conservation. By that time specific instructions concerning 
the type and amounts of certain foods had been replaced by general appeals to cut 
back on all food consumption. Additionally, the government removed completely 
suggested restrictions on foodstuffs such as wheat and sugar, while updated home 
cards were planned but perpetually postponed until they ended up on the permanent 
back burner. All of these developments no doubt contributed to an overall lack of 
engagement from the public by the start of 1919, and by this time the agency itself was 
in the process of being dismantled. The United States Food Administration ended the 
wartime controls on production and distribution immediately after the Armistice on 
November 11, 1918. As was noted above, the conservation program died down 
between November and December of that year, and the Food Administration was 
completely abolished by Executive Order 3320 on August 21, 1920. Although it had 
ceased to exist as an active institution, its influence on the way Americans thought 
about food, and its role in the world, would persist. A great deal of importance was 
placed upon conveying the international scope of the food problem in Food 
Administration propaganda. U.S. food control officials, with the careful cooperation of 
their Allied counterparts, attempted to show Americans that their food behaviors had 
global consequences. These actions not only changed the way people ate, but also 
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signaled a significant change in the relationship between the people and their 
government.  47
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Conclusion
By the end of 1918, the presence of the U.S. Food Administration in America had 
all but disappeared. Reflecting this shift away from domestic food conservation 
measures, Hoover himself left for Europe on November 16th to focus his attention and 
energy on relief for the war-torn region. The domestic food conservation offices of the 
agency were dismantled throughout the month of December, while the other aspects of 
Food Administration responsibilities were abandoned via various actions from both the 
president and Congress throughout the first half of 1919. In July, Herbert Hoover 
officially resigned as head of the Food Administration, and at that point the wartime 
agency ceased to exist.  1
Despite the conflicts that arose in the creation of the Food Administration, and 
the subsequent frustrations that officials encountered in their attempts to achieve one 
hundred percent buy-in from the American public, by most accounts the agency 
succeeded in achieving the stated goal of increasing food exports to the soldiers and 
citizens experiencing the Great War in Europe first-hand. A simple assessment of the 
general outcomes of the conflict suggests that American food control policy was a 
success. First, the United States and its allies defeated Germany, and while it might be 
difficult to assess the exact level of importance food played in the ultimate outcome, it 
certainly had a role. Secondly, the American government through the Food 
Administration was able to, at lest on some level, implement its program without any 
significant level of resistance or social unrest. This is particularly notable given the 
growing concern over food prices, and the actual episodes of protest, in the months 
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leading up to American involvement in the war. In 1920 Hoover, looking back at these 
accomplishments, asserted that “the Allies would have starved” if food exports had 
remained at their prewar levels. He confidently proclaimed that, in addition to the impact 
of America’s military contribution, “the organization and expenditure of our food 
resources contributed no less to winning the war.”  2
In terms of specific outcomes reflected in the numbers of wartime food 
production and exports, the results also suggest that the Food Administration had a 
positive impact. In terms of the stimulation of production, the amount of harvested 
acreage in the United States by the end of the war compared to the year prior to 
American involvement increased by nearly thirty million. The three-year average of net 
exports of all food and animal feed for the United States in the years immediately 
preceding American involvement in the war was just over six million tons. That figure 
rose to over fifteen million in 1917 and then to over eighteen million in 1918. By 1918 
over ninety-four percent of the two hundred and thirty million bushels of bread grains 
exported were shipped to the Allies. Hoover also claimed that the government’s price 
controls were overall successful given both the prewar concerns over food prices and 
the inflationary pressures that commonly come with war. From the time the United 
States entered the war until the Food Administration was dissolved, retail prices for food 
increased approximately twenty-five percent. Further, Hoover claimed that there were 
no episodes of famine, either local or widespread, nor the presence of black markets. 
The head of the Food Administration was also keen to stress that the agency neither 
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abused its powers or misused public funds in carrying out its program. The Food 
Administration avoided “evil consequences to American life” and was never charged 
with malfeasance despite taking on unprecedented control over the nation’s food supply 
and handling over seven billion dollars in transactions. Finally, through its activities in 
coordinating the production, distribution, and trade of staple foodstuffs, the Food 
Administration, rather than costing the American public money, actually returned a $50 
million profit to the government. In almost every measurable way, the Food 
Administration represented for Hoover the perfect example of how the power of 
government could be used to positively shape society.   3
Upon completing his public service, Hoover returned to food distribution in the 
private sector by remaining in Europe to work for the American Relief Administration.  
While Hoover moved on, his legacy and that of the Food Administration were lasting.  
They can both be seen as a byproduct of Progressive Era thinking, in which a proactive 
federal government, reliant on the advice and direction of experts in areas such as 
science, engineering, home economics and advertising, worked to influence and 
change the habits of the American people by stressing such themes as patriotism, 
efficiency and good health.  The overall success of the food conservation program no 
doubt confirmed Hoover’s strong belief in the ability of an informed public to solve 
complex social problems through “voluntary cooperation.” One can see how this 
experience would shape President Hoover’s response to the economic crisis he would 
face in 1929. However, the complexity and scope of the Great Depression was much 
greater than the food crisis of World War I, and the reliance on “voluntary cooperation” 
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to solve the economic catastrophe proved wholly inadequate. Armed with a wealth of 
information from these professionals, the Food Administration initiated a program during 
the war that involved close interaction with a number of private media outlets in order to 
covey their carefully crafted message to the American public.  In addition, a great deal 
of importance was placed upon conveying the international scope of the food problem. 
U.S. food control officials, with the careful cooperation of their Allied counterparts, 
attempted to show Americans that their food behaviors had global consequences. 
These actions not only changed the way people ate, but also signaled a significant 
change in the relationship between the people and their government.4
The U.S. Food Administration during World War I laid the groundwork, and 
prepared the American public, for much more drastic mandatory rationing that was 
implemented by the U.S. government during the World War II. In her cultural study of 
wartime government food control during this second great global conflict of the twentieth 
century, Amy Bentley finds that the Office of Price Administration, utilizing much of the 
same rhetoric and imagery of patriotism and sacrifice that was used by the Food 
Administration, was able to implement a much more aggressive form of food control 
without any more resistance than appeared to exist during World War I. Of course, 
differences in overall public acceptance of American involvement in each of the wars 
(especially after the attach on Pearl Harbor in 1941) should be considered, but the 
influence of the Food Administration on public attitudes towards subsequent 
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government control of consumption should also be appreciated. Even beyond wartime 
government involvement in shaping American food choices, the efforts of the U.S. Food 
Administration should also be looked at as a key factor in growing presence of 
government recommendations and policies (at all levels) aimed at guiding the dietary 
behaviors of the people. In her seminal study of the politics of food in modern American 
society, Marion Nestle examines how the government, in the name of informing the 
public on healthy eating habits, has made tools such as the nutritional food label and 
the Food Guide Pyramid commonplace in American food culture. The aims and 
motivations of such governmental actions can be traced directly back to the ideas that 
guided the messages generated by U.S. Food Administration propaganda during World 
War I.5
Aspects about the Food Administration’s propaganda that emphasized a more 
rational or scientific approach to eating have had an even broader impact in shaping 
modern American food culture. Modern American food culture is tightly linked to the 
epidemic of obesity present in society, as well as to its connection to associated health 
problems and diseases. The fact that the growth in chronic, dietary-related diseases has 
coincided with an increasingly deep and sophisticated understanding of the science 
behind food is something that journalist and American food culture critic Michael Pollan 
has called the “American Paradox.” In other words, the more we worry about and study 
nutrition from a scientific perspective, the less healthy as a society we seem to become. 
Pollan contends that a major factor contributing to this phenomenon is what he and 
 Amy Bentley, Eating for Victory: Food Rationing and the Politics of Domesticity (Urbana: University of 5
Illinois Press, 1998), 13-33; Marion Nestle, Food Politics: How the Food Industry Influences Nutrition and 
Health (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 2-50.
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other scholars term “nutritionism.” Nutritionism describes an ideology that believes that 
the key to understanding food is its nutrients. Any cultural or traditional meaning for food 
is stripped in favor of this reductionist view. Thus, according to Pollan, the true value of 
food is microscopic and thus invisible to the average person. The result has been an 
increasing reliance on experts to tell people what to eat, and the messages that are sent 
out are often complex and contradictory. By having an emotional detachment from their 
food choices, people are often more prone to abandon common sense and make poor 
decisions.  6
According to Pollan, the process that has made “nutritionism” the guiding 
ideology of modern American food culture has been driven by efforts from various social 
institutions over the course of the twentieth century, including the government, the 
scientific community, and the food and advertising industries. The convergence of these 
three entities can first be seen in American society all the way back in 1917 when the 
U.S. Government, under the guidance of President Wilson and Herbert Hoover, took on 
the task of shaping the way Americans ate during World War I.7
 Michael Pollan, In Defense of Food: An Eater’s Manifesto (New York: Penguin Books, 2008) 17-82.6
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